Shifting visual perspective during retrieval shapes autobiographical memories

The dynamic and flexible nature of memories is evident in our ability to adopt multiple visual perspectives. Although autobiographical memories are typically encoded from the visual perspective of our own eyes they can be retrieved from the perspective of an observer looking at our self. Here, we examined the neural mechanisms of shifting visual perspective during long-term memory retrieval and its influence on online and subsequent memories using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants generated specific autobiographical memories from the last five years and rated their visual perspective. In a separate fMRI session, they were asked to retrieve the memories across three repetitions while maintaining the same visual perspective as their initial rating or by shifting to an alternative perspective. Visual perspective shifting during autobiographical memory retrieval was supported by a linear decrease in neural recruitment across repetitions in the posterior parietal cortices. Additional analyses revealed that the precuneus, in particular, contributed to both online and subsequent changes in the phenomenology of memories. Our findings show that flexibly shifting egocentric perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval is supported by the precuneus, and suggest that this manipulation of mental imagery during retrieval has consequences for how memories are retrieved and later remembered

Remembering and imagining alternative versions of the personal past

Although autobiographical memory and episodic simulations recruit similar core brain regions, episodic simulations engage additional neural recruitment in the frontoparietal control network due to greater demands on constructive processes. However, previous functional neuroimaging studies showing differences in remembering and episodic simulation have focused on veridical retrieval of past experiences, and thus have not fully considered how retrieving the past in different ways from how it was originally experienced may also place similar demands on constructive processes. Here we examined how alternative versions of the past are constructed when adopting different egocentric perspectives during autobiographical memory retrieval compared to simulating hypothetical events from the personal past that could have occurred, or episodic counterfactual thinking. Participants were asked to generate titles for specific autobiographical memories from the last five years, and then, during functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) scanning, were asked to repeatedly retrieve autobiographical memories or imagine counterfactual events cued by the titles. We used an fMRI adaptation paradigm in order to isolate neural regions that were sensitive to adopting alternative egocentric perspectives and counterfactual simulations of the personal past. The fMRI results revealed that voxels within left posterior inferior parietal and ventrolateral frontal cortices were sensitive to novel visual perspectives and counterfactual simulations. Our findings suggest that the neural regions supporting remembering become more similar to those underlying episodic simulation when we adopt alternative egocentric perspectives of the veridical past

Mapping dynamic interactions among cognitive biases in depression

Depression is theorized to be caused in part by biased cognitive processing of emotional information. Yet, prior research has adopted a reductionist approach that does not characterize how biases in cognitive processes such as attention and memory work together to confer risk for this complex multifactorial disorder. Grounded in affective and cognitive science, we highlight four mechanisms to understand how attention biases, working memory difficulties, and long-term memory biases interact and contribute to depression. We review evidence for each mechanism and highlight time- and context-dependent dynamics. We outline methodological considerations and recommendations for research in this area. We conclude with directions to advance the understanding of depression risk, cognitive training interventions, and transdiagnostic properties of cognitive biases and their interactions

Shifting visual perspective during memory retrieval reduces the accuracy of subsequent memories

Memories for events can be retrieved from visual perspectives that were never experienced, reflecting the dynamic and reconstructive nature of memories. Characteristics of memories can be altered when shifting from an own eyes perspective, the way most events are initially experienced, to an observer perspective, in which one sees oneself in the memory. Moreover, recent evidence has linked these retrieval-related effects of visual perspective to subsequent changes in memories. Here we examine how shifting visual perspective influences the accuracy of subsequent memories for complex events encoded in the lab. Participants performed a series of mini-events that were experienced from their own eyes, and were later asked to retrieve memories for these events while maintaining the own eyes perspective or shifting to an alternative observer perspective. We then examined how shifting perspective during retrieval modified memories by influencing the accuracy of recall on a final memory test. Across two experiments, we found that shifting visual perspective reduced the accuracy of subsequent memories and that reductions in vividness when shifting visual perspective during retrieval predicted these changes in the accuracy of memories. Our findings suggest that shifting from an own eyes to an observer perspective influences the accuracy of long-term memories

Hypnosis and memory: two hundred years of adventures and still going!

One of the most persistent beliefs about hypnosis is its ability to transcend mnemonic abilities. This belief has paved the way to the use of hypnosis in the clinical and legal arenas. The authors review the phenomena of hypnotic hypermnesia, pseudo-memories, and amnesia in light of current knowledge of hypnosis and memory. The investigation of the relation between hypnosis and memory processes has played an important role in our understanding of memory in action. Hypnosis provides a fertile field to explore the social, neuropsychological, and cognitive variables at play when individuals are asked to remember or to forget their past. We suggest promising avenues of research that may further our knowledge of the building blocks of memories and the mechanisms that leads to forgetfulness

How thinking about what could have been affects how we feel about what was

Episodic counterfactual thoughts (CFT) and autobiographical memories (AM) involve the reactivation and recombination of episodic memory components into mental simulations. Upon reactivation, memories become labile and prone to modification. Thus, reactivating AM in the context of mentally generating CFT may provide an opportunity for editing processes to modify the content of the original memory. To examine this idea, this paper reports the results of two studies that investigated the effect of reactivating negative and positive AM in the context of either imagining a better (i.e., upward CFT) or a worse (i.e., downward CFT) alternative to an experienced event, as opposed to attentively retrieving the memory without mental modification (i.e., remembering) or no reactivation. Our results suggest that attentive remembering was the best strategy to both reduce the negative affect associated with negative AM, and to prevent the decay of positive affect associated with positive AM. In addition, reactivating positive, but not negative, AM with or without CFT modification reduces the perceived arousal of the original memory over time. Finally, reactivating negative AM in a downward CFT or an attentive remembering condition increases the perceived detail of the original memory over time

The Impact of Perspective Change As a Cognitive Reappraisal Strategy on Affect: A Systematic Review

The strategic or deliberate adoption of a cognitively distanced, third-person perspective is proposed to adaptively regulate emotions. However, studies of psychological disorders suggest spontaneous adoption of a third-person perspective reflects counter-productive avoidance. Here, we review studies that investigate the deliberate adoption of a third- or first-person vantage perspective and its impact on affect in healthy people, “sub-clinical” populations and those with psychological disorders. A systematic search was conducted across four databases. After exclusion criteria were applied, 38 studies were identified that investigated the impact of both imagery and verbal instructions designed to encourage adoption of a third-person perspective on self-reported affect. The identified studies examined a variety of outcomes related to recalling memories, imagining scenarios and mood induction. These were associated with specific negative emotions or mood states (dysphoria/sadness, anxiety, anger), mixed or neutral affect autobiographical memories, and self-conscious affect (e.g., guilt). Engaging a third-person perspective was generally associated with a reduction in the intensity of positive and negative affect. Studies that included measures of semantic change, suggested that this is a key mediator in reduction of affect following perspective change. Strategically adopting a “distanced,” third-person perspective is linked to a reduction in affect intensity across valence, but in addition has the potential to introduce new information that regulates emotion via semantic change. Such reappraisal distinguishes deliberate adoption of a distanced perspective from the habitual and/or spontaneous shift in perspective that occurs in psychopatholog

The thoughtful self

The relationship between a concept in the external world (e.g., the self), and its representation in cognition

Resolving Distressing Autobiographical Memories: The Role of Perspective in Imagery, Writing, and Self-Reflection

This program of research consists of three studies centered on the development and validation of a measure of psychological closure along with an investigation of how different strategies for recalling and writing about unresolved autobiographical events inform attributions of closure and aspects of emotion (valence, intensity, and reaction). Study 1 (Ntotal =601) centered on the construction of the Psychological Closure Scale (PCS). This began with a multifaceted conceptualization based on a thorough review of definitions and theoretical contexts. Factor analyses revealed a robust, good-fitting, and reliable structural solution. The PCS contains 42 items that assess seven facets of event resolution: finality, understanding, felt distance, emotional relief, changed experience, less preoccupation, and reduced need to act. Model fit was replicated using independent MTurk (Study 2) and undergraduate (Study 3) samples. Study 2 (N = 182) examined issues of construct validity for the PCS. Convergent and discriminant validity were supported via statistically meaningful correlations amongst the PCS and theoretically related constructs (e.g., unfinished business resolution), along with the lack of correlations with theoretically unrelated constructs (e.g., event impact). Study 3 (N = 351) used a 15-minute randomized control writing paradigm to explore changes in closure and emotion at retrieval and 1-2 days later. Participants selected an unresolved event and were instructed to write about it using one of two narrative perspective shift sequences: third-person to first-person (shift-to-first) vs. first-person to third-person (shift-to-third). First-person entailed recalling and visualizing the event as if through one’s own eyes and writing about it using the pronoun, ‘I’. Third-person involved envisioning the event as if through the eyes of an observer and writing about it using the pronouns ‘He’, ‘She’, or ‘They’ to refer to the self. Participants were then prompted to use one of two mental foci to continue writing about their event: an experience focus consisted of reporting on the event’s concrete details, whereas a coherence focus entailed reporting on its self-narrative significance. The control condition was instructed to think about their event in a “true and honest manner.” All participants completed the PCS, emotion, and exploratory items (cognitive avoidance, centrality of event) immediately following the manipulation and 1-2 days later. The shift-to-first condition reported greater closure, relative to the shift-to-third and control conditions, particularly on subscales pertaining to finality, understanding, emotional release, mental liberation, and behavioural deactivation. These effects were greater when followed by an experience (not coherence) focus, however mental focus conditions showed no difference on closure. The shift-to-first condition also indicated less negative affect, emotional intensity, and reactivity than the other conditions. The magnitude of these effects remained after 1-2 days. All writing conditions showed increases in closure over time along with decreases in negative affect, while the control condition showed no change. The shift-to-first condition also reported less cognitive avoidance and less event centrality to identity and life story relative to the other groups. This research offers a new measure of psychological closure with preliminary evidence of good psychometric properties. It also addresses theoretical and empirical discrepancies concerning the function and adaptive value of imagery and narrative perspectives, identifies effective shift sequences that support greater resolution, and suggests possible mechanisms by which this occurs. Theoretical and clinical implications along with future directions are discussed. Closure, memory-induced emotion regulation, and adaptive self-reflection are thought to be facilitated by features of the retrieval context that support sufficient distance from, followed by engagement with, unresolved past events, elements within the events, and the self as rememberer, tied to the present