High atmospheric horizontal resolution eliminates the wind-driven coastal warm bias in the southeastern tropical Atlantic

We investigate the strong warm bias in sea surface temperatures (SST) of the southeastern tropical Atlantic that occurs in most of the current global climate models. We analyse this bias in the Max Planck Institute Earth System Model at different horizontal resolutions ranging from 0.1° to 0.4° in the ocean and 0.5° to 1.8° in the atmosphere. High atmospheric horizontal resolution eliminates the SST bias close to the African coast, due to an improved representation of surface wind-stress near the coast. This improvement affects coastal upwelling and horizontal ocean circulation, as confirmed with dedicated sensitivity experiments. The wind-stress improvements are partly caused by the better represented orography at higher horizontal resolution in the spectral atmospheric model. The reductions of the coastal SST bias obtained through higher horizontal resolution do not, however, translate to a reduction of the large-scale bias extending westward from the African coast into the southeastern tropical Atlantic

A note on quantization operators on Nichols algebra model for Schubert calculus on Weyl groups

We give a description of the (small) quantum cohomology ring of the flag variety as a certain commutative subalgebra in the tensor product of the Nichols algebras. Our main result can be considered as a quantum analog of a result by Y. Bazlov

A risk-seeking future

The 2014 IPCC Assessment expresses doubt that the global surface temperature increase will remain within the 2 °C target without deploying risky carbon-capturing or solar radiation-deflecting technologies. New behavioural research suggests that, if the IPCC is right, citizens and policymakers will support such risk-taking

The Joker effect: cooperation driven by destructive agents

Understanding the emergence of cooperation is a central issue in evolutionary game theory. The hardest setup for the attainment of cooperation in a population of individuals is the Public Goods game in which cooperative agents generate a common good at their own expenses, while defectors "free-ride" this good. Eventually this causes the exhaustion of the good, a situation which is bad for everybody. Previous results have shown that introducing reputation, allowing for volunteer participation, punishing defectors, rewarding cooperators or structuring agents, can enhance cooperation. Here we present a model which shows how the introduction of rare, malicious agents -that we term jokers- performing just destructive actions on the other agents induce bursts of cooperation. The appearance of jokers promotes a rock-paper-scissors dynamics, where jokers outbeat defectors and cooperators outperform jokers, which are subsequently invaded by defectors. Thus, paradoxically, the existence of destructive agents acting indiscriminately promotes cooperation.Comment: Accepted for publication in the Journal of Theoretical Biology (JTB

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report

Benevolent characteristics promote cooperative behaviour among humans

Cooperation is fundamental to the evolution of human society. We regularly observe cooperative behaviour in everyday life and in controlled experiments with anonymous people, even though standard economic models predict that they should deviate from the collective interest and act so as to maximise their own individual payoff. However, there is typically heterogeneity across subjects: some may cooperate, while others may not. Since individual factors promoting cooperation could be used by institutions to indirectly prime cooperation, this heterogeneity raises the important question of who these cooperators are. We have conducted a series of experiments to study whether benevolence, defined as a unilateral act of paying a cost to increase the welfare of someone else beyond one's own, is related to cooperation in a subsequent one-shot anonymous Prisoner's dilemma. Contrary to the predictions of the widely used inequity aversion models, we find that benevolence does exist and a large majority of people behave this way. We also find benevolence to be correlated with cooperative behaviour. Finally, we show a causal link between benevolence and cooperation: priming people to think positively about benevolent behaviour makes them significantly more cooperative than priming them to think malevolently. Thus benevolent people exist and cooperate more

Disordered Environments in Spatial Games

The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in heterogeneous ecosystems in spatial evolutionary games by considering site diluted lattices. The main result is that due to disorder, the fraction of cooperators in the population is enhanced. Moreover, the system presents a dynamical transition at $\rho^*$, separating a region with spatial chaos from one with localized, stable groups of cooperators.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure

Images of Eyes Enhance Investments in a Real-Life Public Good

A key issue in cooperation research is to determine the conditions under which individuals invest in a public good. Here, we tested whether cues of being watched increase investments in an anonymous public good situation in real life. We examined whether individuals would invest more by removing experimentally placed garbage (paper and plastic bottles) from bus stop benches in Geneva in the presence of images of eyes compared to controls (images of flowers). We provided separate bins for each of both types of garbage to investigate whether individuals would deposit more items into the appropriate bin in the presence of eyes. The treatment had no effect on the likelihood that individuals present at the bus stop would remove garbage. However, those individuals that engaged in garbage clearing, and were thus likely affected by the treatment, invested more time to do so in the presence of eyes. Images of eyes had a direct effect on behaviour, rather than merely enhancing attention towards a symbolic sign requesting removal of garbage. These findings show that simple images of eyes can trigger reputational effects that significantly enhance on non-monetary investments in anonymous public goods under real life conditions. We discuss our results in the light of previous findings and suggest that human social behaviour may often be shaped by relatively simple and potentially unconscious mechanisms instead of very complex cognitive capacities

Incomplete Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment

Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation

In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner's Dilemma as a model for social interactions. Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We find that the aggregate cooperation level is practically unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be affected by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we find two distinct types of behavior, one of reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artificially fake their reputation in almost every interaction.A. A. gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (under grants no. 200020-143224, CR13I1-138032 and P2LAP1-161864) and by the Rectors’ Conference of the Swiss Universities (under grant no. 26058983). All authors acknowledge financial support to carry out the experiments by the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of Lausanne and the fundamental support by Prof. Rafael Lalive. This work has been supported in part by the European Commission through FET Open RIA 662725 (IBSEN) and by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under grant FIS2015-64349-P (VARIANCE)