Economic Crisis and Fiscal Reforms in Latin America

The recent financial crisis has initiated pressures for not only policy reform but also fundamental institutional fiscal reforms. This paper explores the connection between economic crises and fiscal institutional reforms in a region that has experienced plenty of both in recent years, namely Latin America. For that purpose it reviews the literature and provides five hypotheses about why, and under what circumstances, crises would promote reforms. The empirical evidence shows that debt crises make reforms more likely but banking crises on their own, if anything, reduce the pressure for fiscal institutional reforms. Political institutions are also important. If the electoral system encourages the personal vote, the country is more likely to reform. This evidence may become useful for predicting the likelihood of reforms in the developed world.Information and communications technology, Education, Experimental design, Ecuador

Executive authority, the personal vote, and budget discipline in Latin American and Carribean countries

Recent scholarship on the impact of fiscal institutions on budgeting outcomes in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries indicates that political institutions impact the level of budget discipline. BuiIding upon this previous research, we argue that the principle problem that must be addressed to insure strong fiscal discipline is the common pool resource (CPR) problem. The source of the problem, as well as its solution, differ in the government and in the legislature. At the cabinet level, the CPR problem arises because ministers consider the spending and tax implications of decisions on their ministries (only) instead of on the general population. As Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) indicate, the appropriate solution at the cabinet level depends upon the coalition structure of the government. Given that all LAC countries have either presidential or oneparty parliamentary systems, a strong central player like the finance minister can reduce the CPR problem at the cabinet level. A similar strengthening of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature, in contrast, does not necessarily lead to tighter fiscal discipline. The level of the CPR problem in the legislature depends upon the type of electoral system. If states have open list proportional representation systems, then increases in district magnitude increase the problem, while under closed lists increases in district magnitude decrease the problem. Using a data set of LAC countries for the period 1988-97 and following Carey and Shugart (1995), we create an index for the incentives for the personal vote. We find that executive power in the budget process is most effective in reducing budget deficits when the personal vote is high in the legislature, while strengthening the president (or prime minister) in countries where the personal vote is low in the legislature has no statistically significant effect. This finding has practical implications for the design of fiscal institutions in LAC countries—granting the executive a privileged position vis-à-vis the legislature has beneficial effects on the budget balance only when the CPR problem in the legislature is large. Moreover, an alternative institutional change is to reform a country’s electoral system. The second option may be more feasible in countries where legislators are unlikely to give the president more power, or where dictatorial pasts make populations wary of granting the executive too much authority on any policy area. --

Predictability of Critical Transitions

Critical transitions in multistable systems have been discussed as models for a variety of phenomena ranging from the extinctions of species to socio-economic changes and climate transitions between ice-ages and warm-ages. From bifurcation theory we can expect certain critical transitions to be preceded by a decreased recovery from external perturbations. The consequences of this critical slowing down have been observed as an increase in variance and autocorrelation prior to the transition. However especially in the presence of noise it is not clear, whether these changes in observation variables are statistically relevant such that they could be used as indicators for critical transitions. In this contribution we investigate the predictability of critical transitions in conceptual models. We study the quadratic integrate-and-fire model and the van der Pol model, under the influence of external noise. We focus especially on the statistical analysis of the success of predictions and the overall predictability of the system. The performance of different indicator variables turns out to be dependent on the specific model under study and the conditions of accessing it. Furthermore, we study the influence of the magnitude of transitions on the predictive performance

Understanding and Controlling Regime Switching in Molecular Diffusion

Diffusion can be strongly affected by ballistic flights (long jumps) as well as long-lived sticking trajectories (long sticks). Using statistical inference techniques in the spirit of Granger causality, we investigate the appearance of long jumps and sticks in molecular-dynamics simulations of diffusion in a prototype system, a benzene molecule on a graphite substrate. We find that specific fluctuations in certain, but not all, internal degrees of freedom of the molecule can be linked to either long jumps or sticks. Furthermore, by changing the prevalence of these predictors with an outside influence, the diffusion of the molecule can be controlled. The approach presented in this proof of concept study is very generic, and can be applied to larger and more complex molecules. Additionally, the predictor variables can be chosen in a general way so as to be accessible in experiments, making the method feasible for control of diffusion in applications. Our results also demonstrate that data-mining techniques can be used to investigate the phase-space structure of high-dimensional nonlinear dynamical systems.Comment: accepted for publication by PR

The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries

This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. Empirical evidence for the time period 1985-2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition governments where parties are closely aligned and where political competition among them is low, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions and where parties regularly compete against each other

An Effort to Sample Scientifically the Attitudes of Pastors Toward Alcholism in a Section of the Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod

What attitudes do pastors have toward alcoholics? Specifically, do parish pastors of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod have positive or negative attitudes in their ministry to alcoholics? Are the attitudes of pastors a significant factor in an effective ministry to alcoholics? What attitudinal factors can be specified as having particular significance? These are the fundamental questions which this study addresses

The Doctrine of Scripture in the Light of the Relationship of Inspiration and Inerrancy

This paper is written by one who is a member of the Church catholic, by one who is a Lutheran, and by one who does not necessarily make statement of dogmatic truth the exclusive property of men within the Lutheran tradition. This is said to disparage the Lutheran heritage not at all, but to indicate that one can at least be open to different systematic formulations. The point is also made to indicate to the reader that the student was conscious of his own heritage, but that at the same time both during the research and during the writing of this paper he attempted to prevent this heritage from becoming a bias. And yet the other point must also be made, namely, that the normative function of the Scriptures themselves cannot be lightly dismissed nor heedlessly ignored

Budgetary Forecasts in Europe – The Track Record of Stability and Convergence Programmes

We analyse the performance of budgetary and growth forecasts of all stability and convergence programmes submitted by EU member states over the last decade. Differences emerge for the bias in budgetary projections across countries. As a second step we explore whether economic, political and institutional factors can explain this pattern. Our analysis indicates that the cyclical position and the form of fiscal governance are major determinants of forecast biases. Projected changes in the budgetary position are mainly affected by the cycle, the need of convergence before EMU and by electoral cycles.Fiscal forecasting; forecast evaluation; budget processes; Stability and Growth Pact

How effective and legitimate is the European semester? Increasing role of the European parliament

The European Semester is a new institutional process that provides EU member states with ex-ante guidance on fiscal and structural objectives. The Semesterâ??s goals are ambitious and it is still uncertain how it will fit into the new EU economic governance framework. We find that member states are only slowly internalising the new procedure. Furthermore, the Semester has so far lacked legitimacy due to the minor role assigned to the European Parliament, the marginal involvement of national parliaments and the lack of transparency of the process at some stages. Finally, there remains room to clarify the implications from a unified legal text. In fact, diluting the legal separation of recommendations on National Reform Programmes and Council opinions on Stability and Convergence Programmes may compromise effective surveillance and governance. The European Parliament has an important role to play. It needs hold the Commission and the Council accountable. This and the overall objective of enhancing the new procedureâ??s effectiveness and legitimacy can be done by means of a regular Economic Dialogue on the Semester.

Democratically elected politicians tend to push the cost of financial crises to the future in order to avert unpopularity

Autocracies have traditionally been thought more spendthrift than democracies which manage money prudently in order to maintain favour with the public to whom they are accountable. But is this true? According to Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg, not necessarily, as politicians in democratic polities are more likely to push the costs to the future rather than take a hit in popularity