Gender Variations of Physiological and Psychological Stress among Police Officers

This paper analyses the effect of gender on reported and perceived levels of stress through examination of both the physical and psychological indicators. It may be interesting to work with police data due to high stress levels among police officers and the fact that the work environment is male dominant (females are a minority). In our study we not only explore gender differences, but also whether job and private environmental factors such as effective cooperation between units, a higher trust in the work partner, a higher level of work-life-balance and home stability, and a higher level of interactional fairness, affect female and male officers differently. Using multivariate regression analysis of police officers we find that female officers are significantly more likely to report suffering from physical stress indicators than their male counterparts while no gender differences are observable in regards to psychological stress. Moreover, a higher level of trust and cooperation, and a higher level of interactional fairness at work are not able to absorb physical stress among female, while these factors have a strong impact on male officers. On the other hand, for both, female and male officers, work-life balance and stability at home have the tendency of reducing physical stress.Gender, Stress, Police Officers, Burnout, Work-life Balance, Justice

On the coexistence of cooperators, defectors and conditional cooperators in the multiplayer iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Recent experimental evidence [Gruji\'c et al., PLoS ONE 5, e13749 (2010)] on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that players choosing to cooperate or not on the basis of their previous action and the actions of their neighbors coexist with steady defectors and cooperators. We here study the coexistence of these three strategies in the multiplayer iterated Prisoner's Dilemma by means of the replicator dynamics. We consider groups with n = 2, 3, 4 and 5 players and compute the payoffs to every type of player as the limit of a Markov chain where the transition probabilities between actions are found from the corresponding strategies. We show that for group sizes up to n = 4 there exists an interior point in which the three strategies coexist, the corresponding basin of attraction decreasing with increasing number of players, whereas we have not been able to locate such a point for n = 5. We analytically show that in the infinite n limit no interior points can arise. We conclude by discussing the implications of this theoretical approach on the behavior observed in experiments.Comment: 12 pages, 10 figures, uses elsart.cl

If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

Visible inequality breeds more inequality

Experiments suggest that when people can see wealth inequality in their social network, this propels further inequality through reduced cooperation and reduced social connectivity. News & Views comment on Nishi et al, Nature 526, 2015, p. 426-429

Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task

We introduce the “ball-catching task”, a novel computerized task, which combines a tangible action (“catching balls”) with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ball-catching task combines the advantages of real effort tasks with the use of induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications

Joint field experiments for comparisons of measuring methods of photosynthetic production

During the 1st GAP Workshop at Konstanz in April 1982 comparative measurements of phytoplankton primary production by several techniques were conducted simultaneously at an offshore station in Lake Konstanz and an experimental algal pond. Suspended glass bottle exposure techniques using 14C and 13C uptake gave Pz (mg C m−3 h−1) values which varied considerably near-surface, but estimates of areal rates for the euphotic zone ΣPcu(mg C m−3 h−1) which were reasonably close. In the lake, ΣPz, from a vertical tube exposure (with 14C uptake) was greater than rates derived for integrated bottle samples. The oxygen bottle method permitted a good estimate of compensation depth, corresponding to in situ growth studies. There were difficulties in direct comparison between O2 and carbon methods. Correlation between them for Pz was good in the lake but poor in the pond, both for suspended bottle and vertical tube methods. This series demonstrates that despite reasonable overall estimates, comparatively minor methodological differences in experimental technique can cause large variatio

Analysing and controlling the tax evasion dynamics via majority-vote model

Within the context of agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we study the well-known majority-vote model (MVM) with noise applied to tax evasion on simple square lattices, Voronoi-Delaunay random lattices, Barabasi-Albert networks, and Erd\"os-R\'enyi random graphs. In the order to analyse and to control the fluctuations for tax evasion in the economics model proposed by Zaklan, MVM is applied in the neighborhod of the noise critical $q_{c}$. The Zaklan model had been studied recently using the equilibrium Ising model. Here we show that the Zaklan model is robust and can be reproduced also through the nonequilibrium MVM on various topologies.Comment: 18 pages, 7 figures, LAWNP'09, 200

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report

Occasional errors can benefit coordination

The chances solving a problem that involves coordination between people are increased by introducing robotic players that sometimes make mistakes. This finding has implications for real-world coordination problems