The impact of relative position and returns on sacrifice and reciprocity: an experimental study using individual decisions

We present a comprehensive experimental design that makes it possible to characterize other-regarding preferences and their relationship to the decision maker’s relative position. Participants are faced with a large number of decisions involving variations in the trade-offs between own and other’s payoffs, as well as in other potentially important factors like the decision maker’s relative position. We find that: (1) choices are responsive to the cost of helping and hurting others; (2) The weight a decision maker places on others’ monetary payoffs depends on whether the decision maker is in an advantageous or disadvantageous relative position; and (3) We find no evidence of reciprocity of the type linked to menu-dependence. The results of a mixture-model estimation show considerable heterogeneity in subjects’ motivations and confirm the absence of reciprocal motives. Pure selfish behavior is the most frequently observed behavior. Among the subjects exhibiting social preferences, social-welfare maximization is the most frequent, followed by inequality-aversion and by competitiveness

Generalization of the Zlámal condition for simplicial finite elements in ℝ d

The famous Zlámal's minimum angle condition has been widely used for construction of a regular family of triangulations (containing nondegenerating triangles) as well as in convergence proofs for the finite element method in 2d. In this paper we present and discuss its generalization to simplicial partitions in any space dimension

The maximum angle condition is not necessary for convergence of the finite element method

We show that the famous maximum angle condition in the finite element analysis is not necessary to achieve the optimal convergence rate when simplicial finite elements are used to solve elliptic problems. This condition is only sufficient. In fact, finite element approximations may converge even though some dihedral angles of simplicial elements tend to π

Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment

The Dixit (Econ J 90:95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (J Econ 27:660–680, 1996) propose a model where, in the unique game-theoretic prediction based on forward induction or iterated elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, the incumbent does not have the strategic advantage. We conduct an experiment with games inspired by these models. In the Dixit-style game, the incumbent monopolizes the market most of the time even without the investment in capacity. In our Bagwell-and-Ramey-style game, the incumbent also tends to keep the market, in contrast to the predictions of an entrant advantage. Nevertheless, we fin strong evidence that forward induction affects the behavior of most participants. The results of our games suggest that players perceive that the firs mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our Bagwell–Ramey game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis and a theoretical framework for dynamics.Publicad

Communication, leadership and coordination failure

We investigate the limits of communication and leadership in avoiding coordination failure in minimum effort games. Our environment is challenging, with low benefits of coordination relative to the effort cost. We consider two leader types: cheap-talk leader-communicators who suggest an effort level, and first-mover leaders who lead by example. Both types of leadership have some ability to increase effort in groups with no history, but are insufficient in groups with a history of low effort. Using the strategy method for followers’ responses, we attribute the persistence of coordination failure to the presence of followers who do not follow the leader

Sequential two-player games with ambiguity

Author's pre-printIf players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster–Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster–Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We argue that our equilibrium can be used to define a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.ESRC senior research fellowship scheme, H5242750259

Accidental Outcomes Guide Punishment in a “Trembling Hand” Game

How do people respond to others' accidental behaviors? Reward and punishment for an accident might depend on the actor's intentions, or instead on the unintended outcomes she brings about. Yet, existing paradigms in experimental economics do not include the possibility of accidental monetary allocations. We explore the balance of outcomes and intentions in a two-player economic game where monetary allocations are made with a “trembling hand”: that is, intentions and outcomes are sometimes mismatched. Player 1 allocates $10 between herself and Player 2 by rolling one of three dice. One die has a high probability of a selfish outcome, another has a high probability of a fair outcome, and the third has a high probability of a generous outcome. Based on Player 1's choice of die, Player 2 can infer her intentions. However, any of the three die can yield any of the three possible outcomes. Player 2 is given the opportunity to respond to Player 1's allocation by adding to or subtracting from Player 1's payoff. We find that Player 2's responses are influenced substantially by the accidental outcome of Player 1's roll of the die. Comparison to control conditions suggests that in contexts where the allocation is at least partially under the control of Player 1, Player 2 will punish Player 1 accountable for unintentional negative outcomes. In addition, Player 2's responses are influenced by Player 1's intention. However, Player 2 tends to modulate his responses substantially more for selfish intentions than for generous intentions. This novel economic game provides new insight into the psychological mechanisms underlying social preferences for fairness and retribution

Cerebral Perfusion and Aortic Stiffness Are Independent Predictors of White Matter Brain Atrophy in Type 1 Diabetic Patients Assessed With Magnetic Resonance Imaging

OBJECTIVE-To identify vascular mechanisms of brain atrophy in type 1 diabetes mellitus (DM) patients by investigating the relationship between brain volumes and cerebral perfusion and aortic stiffness using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS-Approval from the local institutional review board was obtained, and patients gave informed consent. Fifty-one type 1 DM patients (30 men; mean age 44 +/- 11 years; mean DM duration 23 +/- 12 years) and 34 age- and sex-matched healthy control subjects were prospectively enrolled. Exclusion criteria comprised hypertension, stroke, aortic disease, and standard MRI contraindications. White matter (WM) and gray matter (GM) brain volumes, total cerebral blood flow (tCBF), total brain perfusion, and aortic pulse wave velocity (PWV) were assessed using MRI. Multivariable linear regression analysis was used for statistics, with covariates age, sex, mean arterial pressure, BMI, smoking, heart rate, DM duration, and HbA(1c). RESULTS-Both WM and GM brain volumes were decreased in type 1 DM patients compared with control subjects (WM P = 0.04; respective GM P = 0.03). Total brain perfusion was increased in type 1 DM compared with control subjects (beta = -0.219, P < 0.05). Total CBF and aortic PWV predicted WM brain volume (beta = 0.352, P = 0.024 for tCBF; respective beta = 0.458, P = 0.016 for aortic PWV) in type 1 DM. Age was the independent predictor of GM brain volume (beta = -0.695, P < 0.001). CONCLUSIONS-Type 1 DM patients without hypertension showed WM and GM volume loss compared with control subjects concomitant with a relative increased brain perfusion. Total CBF and stiffness of the aorta independently predicted WM brain atrophy in type 1 DM. Only age predicted GM brain atrophy.Cardiovascular Aspects of Radiolog