4 research outputs found
Facility Location Games with Ordinal Preferences
We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal
preferences. In such a setting, we have a set of agents and a set of
facilities. Each agent is located on a line and has an ordinal preference over
the facilities. Our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms that elicit
truthful information (preferences and/or locations) from the agents and locate
the facilities to minimize both maximum and total cost objectives as well as to
maximize both minimum and total utility objectives. For the four possible
objectives, we consider the 2-facility settings in which only preferences are
private, or locations are private. For each possible combination of the
objectives and settings, we provide lower and upper bounds on the approximation
ratios of strategyproof mechanisms, which are asymptotically tight up to a
constant. Finally, we discuss the generalization of our results beyond two
facilities and when the agents can misreport both locations and preferences
Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey
The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering. At a high level, the goal is to design mechanisms to select a set of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective and ensure desirable properties based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information such as their locations. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research