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How to be a truthmaker maximalist

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1: The Problem of Negative Facts

When there is truth, there must be some thing to account for that truth: some thing that couldn't exist and the true proposition fail to be true. That is the truthmaker principle. True propositions are made true by entities in the mind-independently existing external world.

The truthmaker principle seems attractive to many metaphysicians, but many have wanted to weaken it and accept not that *every* true proposition has a truthmaker but only that some important class of propositions require truthmakers.¹

Let us, following Armstrong, call the claim that all true propositions, without exception, have a truthmaker, Truthmaker Maximalism. Why might one be tempted to the spirit of truthmaker theory but reject Truthmaker Maximalism? Well, you might deny that necessary truths need truthmakers, for one, and insist that only contingent truths have truthmakers. But I think it's fair to say that the most common motivation for rejecting maximalism concerns negative truths.

The thought that negative truths are exempt from the demand for truthmakers could be justified in one of two ways: there is the claim that we *don't need* truthmakers for negative truths, and there is the claim that we *can't have* truthmakers for negative truths. The idea behind the first of these claims is that once we have made true the positive truths we get the negative truths for free, and so to demand additional truthmakers for negative truths would be a violation of Ockham's razor. The idea behind the second claim is that all the options for truthmakers for negative truths are rebarbative, and have no place in a safe and sane ontology; hence we should exempt negative truths from the truthmaker principle lest we commit an ontological sin. Let's consider these claims in order.

A prominent defender of the claim that we don't need truthmakers for negative truths is Hugh Mellor (2003). Mellor says²

Some . . . truths need no truthmakers, notably true truth-functions, whose truth follows from the truth values of their constituents. We may *say* of course that 'P&Q' and 'PVQ' are "made true" by the truth of 'P' and 'Q'; but this is just the entailment of one proposition by others, not the "cross-categorical" link between propositions and other entities that concerns us here. That is what true truth-functions do not need and therefore, I claim, do not have. . . In particular, negative propositions do not need them, since if 'P' is made true by

¹ See, inter alia, Simons (2005), Mumford (2005), and Mellor (2003).

² Mellor (2003, p213)

S, all it takes to make 'P' false and hence '¬P' true is that S *not* exist.

But this isn't very convincing. It's not unreasonable to think that no further truthmaker is needed for a conjunction than the truthmakers for each of its conjuncts, or that once you make a proposition true you thereby make true any disjunction of which that proposition is a disjunct; but the case of negation looks quite different. In the conjunction and disjunction case we have the sense of truthmaking transmitting across entailment: we don't need a further truthmaker for p because we have a truthmaker for q, and q entails p.³ This is missing from the case of negation. If we don't have a truthmaker for ¬p then we don't have a truthmaker for any proposition that entails ¬p either: it's not as if truthmakers for ¬¬¬P are any easier to find than truthmakers for ¬P!

Mellor says that "if 'P' is made true by S, all it takes to make 'P' false and hence '¬P' true is that S *not* exist". But that's not right. A proposition can have more than one possible truthmaker. S, the actual truthmaker for P, might not exist and P still be true because something *else* other than S makes it true. To guarantee that P is false, and hence that ¬P is true, we need to ensure that there is *nothing* that is a truthmaker for P. But that's just another negative existential. So we can argue that the *only* problem with negative truths is the problem of negative existentials – since to account for the truth of ¬P we need only point to the truthmaker for <there is no truthmaker for P> – but we can't claim that there is no problem with negative truth at all. We've been given no reason to think we don't need a truthmaker for the negative existential which says that the positive proposition P *lacks* a truthmaker.

The thought that we don't need truthmakers for negative truths doesn't seem much of a runner. But if that's right then the thought that we can't have truthmakers for negative truths looks very serious indeed; for if true it would seem to motivate abandoning not just truthmaker maximalism, but truthmaker theory altogether. If we don't get the negative truths for free given the positive truths, then what possible motivation could there be for accepting that some truths require truthmakers but that negative truths don't? That would be to accept that the negative truths are not true in virtue of anything; but if we allow that then why do we not allow positive truths that are not true in virtue of anything? It's one thing to say that certain truths are obtained for free given our grounding of other truths, and hence that they don't need a *further* grounding; it's another thing altogether to say that certain truths just aren't grounded. Either there's something wrong with accepting truths that don't have an ontological grounding or there isn't: if there is, then *every* truth requires a grounding; if there isn't, then *no* truth requires a grounding.

Truthmaker theory is a theory about *what it is* for a proposition to be true; it's just not the kind of theory that can apply only in a restricted domain. What possible reason could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn't apply to all propositions? Why should it be okay for negative truths to go ungrounded and not okay for positive truths to go ungrounded? And if negative truths don't have truthmakers then make no mistake: they *are* ungrounded. It is no good to say that they are grounded in the *lack* of a truthmaker

³ Armstrong defends the claim that truthmaking distributes across entailment in his (2003).

for the positive truth that is their negation. Unless we reify this absence of a truthmaker this is nothing but metaphysical smoke and mirrors. It's totally disingenuous to say that $\neg p$ is true in virtue of the absence of a truthmaker for p unless there is *some thing* that is this absence. And if there *is* such a thing as the absence then it is a truthmaker for $\neg p$, so maximalism is vindicated.

So either truthmaker maximalism is true or we should abandon truthmaker theory altogether. That these are our options is also argued for by Julian Dodd (forthcoming). Dodd concludes from this that we should abandon truthmaker theory, on the grounds that no plausible story concerning truthmakers for negative facts is forthcoming. So he moves from (1) If there are truthmakers at all, there are truthmakers for negative truths and (2) There are no truthmakers for negative truths to (3) There are no truthmakers. I agree with (1), but would instead argue from the negation of (3) to the negation of (2). There *must be* truthmakers for negative truths, given that there are truthmakers at all.

Why think that we can't have truthmakers for negative truths? George Molnar put the problem thus⁴ (and is cited favourably by Dodd): (i) the world is everything that exists, (ii) everything that exists is positive, therefore (iii) negative claims about the world aren't made true by anything that exists. The idea is that there's no negative ontology and so, since negative ontology would be what made negative truths true, there are no truthmakers for negative truths.

But what is 'negative ontology'? What is it for a thing to be positive or negative? I have no idea.⁵ And as van Inwagen might have said, I don't believe this is my fault. Being positive or negative seems to apply, in the first case, to representational entities such as propositions: <there is a donkey> is positive and <there is not a talking donkey> is negative because the former represents something to be the case and the latter represents something *not* to be the case. Now you may not even like the distinction here (After all, doesn't <there is a donkey> represent it *not* to be the case that there are no donkeys? Doesn't <there is not a talking donkey> represent, positively, that every donkey lacks speech?) but grant it for the sake of argument. Most things are not representations, so it seems that we can call them 'positive' or 'negative' in a derivative sense at best. So what are the rules? Is an entity positive if it corresponds to a positive proposition and negative otherwise? Well if so then I am not convinced by Molnar's (ii). (ii) would amount to the claim that nothing corresponds to a negative proposition; but the correspondent of a truth is just its truthmaker, so (ii) would simply amount to the claim that there are no truthmakers for negative propositions. It can't be relied upon, then, in an argument meant to show that there's any problem in providing truthmakers for negative truths. But if that's not what it means for an entity to be negative or positive then I have no idea what it means. So Molnar doesn't seem to have provided any particular reason for thinking that negative truths resist truthmaking.

There seems to be no problem with truthmakers for negative truths *per se*. The only problem worth taking seriously, I think, is the intuitive dissatisfaction with the extant accounts of such truthmakers. The main contenders in the literature for what makes it

⁴ Molnar (2000)

⁵ I'm not alone in my ignorance. See also Parsons (forthcoming)

the case that, for example, there are no unicorns are (1) the absence of unicorns⁶, and (2) the totality fact that all the first-order states of affairs are *all* the first-order states of affairs.⁷ But both kinds of thing are just really peculiar⁸: and if the choice is between them or abandoning truthmaker theory it's not surprising that many opt for the latter.

I'm going to offer a new solution. I'm going to recommend belief in an entity that makes all true propositions of the form <there is no X> true and whose admission into our ontology should not make us ashamed. That entity is the world. The world, I will argue, makes it the case that there are no unicorns, or arctic penguins, or talking donkeys, etc.

Given truthmaker necessitarianism this commits me to the claim that the world is essentially lacking in unicorns, talking donkeys etc. But what's wrong with that? That doesn't entail that there couldn't have been such things; it only entails that worlds which contain such things wouldn't have been counterparts⁹ of the actual world.

From the fact that some proposition *p* is possible we are committed to the claim that there is a possible world *w* at which *p* is true; but we are not thereby committed to thinking that the object which is the actual world could have been like *w* is. It is an open question whether the possible worlds which represent *de dicto* ways things could have been also represent *de re* of the actual world ways it might have been. The only counterpart of the actual world might be itself, in which case it has all its properties essentially; but that by no means entails that every truth is necessarily true: there are still worlds at which propositions which are in fact true are false, but they are not counterparts of our world.

Why might one think that there can be possible worlds which are not counterparts of the actual world (or equivalently, why might one think that there are *de dicto* ways things might have been that are not *de re* ways the object which is the world might have been)? Well, it seems that there is a world *w* which contains as a proper part a duplicate of the actual world, @. (This is a world that represents the possibility of things going just as they in fact do, but with extra stuff going on 'on the outside'.) Is it obvious that *w* is the counterpart of @ at *w*? The thing at *w* most like @ is not *w* itself but the proper part of *w* that is the duplicate of @, call it *w*-.¹⁰ One might be tempted to think, then, that while it is *w* that represents a *de dicto* way things could have been, it is *w*- that represents a *de re* way the actual world might have been.

⁶ As in Martin (1996) and Kukso (2006)

⁷ As in Armstrong (1997)

⁸ I'm not going to argue for the peculiarity of absences or totality facts here. However I will, below, offer reasons for preferring my account of truthmakers for negative facts over these alternatives.

⁹ Or wouldn't have borne the relation of trans-world identity to the actual world. I am not assuming the truth of counterpart theory, I merely find it a convenient way of talking. In particular, I *am* assuming that the (Lewisian) counterpart theorist is wrong in accepting the inconstancy of modality *de re*. I proceed on the assumption that ascriptions of essence are true or false independently of the context of utterance.

¹⁰ The Lewisian counterpart theorist, of course, could hold that both *w* and *w*- are counterparts of @. But I will be assuming with the orthodoxy that the relation that represents identity across worlds is an equivalence relation.

But once we allow that not every world is a counterpart of the actual world, what is to stop us holding that the only counterpart of the actual world is itself, or less drastically: that the only counterparts of the actual world are itself or worlds that are indiscernible to it, and hence that it has *no* counterpart at *w*? After all, does it not sound quite natural to say that we individuate worlds by what goes on at them? What makes a world *w* *that very world* and not some other world is, surely, what goes on at *w*.

‘The world’ is, familiarly, ambiguous. It can refer to the actual world, something concrete, or to the *actualised* world, something abstract. It’s not controversial to suggest that possible worlds, the abstract entities, are individuated by what is true according to them. If, for example, possible worlds are sets of propositions, and what is true according to them is a matter of what propositions are in the set, then it follows from the fact that sets are individuated by their members that possible worlds are individuated by what is true according to them. If *w* and *v* were distinct worlds then there would have to be a proposition, *p*, that is a member of *w* and not *v*; in which case there is at least one proposition, namely *p*, that is true at *w* and not at *v*. I am suggesting something further: that the concrete worlds that are said to be actual by the possible worlds are also individuated by what is true at them.¹¹ So let the world that is said to be actual by a possible world *w* be *W*; my claim is that, for any two possible worlds *w* and *v*, *W* and *V* (the concrete worlds that are said to be actual by the possible worlds *w* and *v* respectively) are counterparts iff all and only the propositions that are true according to *w* are true according to *v*.

I’ll say more to defend this claim shortly, but let me first note another pleasing consequence of accepting it. As Lewis (2001) pointed out, the truthmaker principle entails that no two possible worlds have the same domain: for any two worlds, *w* and *v*, there exists something at *w* that does not exist at *v*, or vice-versa. For suppose otherwise – suppose that all and only the entities that exist at *w* exist at *v*. Then exactly the same propositions must be true at each world. For suppose some proposition *p* was true at *w* and false at *v*. Then something exists at *w* that can’t exist and *p* be false. But since everything that exists at *w* exists at *v* it follows that *p* is true at *v*. So we must reject either our assumption that there’s some proposition that is true at *w* and false at *v* or our assumption that *w* and *v* have the same domain. So if two worlds have the same domain then the same propositions are true at each. But for any two worlds, *w* and *v*, there is a proposition that is true at *w* and not true at *v*: namely, the proposition that *w* is actualised. So there are no two worlds that have the same domain.

That might seem surprising. You might have thought it an open question whether or not there are distinct worlds with the same domains; but if Lewis is right, and he is, then the question is closed: if two worlds are distinct then they have different domains. But if I’m right about how worlds are individuated then the pill Lewis forces on the truthmaker theorist is sweetened. *Of course* there’s something that exists at *w* that doesn’t exist at *v* (and vice-versa): namely *W*, the concrete world that

¹¹ And it’s obviously this claim that is necessary to make for my proposal to be successful. One can’t claim that is the abstract possible worlds that make the negative existentials true, since all the abstract possible worlds actually exist.

w represents as being actualised.¹² W exists according to w but not v, and V exists according to v but not w. In that case the truthmaker for <w is actualised> would, were w actual, be W. But w and v might, for all I have said, be indiscernible in every other respect; that is, they might differ *only* in what world is said to exist – and that goes a long way to saving the intuition that there can be distinct but indiscernible worlds.

2: World and Essence

I've claimed that the actual world is individuated by what is true according to it. This amounts to the claim that it has all its properties essentially. As such it is a suitable truthmaker for true negative existentials. No proper part of the world necessitates that there are no unicorns, since every proper part might have been a proper part of a different world that did contain unicorns; so the truthmaker, and hence the ontological commitment, of <there are no unicorns> is just the actual world. (Will the world be a truthmaker for *every* true proposition? I think not, for reasons I will give in section 3.)

Why should you believe my claim? Well I'm just doing what the truthmaker theorist always does: urging you to believe in a certain entity with certain essential properties on the grounds that this entity is a suitable truthmaker for otherwise recalcitrant truths. I've already argued that you should be a truthmaker maximalist if you like truthmaking at all. So even if you find it unintuitive that the essential properties of the actual world are as I claim, you should accept this claim insofar as it is more plausible than the rival accounts of truthmakers for negative truths – or stop doing truthmaking altogether. (I'm not trying to convince you to be a truthmaker theorist here: I'm trying to convince you to accept my account of negative truths *if* you are sympathetic to truthmaking.)

I find the thought that the actual world has all its properties essentially far more plausible than the thought that there are such things as absences or totality facts, but I won't rest my case solely on this intuition. The advantage I will cite concerns the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existents.¹³ Lewis (1999) famously charged truthmaker theory with violating the Humean doctrine: the principle that “anything can coexist with anything else . . . Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with anything else”.¹⁴ Consider the truthmaker for the contingent predication <A is red>. It can't be A, since A might not have been red. So the truthmaker is something distinct from A, but nevertheless its existence necessitates the existence of A, since it necessitates the truth of <A is red>, and that can't be true without A existing. So there is a necessary connection between the distinct things, A and the truthmaker for <A is red>.

¹² I'm not committing myself to there being a concrete world W in saying this. I can talk of the concrete world that w says is actual without believing that there is such a concrete world just like I can talk of the concrete talking donkey that v says to be actual without believing that there is such a concrete talking donkey. What I *may* be committed to is ersatz representations of these concrete objects.

¹³ In what follows I draw on Cameron (forthcoming).

¹⁴ Lewis (1986, p87-88)

But Lewis is too quick to charge the truthmaker theorist with violation of the Humean doctrine. By his own lights, the principle we are committed to is not that for any two things, x and y , x could exist without y existing, but that a *duplicate* of x could exist without y existing. That will at most put a constraint on what the truthmaker for $\langle A$ is red \rangle could be – it won't rule out truthmaker theory. If, for example, the truthmaker for $\langle A$ is red \rangle is the trope of A 's particular redness then there seems to be no problem in the claim that a duplicate of this trope could exist without a duplicate of A existing.

What's relevant to the current discussion, however, is not the part of the Humean doctrine that says that for any two things, one might exist without the other, but the part that says that any two possible things might coexist. It is *that* doctrine that looks to be violated by having truthmakers for negative truths. For consider any contingently true negative existential \langle there are no X s \rangle such that, were there X s, they would essentially be X s. If there are any such propositions – and it seems very likely that there are – then we have a violation of the Humean doctrine, since no possible X can coexist with the actual truthmaker for \langle there are no X s \rangle .

So the compossibility demand of the Humean doctrine is violated by the demand for truthmakers for negative existentials just as the demand for independent existence is violated by the demand for truthmakers for contingent predications. But just as we should weaken the independent existence demand to talk about duplicates, so we should weaken the compossibility demand. That is, we should demand only that for any two possible objects, x and y , a *duplicate* of x could coexist with a *duplicate* of y . And, just as before, this at most puts *constraints* on what the truthmakers for negative existentials can be, it does not rule out such truthmakers altogether.

And, interestingly, this doctrine apparently rules out both absences and totality facts as such truthmakers, but it does not rule out my account that it is the world that makes negative existentials true. This is the main advantage – other than its higher degree of intuitive plausibility – that I claim for my account.

The negative existentials that threaten to cause trouble for the revised form of the Humean doctrine are not ones where there could be X s which would essentially be X s but ones where there could be X s which would intrinsically be X s. In that case there is a possible X such that any duplicate of it is also an X . This thing had better be able to coexist with the actual truthmaker for \langle there are no X s \rangle , so that truthmaker had better have a duplicate that is not itself a truthmaker for \langle there are no X s \rangle . So it had better not be intrinsic to the truthmaker for \langle there are no X s \rangle that it makes it the case that there are no X s. This is where I think I have the advantage, because while it is plausible that absences of X s are intrinsically absences of X s, and that the totality fact that such-and-such first-order facts are *all* the first-order facts is intrinsically the totality fact that *those very* first-order facts are all the first-order facts, it is not at all plausible that worlds are intrinsically worlds. The world is the biggest thing. It is a world because there is nothing bigger than it that it is a proper part of. Remember the case earlier of the world w that had a proper part, w^- , that is a duplicate of the actual world $@$. That is precisely a case where the actual world has a duplicate that is not itself a world. And while $@$ is the truthmaker for \langle there are no unicorns \rangle , w^- is not such a truthmaker because it is not a world. That is why there is no problem in w^- coexisting with unicorns. The Humean denial of necessary connections, then, gives

us reason to prefer my account of truthmakers for negative existentials over the main contenders. That, to my mind, is sufficient reason to accept it.

3: Truthmaker theory as a guide to ontology

Let me turn now to a possible objection to my proposal. If I am right, so the objection goes, truthmaker theory is no use as a guide to what there is. For whenever there is a true proposition p , its truth will be necessitated by the existence of the actual world. In that case once I have admitted the world as the truthmaker for negative existentials, I need not admit the existence of anything else. But surely that makes a mockery of truthmaker theory? The truthmaker theorist urges us to accept an ontology rich enough to ground the truth of the propositions we accept as true. Surely that requires more than believing in the world! I do not meet a truthmaker objection just by claiming that the world exists.

Let's consider a case study. There is supposed to be a truthmaker objection to nominalism: the view (at least as I will be using the term) that there are no properties.¹⁵ The objection is that the nominalist has no ontological grounding for truths of the form $\langle a \text{ is } F \rangle$. a does not ground the truth of this proposition because, in most cases at least, a will be merely accidentally F . If there is to be an ontological grounding for propositions such as $\langle a \text{ is red} \rangle$, the thought goes, there must be properties; for the only candidates, seemingly, for entities whose existence necessitates the truth of $\langle a \text{ is red} \rangle$ are the non-transferable trope of a 's redness, or the state of affairs of a instantiating the universal of redness. Either there are tropes or there are universals, then; in any case, nominalism is false.

But, so the objection goes, the truthmaker objection to nominalism is completely wrong headed if what I said was right, because the nominalist has available to them a nominalistically acceptable necessitating truthmaker for $\langle a \text{ is red} \rangle$: the world. Indeed, the truthmaker principle is useless as a guide to what there is; for whenever someone argues for the existence of X , or the X s, on the grounds that they are needed to be the truthmaker for p , or some domain of truths D , her opponent can always say that the world does the job instead.

I do not want to bite the bullet on this objection. I want to argue that there *is* still, on my view, a truthmaker objection to nominalism. My claim is that while the world is a suitable truthmaker for negative existentials it is not a suitable truthmaker for propositions of the form $\langle a \text{ is } F \rangle$. So even if the nominalist accepts the existence of the world (and accepts that its essential properties are as I have said) they still have not recognised the existence of anything which is a suitable truthmaker for $\langle a \text{ is red} \rangle$.

Why is the world not a suitable truthmaker for $\langle a \text{ is } F \rangle$? Because it is not the case that a is F because the world which exists is the actual world; rather, it is *that* world that exists, and not some other world, because (among other things) a is F . The truthmaker is meant to ground the truth of the proposition. The proposition is true *in virtue of* the existence of the truthmaker. But it does not sound right to say that a is F in virtue of the existence of the world. That is to get things the wrong way round.

¹⁵ One nominalist, Josh Parsons (1999), attempts to reconcile his nominalism with truthmaker theory, but he does so at the expense of rejecting truthmaker necessitarianism, which I accept.

The world being *this* very world depends on a being F (if a were not F, the world would not be the world it in fact is), not the other way round. Why is the same not true of negative existentials? Well we can't say that the world is the very world it is *because* of the absence of arctic penguins, because that gets us back into believing in absences, and there are no such things as absences.

The idea is that the world is the very world it is in virtue of its constituents; were the world to be constituted differently, it would not be the very world it in fact is. But while there is a constituent of a's F-ness, there is no constituent of the absence of arctic penguins, because there are no such things as absences. So it's not the case that the world is the world it is in virtue of the non-existence of arctic penguins, because there is no such thing as the non-existence of arctic penguins. Instead, it must be that there are no arctic penguins in virtue of the existence of the world.

This yields what I think is a very pleasing picture. For each positive truth there is a truthmaker – for my money, I think these truthmakers will be particularised properties (tropes). None of these truthmakers is a world, but each of them partly constitutes the actual world. These truthmakers together suffice for the entirety of the positive truths. The world is constituted from these truthmakers, and is essentially constituted from just them, so that no thing which lacks one of them as a constituent, and no thing which has any thing else as a constituent, is a counterpart of the world. The world then is the truthmaker for the negative truths. And so given the world and the truthmakers which constitute the world, we have an ontological grounding for every truth: positive and negative.

I am relying here on the thought that the nature of the whole is determined by the nature of the parts. The world – the biggest entity that there is – exists, and is what it is, in virtue of its parts. That's why you have to believe in the truthmakers for the positive truths (the tropes) if you believe in the world: to believe in the world but not these truthmakers is like believing in Socrates' singleton without believing in Socrates – you would believe in the dependent without believing in what it is dependent *on*, and that's no good. However, if you thought instead that the whole was prior to its parts – as in the priority monism defended by Jonathan Schaffer¹⁶ – then I wouldn't have any problem with you claiming simply that the world is the truthmaker for *every* truth, positive and negative. If you say to Schaffer, as I said above, that the world is the very world it is because a is red, rather than the other way round, Schaffer will reply: No, the existence of the world is fundamental – it being *this* world that exists and not some other is where explanation comes to an end. So if the world is ontologically basic, rather than its constituents, then it is fine to let it do *all* the truthmaking, in which case you need not believe in properties. And in fact, that's exactly what Schaffer does.¹⁷

That is, it's fine *given* the truth of monism. I think monism is mistake enough. So I'll be assuming henceforth that the whole is dependent on its parts – in which case I think it is a mistake to believe in the world without believing in the (property involving) truthmakers for the positive truths.

¹⁶ Schaffer (manuscript a)

¹⁷ Schaffer (manuscript b)

Now let us return to our wannabee nominalist truthmaker theorist. She claims to believe in the entity I am calling the world, and to agree with me as to its essential properties, and as a result she claims to have a truthmaker for true predications without having to believe in properties. My response is that she cannot in good faith accept the existence of the world without thereby accepting the existence of the particularised properties that constitute the world.

Suppose someone comes up to Armstrong and says: “You've told me that the truthmaker for negative existentials is the totality fact. But the existence of the totality fact also necessitates any positive truth. In that case I only need the totality fact; I don't need to believe in the first-order states of affairs that you claim are the truthmakers for simple predications.” Armstrong has an easy reply: You cannot in good faith believe in the totality fact without believing in the first-order states of affairs, because the existence of the totality fact is dependent on the existence of the first-order states of affairs. What it is to be *that* totality fact, and not some other totality-fact, is that it has *those* first-order states of affairs (all and only the actual first-order states of affairs) as constituents. Were there extra first-order states of affairs, or less, or were some swapped for others, then there would not be that very same totality fact. The first-order states of affairs are ontologically prior to the totality fact, so you cannot believe in the latter and deny the existence of the former.

Likewise, when my nominalist opponent says to me that she can get away without believing in properties because she believes in the world, I reply that you cannot in good faith believe in the world without believing in properties. The world is constituted by the truthmakers for positive truths, and in order to have truthmakers for the positive truths there must be properties. It is no good to claim that the world is the truthmaker for the positive truths. You only get the world if you already have the truthmakers for the positive truths. The truthmakers for the positive truths are ontologically prior to the world – the world is constituted from these truthmakers, and cannot exist unless they exist – and so acceptance of the existence of the world already involves acceptance of the truthmakers which constitute it, and this involves acceptance of properties. Thus the truthmaker objection to nominalism stands, and my version of truthmaker theory remains a guide as to what there is.

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