Average-case Approximation Ratio of Scheduling without Payments

Apart from the principles and methodologies inherited from Economics and Game Theory, the studies in Algorithmic Mechanism Design typically employ the worst-case analysis and approximation schemes of Theoretical Computer Science. For instance, the approximation ratio, which is the canonical measure of evaluating how well an incentive-compatible mechanism approximately optimizes the objective, is defined in the worst-case sense. It compares the performance of the optimal mechanism against the performance of a truthful mechanism, for all possible inputs. In this paper, we take the average-case analysis approach, and tackle one of the primary motivating problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design -- the scheduling problem [Nisan and Ronen 1999]. One version of this problem which includes a verification component is studied by [Koutsoupias 2014]. It was shown that the problem has a tight approximation ratio bound of (n+1)/2 for the single-task setting, where n is the number of machines. We show, however, when the costs of the machines to executing the task follow any independent and identical distribution, the average-case approximation ratio of the mechanism given in [Koutsoupias 2014] is upper bounded by a constant. This positive result asymptotically separates the average-case ratio from the worst-case ratio, and indicates that the optimal mechanism for the problem actually works well on average, although in the worst-case the expected cost of the mechanism is Theta(n) times that of the optimal cost

An equitable approach to the payment scheduling problem in project management

This study reports on a new approach to the payment scheduling problem. In this approach, the amount and timing of the payments made by the client and received by the contractor are determined so as to achieve an equitable solution. An equitable solution is defined as one where both the contractor and the client deviate from their respective ideal solutions by an equal percentage. The ideal solutions for the contractor and the client result from having a lump sum payment at the start and end of the project respectively. A double loop genetic algorithm is proposed to solve for an equitable solution. The outer loop represents the client and the inner loop the contractor. The inner loop corresponds to a multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with the objective of maximizing the contractor's net present value for a given payment distribution. When searching for an equitable solution, information flows between the outer and inner loops regarding the payment distribution over the event nodes and the timing of these payments. An example problem is solved and analyzed. A set of 93 problems from the literature are solved and some computational results are reported

Four payment models for the multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows

In this paper, the multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows is considered. The objective is the maximization of the net present value of all cash flows. Time value of money is taken into consideration, and cash in- and outflows are associated with activities and/or events. The resources can be of renewable, nonrenewable, and doubly constrained resource types. Four payment models are considered: Lump sum payment at the terminal event, payments at prespecified event nodes, payments at prespecified time points and progress payments. For finding solutions to problems proposed, a genetic algorithm (GA) approach is employed, which uses a special crossover operator that can exploit the multi-component nature of the problem. The models are investigated at the hand of an example problem. Sensitivity analyses are performed over the mark up and the discount rate. A set of 93 problems from literature are solved under the four different payment models and resource type combinations with the GA approach employed resulting in satisfactory computation times. The GA approach is compared with a domain specific heuristic for the lump sum payment case with renewable resources and is shown to outperform it

Mechanism design for decentralized online machine scheduling

Traditional optimization models assume a central decision maker who optimizes a global system performance measure. However, problem data is often distributed among several agents, and agents take autonomous decisions. This gives incentives for strategic behavior of agents, possibly leading to sub-optimal system performance. Furthermore, in dynamic environments, machines are locally dispersed and administratively independent. Examples are found both in business and engineering applications. We investigate such issues for a parallel machine scheduling model where jobs arrive online over time. Instead of centrally assigning jobs to machines, each machine implements a local sequencing rule and jobs decide for machines themselves. In this context, we introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the classical dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. Our main result is a polynomial time, online mechanism that |assuming rational behavior of jobs| results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive with respect to the maximal social welfare. This is only lightly worse than state-of-the-art algorithms with central coordination

When queueing is better than push and shove

We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that existing property rights for the service are small enough to enable trade between the agents. In particular, we show on the one hand that no queue under a fully deterministic service schedule such as first-come, first-serve can be dissolved efficiently and meet our requirements. If, on the other hand, the alternative is service anarchy (ie. a random queue), every existing queue can be transformed into an efficient order

Charlotte Valley Central School District and Charlotte Valley Teachers Association

In the matter of the fact-finding between the Charlotte Valley Central School District, employer, and the Charlotte Valley Teachers Association, union. PERB case no. M2011-066. Before: Robert E. Flynt, fact finder