Correlation between centrality metrics and their application to the opinion model

In recent decades, a number of centrality metrics describing network properties of nodes have been proposed to rank the importance of nodes. In order to understand the correlations between centrality metrics and to approximate a high-complexity centrality metric by a strongly correlated low-complexity metric, we first study the correlation between centrality metrics in terms of their Pearson correlation coefficient and their similarity in ranking of nodes. In addition to considering the widely used centrality metrics, we introduce a new centrality measure, the degree mass. The m order degree mass of a node is the sum of the weighted degree of the node and its neighbors no further than m hops away. We find that the B_{n}, the closeness, and the components of x_{1} are strongly correlated with the degree, the 1st-order degree mass and the 2nd-order degree mass, respectively, in both network models and real-world networks. We then theoretically prove that the Pearson correlation coefficient between x_{1} and the 2nd-order degree mass is larger than that between x_{1} and a lower order degree mass. Finally, we investigate the effect of the inflexible antagonists selected based on different centrality metrics in helping one opinion to compete with another in the inflexible antagonists opinion model. Interestingly, we find that selecting the inflexible antagonists based on the leverage, the B_{n}, or the degree is more effective in opinion-competition than using other centrality metrics in all types of networks. This observation is supported by our previous observations, i.e., that there is a strong linear correlation between the degree and the B_{n}, as well as a high centrality similarity between the leverage and the degree.Comment: 20 page

The noisy voter model under the influence of contrarians

The influence of contrarians on the noisy voter model is studied at the mean-field level. The noisy voter model is a variant of the voter model where agents can adopt two opinions, optimistic or pessimistic, and can change them by means of an imitation (herding) and an intrinsic (noise) mechanisms. An ensemble of noisy voters undergoes a finite-size phase transition, upon increasing the relative importance of the noise to the herding, form a bimodal phase where most of the agents shear the same opinion to a unimodal phase where almost the same fraction of agent are in opposite states. By the inclusion of contrarians we allow for some voters to adopt the opposite opinion of other agents (anti-herding). We first consider the case of only contrarians and show that the only possible steady state is the unimodal one. More generally, when voters and contrarians are present, we show that the bimodal-unimodal transition of the noisy voter model prevails only if the number of contrarians in the system is smaller than four, and their characteristic rates are small enough. For the number of contrarians bigger or equal to four, the voters and the contrarians can be seen only in the unimodal phase. Moreover, if the number of voters and contrarians, as well as the noise and herding rates, are of the same order, then the probability functions of the steady state are very well approximated by the Gaussian distribution

Fashion, Cooperation, and Social Interactions

Fashion plays such a crucial rule in the evolution of culture and society that it is regarded as a second nature to the human being. Also, its impact on economy is quite nontrivial. On what is fashionable, interestingly, there are two viewpoints that are both extremely widespread but almost opposite: conformists think that what is popular is fashionable, while rebels believe that being different is the essence. Fashion color is fashionable in the first sense, and Lady Gaga in the second. We investigate a model where the population consists of the afore-mentioned two groups of people that are located on social networks (a spatial cellular automata network and small-world networks). This model captures two fundamental kinds of social interactions (coordination and anti-coordination) simultaneously, and also has its own interest to game theory: it is a hybrid model of pure competition and pure cooperation. This is true because when a conformist meets a rebel, they play the zero sum matching pennies game, which is pure competition. When two conformists (rebels) meet, they play the (anti-) coordination game, which is pure cooperation. Simulation shows that simple social interactions greatly promote cooperation: in most cases people can reach an extraordinarily high level of cooperation, through a selfish, myopic, naive, and local interacting dynamic (the best response dynamic). We find that degree of synchronization also plays a critical role, but mostly on the negative side. Four indices, namely cooperation degree, average satisfaction degree, equilibrium ratio and complete ratio, are defined and applied to measure people's cooperation levels from various angles. Phase transition, as well as emergence of many interesting geographic patterns in the cellular automata network, is also observed.Comment: 21 pages, 12 figure

Critical Market Crashes

This review is a partial synthesis of the book ``Why stock market crash'' (Princeton University Press, January 2003), which presents a general theory of financial crashes and of stock market instabilities that his co-workers and the author have developed over the past seven years. The study of the frequency distribution of drawdowns, or runs of successive losses shows that large financial crashes are ``outliers'': they form a class of their own as can be seen from their statistical signatures. If large financial crashes are ``outliers'', they are special and thus require a special explanation, a specific model, a theory of their own. In addition, their special properties may perhaps be used for their prediction. The main mechanisms leading to positive feedbacks, i.e., self-reinforcement, such as imitative behavior and herding between investors are reviewed with many references provided to the relevant literature outside the confine of Physics. Positive feedbacks provide the fuel for the development of speculative bubbles, preparing the instability for a major crash. We demonstrate several detailed mathematical models of speculative bubbles and crashes. The most important message is the discovery of robust and universal signatures of the approach to crashes. These precursory patterns have been documented for essentially all crashes on developed as well as emergent stock markets, on currency markets, on company stocks, and so on. The concept of an ``anti-bubble'' is also summarized, with two forward predictions on the Japanese stock market starting in 1999 and on the USA stock market still running. We conclude by presenting our view of the organization of financial markets.Comment: Latex 89 pages and 38 figures, in press in Physics Report

Contrarian Majority Rule Model with External Oscillating Propaganda and Individual Inertias

We study the Galam majority rule dynamics with contrarian behavior and an oscillating external propaganda in a population of agents that can adopt one of two possible opinions. In an iteration step, a random agent interacts with three other random agents and takes the majority opinion among the agents with probability (Formula presented.) (majority behavior) or the opposite opinion with probability (Formula presented.) (contrarian behavior). The probability of following the majority rule (Formula presented.) varies with the temperature T and is coupled to a time-dependent oscillating field that mimics a mass media propaganda, in a way that agents are more likely to adopt the majority opinion when it is aligned with the sign of the field. We investigate the dynamics of this model on a complete graph and find various regimes as T is varied. A transition temperature (Formula presented.) separates a bimodal oscillatory regime for (Formula presented.), where the population’s mean opinion m oscillates around a positive or a negative value from a unimodal oscillatory regime for (Formula presented.) in which m oscillates around zero. These regimes are characterized by the distribution of residence times that exhibit a unique peak for a resonance temperature (Formula presented.), where the response of the system is maximum. An insight into these results is given by a mean-field approach, which also shows that (Formula presented.) and (Formula presented.) are closely related.Fil: Gimenez, Maria Cecilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Física Enrique Gaviola. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Física Enrique Gaviola; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Matemática, Astronomía y Física; ArgentinaFil: Reinaudi, Luis. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Investigaciones en Físico-química de Córdoba. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Químicas. Instituto de Investigaciones en Físico-química de Córdoba; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Cs.químicas. Departamento de Química Teórica y Computacional; ArgentinaFil: Galam, Serge. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; FranciaFil: Vazquez, Federico. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Calculo. - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Calculo; Argentin

Construction, Concentration, and (Dis)Continuities in Social Valuations

I review and integrate recent sociological research that makes progress on three interrelated questions pertaining to social valuation: (a) the degree of social construction relative to objective constraints; (b) the degree of concentration in social valuations at a single point in time; and (c) the conditions that govern two broad forms of temporal discontinuity—(i) fashion cycles, especially in cultural expression and in managerial practices, and (ii) bubble/crash dynamics, as witnessed in such domains as authoritarian regimes and financial markets. In the course of the review, I argue for the importance of identifying how objective conditions constrain social construction and suggest two contrarian mechanisms by which this is accomplished—valuation opportunism and valuation entrepreneurship—and the conditions under which they are more or less effective