Formal Principles

En este trabajo se defiende la teoría principialista de los derechos fundamentales de las críticas que la acusan de ser incapaz de determinar de forma adecuada la relación entre los derechos fundamentales y el control constitucional, con la democracia. Para llegar a una adecuada teoría de la discrecionalidad legislativa, se necesita analizar el papel de los principios formales en la ponderación. Para ello se defiende un «modelo epistémico» de ponderación entre principios formales y sustanciales que se situaría entre el llamado «modelo sustancial-formal puro» y el «modelo combinado», y que se fundamentaría en la idea de ponderación de segundo orden, incorporando la fiabilidad epistémica en la fórmula del peso.This paper argues in favor of the principle theory of fundamental rights. It is an elaborated reaction against those objections considering the theory not being able to determine the appropriate relation between fundamental rights, constitutional control, and democracy. According to the author, in order to construct an adequate theory of legislative discretion, we must analyze the role that formal principles play in balancing. As a methodological instrument, the author defends an «epistemic model» for the balancing of formal and substantial principles. This model should be considered between the so called «pure substantial-formal model» and «a combined model». The base of this model is to be found in the idea of second order balancing, incorporating the variable of epistemic fidelity in the weight formula

Inclusive Non-Positivism

Partiendo de la distinción entre las dos formas de positivismo y las tres de no-positivismo, sostengo que sólo uno de estos cinco conceptos de derecho es defendible: el no-positivismo incluyente. En el centro de mi argumentación está la tesis de la corrección, la cual establece que el derecho necesariamente formula una pretensión de corrección. Esta tesis implica a su vez la tesis de la naturaleza dual, según la cual el derecho comprende tanto una dimensión real o autoritativa como una dimensión ideal o crítica. La idea de la naturaleza dual del derecho es el fundamento de la fórmula de Radbruch. Ésta señala, en su formulación más simple, que la injusticia extrema no es derecho.On the basis of the distinction between two forms of positivism and three forms of non-positivism, I argue that only one of these five concepts of law is defensible: inclusive non-positivism. The basis of my argument is the correctness thesis, which says that law necessarily makes a claim to correctness. The doctrine of correctness implies the dual nature thesis, which says that law comprises a real or authoritative dimension as well as an ideal or critical dimension. The dual nature of law is the basis of the Radbruch formula. It says, in its shortest form, that extreme injustice is not law

La institucionalización de los derechos humanos en el Estado constitucional democrático

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HUMAN DIGNITY AND PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS / A DIGNIDADE HUMANA E A ANÁLISE DA PROPORCIONALIDADE

The relation between proportionality analysis and human dignity is one of the most contested questions in the debate about the normative structure of human dignity. Two conceptions stand in opposition: an absolute and a relative conception. According to the absolute conception, the guarantee of human dignity counts as a norm that takes precedence over all other norms in all cases. Taking precedence over all other norms in all cases implies that balancing is precluded. This, in turn, means that each and every interference with human dignity is a violation of human dignity. Thus, justified interference with human dignity becomes impossible. By contrast, proportionality analysis is intrinsically connected to the distinction between justified and unjustified interferences. A proportional interference is justified and is, therefore, constitutional. The opposite applies in the case of disproportional interference. The absolute conception is incompatible with this conceptual framework. For this reason, it is incompatible with proportionality analysis. According to the relative conception, precisely the opposite is true. The relative conception says that the question of whether human dignity is violated is a question of proportionality. With this, the relative conception is not only compatible with proportionality analysis, it presupposes it

INCLUSIVE NON-POSITIVISM

On the basis of the distinction between two forms of positivism and three forms of non-positivism, I argue that only one of these five concepts of law is defensible: inclusive non-positivism. The basis of my argument is the correctness thesis, which says that law necessarily makes a claim to correctness. The doctrine of correctness implies the dual nature thesis, which says that law comprises a real or authoritative dimension as well as an ideal or critical dimension. The dual nature of law is the basis of the Radbruch formula. It says, in its shortest form, that extreme injustice is not law.Keywords: Inclusive non-positivism. Correctness. Dual nature of law. Injustice

Conceito e validade do Direito

Divulgação dos SUMÁRIOS das obras recentemente incorporadas ao acervo da Biblioteca Ministro Oscar Saraiva do STJ. Em respeito à lei de Direitos Autorais, não disponibilizamos a obra na íntegra.Localização na estante: 340.12 A384c 2.tir