Apart from the principles and methodologies inherited from Economics and Game
Theory, the studies in Algorithmic Mechanism Design typically employ the
worst-case analysis and approximation schemes of Theoretical Computer Science.
For instance, the approximation ratio, which is the canonical measure of
evaluating how well an incentive-compatible mechanism approximately optimizes
the objective, is defined in the worst-case sense. It compares the performance
of the optimal mechanism against the performance of a truthful mechanism, for
all possible inputs.
In this paper, we take the average-case analysis approach, and tackle one of
the primary motivating problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design -- the
scheduling problem [Nisan and Ronen 1999]. One version of this problem which
includes a verification component is studied by [Koutsoupias 2014]. It was
shown that the problem has a tight approximation ratio bound of (n+1)/2 for the
single-task setting, where n is the number of machines. We show, however, when
the costs of the machines to executing the task follow any independent and
identical distribution, the average-case approximation ratio of the mechanism
given in [Koutsoupias 2014] is upper bounded by a constant. This positive
result asymptotically separates the average-case ratio from the worst-case
ratio, and indicates that the optimal mechanism for the problem actually works
well on average, although in the worst-case the expected cost of the mechanism
is Theta(n) times that of the optimal cost