2,710 research outputs found

    Accumulation is late and brief in preferential choice

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    Preferential choices are often explained using models within the evidence accumulation framework: value drives the drift rate at which evidence is accumulated until a threshold is reached and an option is chosen. Although rarely stated explicitly, almost all such models assume that decision makers have knowledge at the onset of the choice of all available attributes and options. In reality however, choice information is viewed piece-by-piece, and is often not completely acquired until late in the choice, if at all. Across four eye-tracking experiments, we show that whether the information was acquired early or late is irrelevant in predicting choice: all that matters is whether or not it was acquired at all. Models with potential alternative assumptions were posited and tested, such as 1) accumulation of instantaneously available information or 2) running estimates as information is acquired. These provided poor fits to the data. We are forced to conclude that participants either are clairvoyant, accumulating using information before they have looked at it, or delay accumulating evidence until very late in the choice, so late that the majority of choice time is not time in which evidence is accumulated. Thus, although the evidence accumulation framework may still be useful in measurement models, it cannot account for the details of the processes involved in decision making

    Equity-Efficiency Optimizing Resource Allocation: The Role of Time Preferences in a Repeated Irrigation Game

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    We study repeated water allocation decisions among small scale irrigation users in Tanzania. In a treatment replicating water scarcity conditions, convexities in production make that substantial efficiency gains can be obtained by deviating from equal sharing, leading to an equity–efficiency trade-off. In a repeated game setting, it becomes possible to reconcile efficiency with equity by rotating the person who receives the largest share, but such a strategy requires a longer run perspective. Correlating experimental data from an irrigation game with individual time preference data, we find that less patient irrigators are less likely to use a rotation strategy

    Ligation of protease-activated receptor 1 enhances alpha(v)beta(6) integrin-dependent TGF-beta activation and promotes acute lung injury

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    Activation of latent TGF-beta by the alpha(v)beta(6) integrin is a critical step in the development of acute lung injury. However, the mechanism by which a alpha(v)beta(6)-mediated TGF-beta activation is regulated has not been identified. We show that thrombin, and other agonists of protease-activated receptor 1(PAR1), activate TGF-beta in an alpha(v)beta(6) integrin-specific manner. This effect is PART specific and is mediated by RhoA and Rho kinase. Intratracheal instillation of the PART-specific peptide TFLLRN increases lung edema during high-tidal-volume ventilation, and this effect is completely inhibited by a blocking antibody against the alpha(v)beta(6) integrin. Instillation of TFLLRN during high-tidal-volume ventilation is associated with increased pulmonary TGF-beta activation; however, this is not observed in Itgb6(-/-) mice. Furthermore, Itgb6(-/-) mice are also protected from ventilator-induced lung edema. We also demonstrate that pulmonary edema and TGF-beta activity are similarly reduced in Par1(-/-) mice following bleomycin-induced lung injury. These results suggest that PART-mediated enhancement of a alpha(v)beta(6)-dependent TGF-beta activation could be one mechanism by which activation of the coagulation cascade contributes to the development of acute lung injury, and they identify PART and the alpha(v)beta(6) integrin as potential therapeutic targets in this condition

    Game theory of mind

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    This paper introduces a model of ‘theory of mind’, namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a ‘game theory of mind’. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a ‘stag-hunt’. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution

    Developments in data for economic research

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    0info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

    Accumulation is late and brief in preferential choice

    Get PDF
    Preferential choices are often explained using models within the evidence accumulation framework: value drives the drift rate at which evidence is accumulated until a threshold is reached and an option is chosen. Although rarely stated explicitly, almost all such models assume that decision makers have knowledge at the onset of the choice of all available attributes and options. In reality however, choice information is viewed piece-by-piece, and is often not completely acquired until late in the choice, if at all. Across four eye-tracking experiments, we show that whether the information was acquired early or late is irrelevant in predicting choice: all that matters is whether or not it was acquired at all. Models with potential alternative assumptions were posited and tested, such as 1) accumulation of instantaneously available information or 2) running estimates as information is acquired. These provided poor fits to the data. We are forced to conclude that participants either are clairvoyant, accumulating using information before they have looked at it, or delay accumulating evidence until very late in the choice, so late that the majority of choice time is not time in which evidence is accumulated. Thus, although the evidence accumulation framework may still be useful in measurement models, it cannot account for the details of the processes involved in decision making

    Expression of Protease-Activated Receptor 1 and 2 and Anti-Tubulogenic Activity of Protease-Activated Receptor 1 in Human Endothelial Colony-Forming Cells

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    Endothelial colony-forming cells (ECFCs) are obtained from the culture of human peripheral blood mononuclear cell (hPBMNC) fractions and are characterised by high proliferative and pro-vasculogenic potential, which makes them of great interest for cell therapy. Here, we describe the detection of protease-activated receptor (PAR) 1 and 2 amongst the surface proteins expressed in ECFCs. Both receptors are functionally coupled to extracellular signal-regulated kinase (ERK) 1 and 2, which become activated and phosphorylated in response to selective PAR1- or PAR2-activating peptides. Specific stimulation of PAR1, but not PAR2, significantly inhibits capillary-like tube formation by ECFCs in vitro, suggesting that tubulogenesis is negatively regulated by proteases able to stimulate PAR1 (e.g. thrombin). The activation of ERKs is not involved in the regulation of tubulogenesis in vitro, as suggested by use of the MEK inhibitor PD98059 and by the fact that PAR2 stimulation activates ERKs without affecting capillary tube formation. Both qPCR and immunoblotting showed a significant downregulation of vascular endothelial growth factor 2 (VEGFR2) in response to PAR1 stimulation. Moreover, the addition of VEGF (50–100 ng/ml) but not basic Fibroblast Growth Factor (FGF) (25–100 ng/ml) rescued tube formation by ECFCs treated with PAR1-activating peptide. Therefore, we propose that reduction of VEGF responsiveness resulting from down-regulation of VEGFR2 is underlying the anti-tubulogenic effect of PAR1 activation. Although the role of PAR2 remains elusive, this study sheds new light on the regulation of the vasculogenic activity of ECFCs and suggests a potential link between adult vasculogenesis and the coagulation cascade

    Criticality and finite size effects in a simple realistic model of stock market

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    We discuss a simple model based on the Minority Game which reproduces the main stylized facts of anomalous fluctuations in finance. We present the analytic solution of the model in the thermodynamic limit and show that stylized facts arise only close to a line of critical points with non-trivial properties. By a simple argument, we show that, in Minority Games, the emergence of critical fluctuations close to the phase transition is governed by the interplay between the signal to noise ratio and the system size. These results provide a clear and consistent picture of financial markets as critical systems.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

    Comonotonic Independence: The Critical Test between Classical and Rank-Dependent Utility Theories

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    This article compares classical expected utility (EU) with the more general rank-dependent utility (RDU) models. The difference between the independence condition for preferences of EU and its comonotonic generalization in RDU provides the exact demarcation between EU and rank-dependent models. Other axiomatic differences are not essential. An experimental design is described that tests this difference between independence and comonotonic independence in its most basic form and is robust against violations of other assumptions that may confound the results, in particular the reduction principle and transitivity. It is well known that in the classical counterexamples to EU, comonotonic independence performs better than full-force independence. For our more general choice pairs, however, we find that comonotonic independence does not perform better. This is contrary to our prior expectation and suggests that rank-dependent models, in full generality, do not provide a descriptive improvement over EU. For rank-dependent models to have a future, submodels and choice situations need to be identified for which rank-dependence does contribute descriptively
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