605 research outputs found
Truthmakers and necessary connections
In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis' 'Things-qua-truthmakers' theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3-5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of necessary connections and argue that each of them is either false or compatible with truthmaker theory. In Sect. 6 I show how the truthmaker theorist can resist the charge that they are committed to necessary exclusions between possible existents. I conclude that there is no good objection to truthmaker theory on the grounds that it violates the Humean dictum
Truthmaking
Discussion of grounding-theoretic accounts of truthmaking in terms of the theoretical role of âcatching cheatersâ
How to be a truthmaker maximalist
When there is truth, there must be some thing to account for that truth: some thing that couldnât exist and the true proposition fail to be true. That is the truthmaker principle. True propositions are made true by entities in the mind-independently existing external world.
The truthmaker principle seems attractive to many metaphysicians, but many have wanted to weaken it and accept not that every true proposition has a truthmaker but only that some important class of propositions require truthmakers.
Let us, following Armstrong, call the claim that all true propositions, without exception, have a truthmaker, Truthmaker Maximalism. Why might one be tempted to the spirit of truthmaker theory but reject Truthmaker Maximalism? Well, you might deny that necessary truths need truthmakers, for one, and insist that only contingent truths have truthmakers. But I think itâs fair to say that the most common motivation for rejecting maximalism concerns negative truths. (Continues...
Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking
In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a âdeflationaryâ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in the work of Dodd, Hornsby, Schnieder, Williamson, and others. These philosophers believe that the ambitions of truthmaker theory are easily satisfied, without recourse to ambitious ontological investigationâhence the analogy with deflationary truth. We argue that the deflationistsâ agenda fails: there is no coherent deflationary theory of truthmaking. Truthmaking, once deflated, fails to address the questions at the heart of truthmaking investigation. Truthmaking cannot be had on the cheap
We donât need no explanation
Explanation has played myriad roles in truthmaker theory. The notion of explanation is sometimes thought to give content to the very idea of truthmaking, and is sometimes used as a weapon to undermine the entire point of truthmaker theory. I argue that the notion of explanation is dialectically useless in truthmaker theory: while itâs true that truthmaking offers a form of explanation, this claim is theoretically unilluminating, and leaves truthmaker theorists vulnerable to various kinds of attack. I advocate an alternative approach to truthmaker theory that downplays the role of explanation, and show how it releases the enterprise from a variety of problematic commitments that have troubled truthmaker theorists. The âontology-firstâ approach to truthmaking that I advocate not only restores the initial impulse behind truthmaking, but also has a number of theoretical advantages. Most prominently, it dodges the infamous problem of negative existentials, and lessens truthmaker theoryâs dependence on contentious intuitive judgments about both explanation and truthmaking
Instantiation and Characterization: Problems in Lowe's Four-Category Ontology
According to Loweâs Four-Category Ontology, the general nature of the entities belonging to the four fundamental categories is determined by the basic formal ontological relations (instantiation and characterization) that they bear to other entities. I argue that, in closer analysis, instead of one formal relation of characterization, this category system introduces two, one connecting particulars and another universals. With regard to the characterization relation connecting particulars, it remains an open issue whether it would need further analysis. By contrast, the status of instantiation as an internal relation is comparatively clear. Nevertheless, because of holding by virtue of the essences of particulars, the holding of instantiation between universals and particulars rules out the possibility of kind change and entails that particulars are essentially rigidly dependent on universals. Finally, Loweâs analysis of necessary exemplification gives us some reasons to suspect that some property universals need not have any instances in order to exist
Grounding the Unreal
The scientific successes of the last 400 years strongly suggest a picture on which our scientific theories exhibit a layered structure of dependence and determination. Economics is dependent on and determined by psychology; psychology in its turn is, plausibly, dependent on and determined by biology; and so it goes. It is tempting to explain this layered structure of dependence and determination among our theories by appeal to a corresponding layered structure of dependence and determination among the entities putatively treated by those theories. In this paper, I argue that we can resist this temptation: we can explain the sense in which, e.g., the biological truths are dependent on and determined by chemical truths without appealing to properly biological or chemical entities. This opens the door to a view on which, though there are more truths than just the purely physical truths, there are no entities, states, or properties other than the purely physical entities, states, and properties. I argue that some familiar strategies to explicate the idea of a layered structure of theories by appeal to reduction, ground, and truthmaking encounter difficulties. I then show how these difficulties point the way to a more satisfactory treatment which appeals to something very close to the notion of ground. Finally, I show how this treatment provides a theoretical setting in which we might fruitfully frame debates about which entities there really are
The Tendency Theory of Causation
I propose a non-Humean theory of causation with âtendenciesâ as causal connections. Not, however, as ânecessary connexionsâ: causes are not sufficient, they do not necessitate their effects. The theory is designed to be, not an analysis of the concept of causation, but a description of what is the case in typical cases of causa-tion. I therefore call it a metaphysical theory of causation, as opposed to a semantic one
A Theory of Presentism
Also appears in: (1) L.N.Oaklander and E.Magalhaes (eds.) Presentism: A Reader (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010) (2) L.N. Oaklander (ed.) Routledge Major Works: The Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2008)Most of us would want to say that it is true that Socrates taught Plato. According to realists about past facts, this is made true by the fact that there is, located in the past, i.e., earlier than now, at least one real event that is the teaching of Plato by Socrates. Presentists, however, in denying that past events and facts exist cannot appeal to such facts to make their past-tensed statements true. So what is a presentist to do? There are at least three conditions that would ideally be met in a satisfactory solution to this problem: (1) It must preserve our views about which statements are true and which false; (2) It must be transparent what the truthmakers are for those statements; (3) It must accommodate the truth-value links between various times. I shall survey two different families of proposals for the presentist's truthmakers and show that they fail at least one of these three conditions. This is not entirely negative, for it shows us what an adequate solution to the problem would look like. I go on to show where presentists can find suitable objects that satisfy these conditions, and in this way give a clear statement of presentism, something that is lacking in the literature.Peer reviewe
Some Aspects of Modality in Analytical Mechanics
This paper discusses some of the modal involvements of analytical mechanics.
I first review the elementary aspects of the Lagrangian, Hamiltonian and
Hamilton-Jacobi approaches. I then discuss two modal involvements; both are
related to David Lewis' work on modality, especially on counterfactuals.
The first is the way Hamilton-Jacobi theory uses ensembles, i.e. sets of
possible initial conditions. The structure of this set of ensembles remains to
be explored by philosophers.
The second is the way the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approaches' variational
principles state the law of motion by mentioning contralegal dynamical
evolutions. This threatens to contravene the principle that any actual truth,
in particular an actual law, is made true by actual facts. Though this threat
can be avoided, at least for simple mechanical systems, it repays scrutiny; not
least because it leads to some open questions.Comment: 36 pages, no figures. Delivered at a Philosophy of Science
Association Symposium in memory of the distinguished philosopher David Lewis,
Milwaukee, November 2002. This version includes significant additions to
Section 5.1. This version is forthcoming in `Formal Teleology and Causality',
ed. M. Stoeltzner, P. Weingartner, Paderborn, Germany: Mentis. A precis of
the first half of the paper is forthcoming in the journal Philosophy of
Scienc
- âŠ