Leila S. Talani, The Arab Spring in the Global Political Economy

Book Revie

Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome Virus: Origin Hypothesis

Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome is a serious swine disease that appeared suddenly in the midwestern United States and central Europe approximately 14 years ago; the disease has now spread worldwide. In North America and Europe, the syndrome is caused by two genotypes of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV), an arterivirus whose genomes diverge by approximately 40%. My hypothesis, which explains the origin and evolution of the two distinct PRRSV genotypes, is that a mutant of a closely related arterivirus of mice (lactate dehydrogenase-elevating virus) infected wild boars in central Europe. These wild boars functioned as intermediate hosts and spread the virus to North Carolina in imported, infected European wild boars in 1912; the virus then evolved independently on the two continents in the prevalent wild hog populations for approximately 70 years until independently entering the domestic pig population

Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) infection spreads by cell-to-cell transfer in cultured MARC-145 cells, is dependent on an intact cytoskeleton, and is suppressed by drug-targeting of cell permissiveness to virus infection

BACKGROUND: Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) is the etiologic agent of PRRS, causing widespread chronic infections which are largely uncontrolled by currently available vaccines or other antiviral measures. Cultured monkey kidney (MARC-145) cells provide an important tool for the study of PRRSV replication. For the present study, flow cytometric and fluorescence antibody (FA) analyses of PRRSV infection of cultured MARC-145 cells were carried out in experiments designed to clarify viral dynamics and the mechanism of viral spread. The roles of viral permissiveness and the cytoskeleton in PRRSV infection and transmission were examined in conjunction with antiviral and cytotoxic drugs. RESULTS: Flow cytometric and FA analyses of PRRSV antigen expression revealed distinct primary and secondary phases of MARC-145 cell infection. PRRSV antigen was randomly expressed in a few percent of cells during the primary phase of infection (up to about 20–22 h p.i.), but the logarithmic infection phase (days 2–3 p.i.), was characterized by secondary spread to clusters of infected cells. The formation of secondary clusters of PRRSV-infected cells preceded the development of CPE in MARC-145 cells, and both primary and secondary PRRSV infection were inhibited by colchicine and cytochalasin D, demonstrating a critical role of the cytoskeleton in viral permissiveness as well as cell-to-cell transmission from a subpopulation of cells permissive for free virus to secondary targets. Cellular expression of actin also appeared to correlate with PRRSV resistance, suggesting a second role of the actin cytoskeleton as a potential barrier to cell-to-cell transmission. PRRSV infection and cell-to-cell transmission were efficiently suppressed by interferon-γ (IFN-γ), as well as the more-potent experimental antiviral agent AK-2. CONCLUSION: The results demonstrate two distinct mechanisms of PRRSV infection: primary infection of a relatively small subpopulation of innately PRRSV-permissive cells, and secondary cell-to-cell transmission to contiguous cells which appear non-permissive to free virus. The results also indicate that an intact cytoskeleton is critical for PRRSV infection, and that viral permissiveness is a highly efficient drug target to control PRRSV infection. The data from this experimental system have important implications for the mechanisms of PRRSV persistence and pathology, as well as for a better understanding of arterivirus regulation

The uncertain (re)politicisation of fiscal relations in Europe: a shift in EMU's modes of governance

Europe's numerous fiscal crises – 2003 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) crisis, its subsequent 2005 reforms, and the recent sovereign debt woes – draw attention to a shift in the management of EMU; namely the inclusion of more uncertainty-based governance. Understood as modalities of government, risk, and uncertainty make the production of this fiscal-monetary space intelligible as a recognised form of knowledge and object of government. Whereas the Pact was devised as the anchor for EMU, it has come to symbolise its weakness. This article argues that the result is an antagonistic relationship between the programmatic and operational dimensions of fiscal governance; otherwise seen as a dialectic between the two competing domains of expertise/law and politics. Starting with the 2005 SGP reforms, and exacerbated by the credit crisis, uncertainty has been mobilised to justify alternative forms of managing fiscal conduct linked to new strategies of calculation and issues of responsibility. Bound to variegated notions of ‘fiscal normality’, I contend that the 2005 reforms signal the (re)politicisation of the budgetary framework and the reconfiguration of the politics of limits. Rather than marginalising informal judgment, the government through uncertainty places a greater emphasis on creative entrepreneurialism in fostering compliance in ways risk does not

The United Kingdoms Eurosceptic political economy

This article explores how a political economy approach can explicate recent events in the United Kingdom’s relation to the European Union. The proposition is that neither critical nor comparative approaches do justice to the extent to which British elites have sought to differentiate the UK from the EU. The UK is here understood as a Eurosceptic political economy, constructed in opposition to European integration and, in particular, Economic and Monetary. The article explores how we have witnessed a hardening of this Eurosceptic political economy in the context of the Eurozone crisis. The most distinctive feature of which, as seen in the referendum campaign, is the extent to which the economic case for withdrawal has been established as part of the mainstream of British political debate

Beyond ‘geo-economics’: advanced unevenness and the anatomy of German austerity

This article aims to shed new light on Germany’s domineering role in the eurocrisis. I argue that the realist-inspired depiction of Germany as a ‘geo-economic power’, locked into zero-sum competition with its European partners, is built around an empty core: unable to theorise how anarchy shapes the calculus of states where security competition has receded, it cannot explain why German state managers have insisted on an austerity response to the crisis despite its significant risks and costs even for Germany itself. To unlock this puzzle, this article outlines a version of uneven and combined development (UCD) that is better able to capture the international pressures and opportunities faced by policy elites in advanced capitalist states that no longer encounter one another as direct security rivals. Applied to Germany, this lens reveals a twofold unevenness in the historical structures and growth cycles of capitalist economies that shape its contradictory choice for austerity. In the long run, the reorientation of the export-dependent German economy from Europe towards Asian and Latin American late industrialisers renders the structural adjustment of the eurozone an opportunity—from the cost-saving view of German manufacturers producing in the European home market for export abroad, as well as for German state officials keen to sustain a crumbling class compromise centred on Germany’s world market success. In the short term, however, its exposed position between the divergent post-crisis trajectories of the US and Europe accelerates pressures for austerity beyond what German state and corporate elites would otherwise consider feasible

‘Axis of evil or access to diesel?: spaces of new imperialism and the Iraq war’

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was waged by the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’. This paper will examine how the war was a space in the ongoing geographical extension of global capitalism linked to U.S. foreign policy. Was it simply the decision by a unitary, hegemonic actor in the inter-state system overriding concerns by other states? Was it an imperialist move to secure the ‘global oil spigot’? Alternatively, did the use of military force reflect the interests and emergence of a transnational state apparatus? In this paper, we argue that the U.S. needs to be conceptualised as a specific form of state, within which and through which national and transnational capital operate to establish the interests of a national fraction of an Atlantic ruling class. It is these processes of class struggle and their relation to wider struggles over spaces of imperialism, which need to be at the centre of analysis

Welche Macht darf es denn Sein? Tracing ‘Power’ in German Foreign Policy Discourse

The relationship between ‘Germany’ and ‘power’ remains a sensitive issue. While observers tend to agree that Germany has regained the status of the most powerful country in Europe, there is debate whether that is to be welcomed or whether that is a problem. Underpinning this debate are views, both within Germany and amongst its neighbours, regarding the kind of power Germany has, or should (not) have. Against this backdrop, the article reviews the dominant role conceptions used in the expert discourse on German foreign policy since the Cold War that depict Germany as a particular type of ‘power’. Specifically, we sketch the evolution of three prominent conceptions (constrained power, civilian power, hegemonic power) and the recent emergence of a new one (shaping power). The article discusses how these labels have emerged to give meaning to Germany’s position in international relations, points to their normative and political function, and to the limited ability of such role images to tell us much about how Germany actually exercises power