A ‘threat’ is a ‘Threat’: Incentive effects of firing threats with varying degrees of performance information

We study the incentive effect of firing threats when bosses have limited information about workers. We show that a minimal amount of individual information about workers’ effort such as the time spent at their work station is sufficient to ensure strong incentive effects. This supports the use of firing threats based on rudimentary yet uncontroversial measures of work performance such as absenteeism, in organizational settings in which only limited information about workers is available. Our results help understand the limited link between pay and performance observed in compensation contracts calling for an extension of the principal-agent model to take into account how workers (mis-)perceive the intensity of incentives

Communication, leadership and coordination failure

We investigate the limits of communication and leadership in avoiding coordination failure in minimum effort games. Our environment is challenging, with low benefits of coordination relative to the effort cost. We consider two leader types: cheap-talk leader-communicators who suggest an effort level, and first-mover leaders who lead by example. Both types of leadership have some ability to increase effort in groups with no history, but are insufficient in groups with a history of low effort. Using the strategy method for followers’ responses, we attribute the persistence of coordination failure to the presence of followers who do not follow the leader

Communication, Leadership and Coordination Failure

Using experimental methods, this paper investigates the limits of communication and leadership in aiding group coordination in a minimum effort game. Choosing the highest effort is the payoff dominant Nash equilibrium in this game, and communication and leadership are expected to help in coordinating on such an equilibrium. We consider an environment in which the benefits of coordination are low compared to the cost of mis-coordination. In this environment, players converge to the most inefficient equilibrium in the absence of a leader. We look at two types of leaders: a cheap-talk leader-communicator who suggests an effort level but is free to choose a different level from the one suggested, and a first-mover leader whose choice of effort is observed by the rest of the group. We study whether leadership can prevent coordination failure and whether leadership allows coordination on a higher effort after a history of coordination failure. We find that in this tough environment both types of leadership are insufficient to escape from the low-effort equilibrium but leadership has some (limited) ability to prevent coordination failure. With the help of the strategy method for the followers' responses we find that the main reason for the persistence of coordination failure in this environment is the presence of followers who do not follow (or would not have followed) the leader

Accidental Outcomes Guide Punishment in a “Trembling Hand” Game

How do people respond to others' accidental behaviors? Reward and punishment for an accident might depend on the actor's intentions, or instead on the unintended outcomes she brings about. Yet, existing paradigms in experimental economics do not include the possibility of accidental monetary allocations. We explore the balance of outcomes and intentions in a two-player economic game where monetary allocations are made with a “trembling hand”: that is, intentions and outcomes are sometimes mismatched. Player 1 allocates $10 between herself and Player 2 by rolling one of three dice. One die has a high probability of a selfish outcome, another has a high probability of a fair outcome, and the third has a high probability of a generous outcome. Based on Player 1's choice of die, Player 2 can infer her intentions. However, any of the three die can yield any of the three possible outcomes. Player 2 is given the opportunity to respond to Player 1's allocation by adding to or subtracting from Player 1's payoff. We find that Player 2's responses are influenced substantially by the accidental outcome of Player 1's roll of the die. Comparison to control conditions suggests that in contexts where the allocation is at least partially under the control of Player 1, Player 2 will punish Player 1 accountable for unintentional negative outcomes. In addition, Player 2's responses are influenced by Player 1's intention. However, Player 2 tends to modulate his responses substantially more for selfish intentions than for generous intentions. This novel economic game provides new insight into the psychological mechanisms underlying social preferences for fairness and retribution

Multiple openings and competitiveness of forward markets: experimental evidence

We test the competition enhancing effect of selling forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly with multiple forward markets. We find that having two forward periods yields competitive outcomes and that the results are very close to the predicted theoretical results for both quantity setting duopolies and quadropolies. Our experiments lend strong support to the hypothesis that forward markets are competition enhancing. We then test a new market that allows for endogenously determined indefinitely many forward periods that only close when sellers coordinate on selling a zero amount in a forward market. We find that the outcomes under an endogenous close rule are also very competitive. These results hold for both duopolies and quadropolies

How Worker Participation Affects Reciprocity Under Minimum Remuneration Policies: Experimental Evidence

We analyze the role of worker participation for the success of minimum remuneration policies. In our experiments employers remunerate workers doing a real-effort task. We vary the way how a minimum remuneration policy is introduced. In the worker-participation treatment, workers bargain with the employer on the enforcement of the policy. In the control treatment the policy is exogenously introduced. We find a pronounced effort increase after the policy was enforced. An exogenous introduction has detrimental effects, i.e., employers frequently pay a premium to maintain performance. Thus, worker participation may be an effective means for maintaining reciprocity under minimum remuneration policies

Feasibility of Azacitidine Added to Standard Chemotherapy in Older Patients with Acute Myeloid Leukemia — A Randomised SAL Pilot Study

Introduction: Older patients with acute myeloid leukemia (AML) experience short survival despite intensive chemotherapy. Azacitidine has promising activity in patients with low proliferating AML. The aim of this dose-finding part of this trial was to evaluate feasibility and safety of azacitidine combined with a cytarabine- and daunorubicin-based chemotherapy in older patients with AML. Trial Design: Prospective, randomised, open, phase II trial with parallel group design and fixed sample size. Patients and Methods: Patients aged 61 years or older, with untreated acute myeloid leukemia with a leukocyte count of ,20,000/ml at the time of study entry and adequate organ function were eligible. Patients were randomised to receive azacitidine either 37.5 (dose level 1) or 75 mg/sqm (dose level 2) for five days before each cycle of induction (7+3 cytarabine plus daunorubicine) and consolidation (intermediate-dose cytarabine) therapy. Dose-limiting toxicity was the primary endpoint. Results: Six patients each were randomised into each dose level and evaluable for analysis. No dose-limiting toxicity occurred in either dose level. Nine serious adverse events occurred in five patients (three in the 37.5 mg, two in the 75 mg arm) with two fatal outcomes. Two patients at the 37.5 mg/sqm dose level and four patients at the 75 mg/sqm level achieved a complete remission after induction therapy. Median overall survival was 266 days and median event-free survival 215 days after a median follow up of 616 days. Conclusions: The combination of azacitidine 75 mg/sqm with standard induction therapy is feasible in older patients with AML and was selected as an investigational arm in the randomised controlled part of this phase-II study, which is currently halted due to an increased cardiac toxicity observed in the experimental arm. Trial Registration: This trial is registered at clinical trials.gov (identifier: NCT00915252)