Transition of Campus Network to IP Next Generation

This work was conducted to define the necessity and feasibility of transition of the campus network for Oklahoma State University to IP Next Generation. IP Next Generation, or IPng, is a new protocol designed as a successor to the current version of IPv4 used in networking. Due to problems with addressing space and routing tables, IPv4 is in need of replacement. IPng comes as a solution to the problems related to IPv4. Increased addressing space from 32 to 128 bits ensures adequate space for growth of the Internet, improved design provides a potential for better performance of routers working with the Internet Protocol. It was concluded that the tunneling procedure does not impose much overhead in transition from IPv4 to IPv6. A plan of introducing IPv6 on the OSU campus was presented

IPv4 to IPv6 transition : security challenges

Tese de mestrado integrado. Engenharia Informática e Computação. Faculdade de Engenharia. Universidade do Porto. 201

Identifying and Preventing Large-scale Internet Abuse

The widespread access to the Internet and the ubiquity of web-based services make it easy to communicate and interact globally. Unfortunately, the software and protocols implementing the functionality of these services are often vulnerable to attacks. In turn, an attacker can exploit them to compromise, take over, and abuse the services for her own nefarious purposes. In this dissertation, we aim to better understand such attacks, and we develop methods and algorithms to detect and prevent them, which we evaluate on large-scale datasets.First, we detail Meerkat, a system to detect a visible way in which websites are being compromised, namely website defacements. They can inflict significant harm on the websites’ operators through the loss of sales, the loss in reputation, or because of legal ramifications. Meerkat requires no prior knowledge about the websites’ content or their structure, but only the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) at which they can be reached. By design, Meerkat mimics how a human analyst decides if a website was defaced when viewing it in a browser, by using computer vision techniques. Thus, it tackles the problem of detecting website defacements through their attention-seeking nature, their goal and purpose, rather than code or data artifacts that they might exhibit. In turn, it is much harder for an attacker to evade our system, as she needs to change her modus operandi. When Meerkat detects a website as defaced, the website can automatically be put into maintenance mode or restored to a known good state.An attacker, however, is not limited to abuse a compromised website in a way that is visible to the website’s visitors. Instead, she can misuse the website to infect its visitors with malicious software (malware). Although malware is well studied, identifying malicious websites remains a major challenge in today’s Internet. Second, we introduce Delta, a novel, purely static analysis approach that extracts change-related features between two versions of the same website, uses machine learning to derive a model of website changes, detects if an introduced change was malicious or benign, identifies the underlying infection vector based on clustering, and generates an identifying signature. Furthermore, due to the way Delta clusters campaigns, it can uncover infection campaigns that leverage specific vulnerable applications as a distribution channel, and it can greatly reduce the human labor necessary to uncover the application responsible for a service’s compromise.Third, we investigate the practicality and impact of domain takeover attacks, which an attacker can similarly abuse to spread misinformation or malware, and we present a defense on how such takeover attacks can be rendered toothless. Specifically, the new elasticity of Internet resources, in particular Internet protocol (IP) addresses in the context of Infrastructure-as-a-Service cloud service providers, combined with previously made protocol assumptions can lead to security issues. In Cloud Strife, we show that this dynamic component paired with recent developments in trust-based ecosystems (e.g., Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates) creates so far unknown attack vectors. For example, a substantial number of stale domain name system (DNS) records points to readily available IP addresses in clouds, yet, they are still actively attempted to be accessed. Often, these records belong to discontinued services that were previously hosted in the cloud. We demonstrate that it is practical, and time and cost-efficient for attackers to allocate the IP addresses to which stale DNS records point. Further considering the ubiquity of domain validation in trust ecosystems, an attacker can impersonate the service by obtaining and using a valid certificate that is trusted by all major operating systems and browsers, which severely increases the attackers’ capabilities. The attacker can then also exploit residual trust in the domain name for phishing, receiving and sending emails, or possibly distributing code to clients that load remote code from the domain (e.g., loading of native code by mobile apps, or JavaScript libraries by websites). To prevent such attacks, we introduce a new authentication method for trust-based domain validation that mitigates staleness issues without incurring additional certificate requester effort by incorporating existing trust into the validation process.Finally, the analyses of Delta, Meerkat, and Cloud Strife have made use of large-scale measurements to assess our approaches’ impact and viability. Indeed, security research in general has made extensive use of exhaustive Internet-wide scans over the recent years, as they can provide significant insights into the state of security of the Internet (e.g., if classes of devices are behaving maliciously, or if they might be insecure and could turn malicious in an instant). However, the address space of the Internet’s core addressing protocol (Internet Protocol version 4; IPv4) is exhausted, and a migration to its successor (Internet Protocol version 6; IPv6), the only accepted long-term solution, is inevitable. In turn, to better understand the security of devices connected to the Internet, in particular Internet of Things devices, it is imperative to include IPv6 addresses in security evaluations and scans. Unfortunately, it is practically infeasible to iterate through the entire IPv6 address space, as it is 296 times larger than the IPv4 address space. Without enumerating hosts prior to scanning, we will be unable to retain visibility into the overall security of Internet-connected devices in the future, and we will be unable to detect and prevent their abuse or compromise. To mitigate this blind spot, we introduce a novel technique to enumerate part of the IPv6 address space by walking DNSSEC-signed IPv6 reverse zones. We show (i) that enumerating active IPv6 hosts is practical without a preferential network position contrary to common belief, (ii) that the security of active IPv6 hosts is currently still lagging behind the security state of IPv4 hosts, and (iii) that unintended default IPv6 connectivity is a major security issue

Study of the operation of a network implemented in the ipv6 protocol

Internet se ha convertido en un recurso crítico para el funcionamiento de más y más instituciones de diversa naturaleza. Lejos están ya los días en que sólo las empresas relacionadas directamente con las tecnologías de la información eran las únicas para las cuales el acceso a Internet resultaba imprescindible para su operación. Hoy en día instituciones de toda naturaleza y tamaño requieren conectividad global ya sea para proveer servicios a través de Internet, para relacionarse con sus proveedores e incluso para el funcionamiento cotidiano de las operaciones internas. Esto implica que una interrupción en el acceso a Internet supone un alto costo, por lo que existe una fuerte demanda de mecanismos que brinden un alto nivel de tolerancia a fallos en la conexión a Internet. El Protocolo de Internet define como se comunican los dispositivos a través de las redes. La versión 4 de IP (IPv4), que actualmente es predominante, contiene aproximadamente cuatro mil millones de direcciones IP, las cuales no son suficientes para una duración ilimitada. Dicho agotamiento del espacio fue realidad en el 2011. Esto está afectando el negocio de los ISPs existentes, llegando en cierto punto, a la creación de nuevas ISPs. Como una de las consecuencias, puede tener un impacto más profundo en las regiones en desarrollo (África, Asia y América latina/el Caribe) donde no está todavía tan extensa la penetración de Internet. El crecimiento extraordinario de las nuevas tecnologías y, en especial, la implementación del Protocolo IP en su versión 6 (IPv6) abre un enorme abanico de posibilidades, actividades y nuevas formas de comunicarse, trabajar, comprar, relacionarse con otras personas y, en definitiva, desempeñar las tareas cotidianas de nuestra vida. El propósito de este estudio es aportar una serie de conocimientos básicos de carácter técnico, necesarios para conocer IPv6, su funcionamiento y el estado actual de su implementación a nivel mundial para, posteriormente, entrar a conocer los posibles problemas y soluciones, en una red nativa en la Universidad de Pamplona.INTRODUCCION 9 1. PLANTEAMIENTO DEL PROBLEMA 13 1.1. PLANTEAMIENTO 13 1.2. JUSTIFICACIÓN 15 1.3. HIPÓTESIS 16 1.4. OBJETIVOS 16 1.4.1 Objetivo principal 16 1.4.2 Objetivos específicos 17 1.5. METODO 18 2. REVISIÓN DE LITERATURA 19 2.1 Estado del arte TCP/IP. 20 2.1.1 Fuentes Primarias – Trabajos Relacionados. 23 2.1.1.1 Internacional. 23 2.1.1.2 Nacional. 27 2.2 Estado del arte IPv4. 30 2.2.1 Fuentes Primarias – Trabajos Relacionados. 30 2.2.1.1 Internacional. 30 2.2.1.2 Nacional. 34 2.3 Estado del arte IPv6. 35 2.3.1 Fuentes Primarias – Trabajos Relacionados. 35 2.3.1.1 Internacional. 35 2.3.1.2 Nacional. 44 2.4. RFC (Request For Comments) 46 2.4.1 RFC generales 46 2.4.2 RFC Calidad de servicio QoS 53 2.4.3 RFCs Relacionados con calidad de servicio QoS 55 2.4.4 RFC 3775 61 RESULTADOS 63 3. SERVICIOS: LABORATORIOS DE LOS PROTOCOLOS TCP (PROTOCOLO DE CONTROL DE TRANSMISIÓN) E IP (PROTOCOLO DE INTERNET) 63 3.1. SOFTWARE: SISTEMAS OPERATIVOS, APLICACIONES 63 3.1.1 Acceso al servidor Web con direcciones Locales de Sitio 64 3.1.2 Prueba de la comunicación entre dos equipos con IPv6 65 3.1.3 Prueba del servidor Apache httpd-2.2.3 66 3.1.4 Pruebas del servidor DNS 66 3.1.4.1 Comando netstat 67 3.1.4.2 Comando nslookup 67 3.1.5 Prueba de eficiencia de un servidor DNS con direcciones IPv4 e IPv6 68 3.1.6 Pruebas de sockets con direcciones IPv4 e IPv6 70 3.1.7 Criterios de Asignación de Direcciones IPv6 71 3.2. Laboratorio Nº 1: Instalar la Versión 6 de IP en Windows XP 72 3.3. Laboratorio Nº 2: Prueba de la Conectividad entre Hosts Locales del Vínculo 75 3.4. Laboratorio Nº 3: Comunicación a un Servidor Web con Direcciones IPv6 Locales del Sitio 77 3.5. Laboratorio Nº 4: Comunicación Remota con SSH (Protocolo de Intérprete Seguro) entre dos Host con Direcciones IPV6 Locales del Sitio 79 3.6. Laboratorio Nº 5: Configuración de un Servidor DNS (Servicio de Nombres de Dominio) con Direcciones IPV6 Locales Del Sitio 85 3.7. Laboratorio Nº 6: Realización de Sockets bajo JAVA con Direcciones IPV6 Locales del sitio 96 4. IPSec 104 4.1. Descripción del Protocolo IPSec 104 4.1.1 Asociación de Seguridad SA (Security Association) 105 4.1.2 Modos de Operación en IPSEC 106 4.2. Métodos de Seguridad en IPSEC 107 4.3. PRUEBAS REALIZADAS CONFIGURACIÓN No1 108 4.3.1 Configuración General 108 4.3.2 Configuración de IPv6 en un Equipo Red Hat Linux 9 108 4.3.2.1 Configuración IPv6 109 4.3.3 Configuración y Prueba de IPSec para IPv6 113 4.3.3.1 Instalación de Frees/wan 113 4.4. PRUEBAS REALIZADAS CONFIGURACIÓN No2 118 4.4.1 Implementación y medición del tráfico de datos de IPSec en IPv6 118 4.4.2 Dispositivos empleados para la configuración de IPSec en IPv6 119 4.4.3 Tráfico de datos de IPSec en IPv6 120 4.4.3.1 Diseño de la red 120 4.4.3.2 Configuración de la red 120 4.4.3.3 Utilizar IPSec entre dos hosts del vínculo local (FE80) y local de sitio (FC80) 121 4.4.3.4 Cómo configurar las políticas de seguridad IPSec y las asociaciones de seguridad para IPv6 127 4.4.3.5 Captura y análisis de tráfico 127 4.4.3.6 Captura y análisis de tráfico 140 4.4.3.7 Análisis comparativo del tráfico de datos sin IPSEC habilitado 153 4.4.3.8 Análisis comparativo del tráfico de datos con IPSEC habilitado 154 5. QoS 155 5.1 INTRODUCCIÓN 155 5.2 ANTECEDENTES DE DESARROLLO QoS 156 5.2.1 Nacional 156 5.2.2 Internacional 157 5.3. CONCEPTOS GENERALES 158 5.3.1 ICMPv6 159 5.3.3 Calidad de servicio 160 5.3.3.1 Componentes de la calidad de servicio 160 5.3.3.2 Campos de la cabecera IPv6 162 5.3.3.3 Herramienta Oreneta: captura, filtra y representa los flujos en tiempo real 163 5.3.3.3.1 Sincronización de las sondas 163 5.3.3.3.2 Captura pasiva 164 5.3.3.3.3 Filtrado 164 5.3.3.3.4 Representación de los flujos 164 5.4. PRUEBAS DE CALIDAD DE SERVICIO QoS SOBRE UNA RED IPv6 164 5.4.1 Configuración de la red 165 5.4.1.1 Topología 165 5.4.1.2 Configuración de IPv6 165 5.4.1.3 Asignación de direcciones IPv6 167 5.4.1.4 Configuración del router 168 5.4.2 Configuración de Calidad de Servicio 170 5.4.3 Captura y análisis del control de tráfico de datos 176 6. ANÁLISIS DE MOVILIDAD EN EL PROTOCOLO DE INTERNET VERSIÓN 6 (MIPv6) 183 6.1. INTRODUCCIÓN 183 6.2. ESTADO DEL ARTE 183 6.2.1 Movilidad IPv6 (MIPv6) 183 6.3. MOVILIDAD IPv6 188 6.3.1 Terminología de MIPv6 188 6.3.2 Visión general de MIPv6 189 6.3.2.1 Actualización de uniones y reconocimientos 194 6.3.2.2 Actualizando Enlaces 199 6.3.2.3 Detección de movimiento 200 6.3.2.4 Retorno a Home 204 6.3.2.5 Selección de dirección fuente en nodos móviles 206 6.3.2.6 Detección de cambios en el enlace primario 209 6.3.2.7 Que sucede si el agente primario falla? 209 6.3.2.8 Nodos móviles con más de un agente 210 6.3.2.9 Enlaces virtuales primarios 210 6.4. OPTIMIZACIÓN DE RUTA 211 6.4.1 Enviando paquetes optimizados al nodo correspondiente 213 6.4.2 Reconociendo BU´s enviados a nodos móviles 215 6.4.3 Que sucede si el nodo correspondiente falla 216 6.5. COMUNICACIÓN EJEMPLO 217 6.6. SIMULACIÓN 219 6.6.1 El Simulador: Network Simulator 219 6.6.2 Descripción de la herramienta 220 6.6.2.1 Event Scheduler Object 221 6.6.2.2 Network Component object 222 6.6.2.3 Network Setup Helping Module 223 6.6.2.4 Nam (Network Animator) 224 6.6.2.5 Xgraph 225 6.6.3 Instalación del Network Simulator 225 6.6.4 Escenario propuesto 228 6.6.5. Creando la topología 229 6.6.5.1 Creación de la topología de MIPv6 229 6.6.5.2 Finalizando la simulación 230 6.6.6 Corriendo la simulación 231 6.6.7 Trazas 232 7. DISCUSIÓN 234 8. RECOMENDACIONES/CONCLUSIONES 235 9. REFERENCIAS Y BIBLIOGRAFÍA 237 9.1 PRINCIPALES 237 9.2 SECUNDARIAS 237 9.3 DIRECCIONES URL 238MaestríaThe Internet has become a critical resource for the functioning of more and more institutions of diverse nature. Gone are the days when only companies directly related to information technology were the only ones for which Internet access was essential for their operation. Today, institutions of all kinds and sizes require global connectivity, either to provide services through the Internet, to interact with their suppliers and even for the daily functioning of internal operations. This implies that an interruption in Internet access involves a high cost, so there is a strong demand for mechanisms that provide a high level of fault tolerance in the Internet connection. The Internet Protocol defines how devices communicate over networks. IP version 4 (IPv4), which is currently prevalent, contains approximately four billion IP addresses, which are not sufficient for an unlimited duration. This depletion of space was a reality in 2011. This is affecting the business of existing ISPs, reaching a certain point, to the creation of new ISPs. As one of the consequences, it may have a more profound impact in developing regions (Africa, Asia and Latin America / the Caribbean) where Internet penetration is not yet as extensive. The extraordinary growth of new technologies and, especially, the implementation of the IP Protocol in its version 6 (IPv6) opens a huge range of possibilities, activities and new ways of communicating, working, shopping, interacting with other people and, ultimately , carry out the daily tasks of our life. The purpose of this study is to provide a series of basic knowledge of a technical nature, necessary to know IPv6, its operation and the current state of its implementation worldwide, to later learn about possible problems and solutions in a native network at the University of Pamplona

Make Grid systems IPv6-enabled and provide mobility support in Grid systems based on mobile IPv6.

During the last few years, systems have emerged to perform large-scale computation and data storage over IP-enabled data communication networks using Grid middleware technology. Grid middleware integrates the computational resources, which may be distributed geographically, over networks. These Grid implementations are currently supported only over IPv4. The next generation Internet Protocol - IPv6 - is replacing IPv4 with a number of improvements. Since IPv6 is expected to become the core protocol for next generation networks, Grid computing systems should be able to continue to work as the lower-layer network protocols migrate to IPv6. Therefore, we studied in depth what needed to be done to integrate IPv6 functionality into Grid middleware here we include both Grid middleware itself and its interface to the underlying networking environment. We have also given consideration to how a Grid implementation can be made to work in heterogeneous IPv4/IPv6 networks. We have used the Globus Toolkit as our working example of a Grid implementation. However, the mechanisms and approaches for integrating IPv6 into the Globus Toolkit are generic. It should cover the integration of IPv6 into most other Grid implementations and even to other IP-based applications. Another aspect of my work relates to the provision of mobility support for Grid middleware, since a lot of Grid resources and users have to be mobile in the wide-area distributed computing environment. Amongst the many mobility solutions, Mobile IP we find the most suitable it has two main advantages in its provision of mobility support in the lower-layer network infrastructure. Firstly, it separates the mobility operations from upper-layer applications, here the Grid middleware. No resultant changes are required in either the applications or the Grid implementations. Secondly, Grid hosts can maintain the identities, so that they can work continuously. The use of Mobile IPv6 rather than Mobile IPv4 is more efficient. This shows that our effort in making Grid middleware IPv6-enabled has brought advantages into the Grid computations. The success of running Grid middleware over Mobile IPv6 builds up only the lower infrastructure for the mobile-enabled Grid by solving the transparent access and handover issues in mobility scenarios. The Grid needs to be modified and improved further in order to work effectively in the mobile environment. The study indicated the major Grid-relevant issue in mobility scenarios is that the status of the Grid changes frequently. Therefore, we introduce a dynamic Grid resource discovery mechanism. Then, we categorise these important characters into four aspects. They are monitored and parameterised dynamically allowing Grid middleware to assign Grid resources dynamically. Eventually, we provide Grid resource mobility functions. Finally, while we have concentrated on the Grid environment, most of methodology and the generic approach apply equally well to other environments

Analyse de sécurité et QoS dans les réseaux à contraintes temporelles

Dans le domaine des réseaux, deux précieux objectifs doivent être atteints, à savoir la QoS et la sécurité, plus particulièrement lorsqu’il s’agit des réseaux à caractère critique et à fortes contraintes temporelles. Malheureusement, un conflit existe : tandis que la QoS œuvre à réduire les temps de traitement, les mécanismes de sécurité quant à eux requièrent d’importants temps de traitement et causent, par conséquent, des délais et dégradent la QoS. Par ailleurs, les systèmes temps réel, la QoS et la sécurité ont très souvent été étudiés séparément, par des communautés différentes. Dans le contexte des réseaux avioniques de données, de nombreux domaines et applications, de criticités différentes, échangent mutuellement des informations, souvent à travers des passerelles. Il apparaît clairement que ces informations présentent différents niveaux de sensibilité en termes de sécurité et de QoS. Tenant compte de cela, le but de cette thèse est d’accroître la robustesse des futures générations de réseaux avioniques de données en contrant les menaces de sécurité et évitant les ruptures de trafic de données. A cet effet, nous avons réalisé un état de l’art des mécanismes de sécurité, de la QoS et des applications à contraintes temporelles. Nous avons, ensuite étudié la nouvelle génération des réseaux avioniques de données. Chose qui nous a permis de déterminer correctement les différentes menaces de sécurité. Sur la base de cette étude, nous avons identifié à la fois les exigences de sécurité et de QoS de cette nouvelle génération de réseaux avioniques. Afin de les satisfaire, nous avons proposé une architecture de passerelle de sécurité tenant compte de la QoS pour protéger ces réseaux avioniques et assurer une haute disponibilité en faveur des données critiques. Pour assurer l’intégration des différentes composantes de la passerelle, nous avons développé une table de session intégrée permettant de stocker toutes les informations nécessaires relatives aux sessions et d’accélérer les traitements appliqués aux paquets (filtrage à états, les traductions d’adresses NAT, la classification QoS et le routage). Cela a donc nécessité, en premier lieu, l'étude de la structure existante de la table de session puis, en second lieu, la proposition d'une toute nouvelle structure répondant à nos objectifs. Aussi, avons-nous présenté un algorithme permettant l’accès et l’exploitation de la nouvelle table de session intégrée. En ce qui concerne le composant VPN IPSec, nous avons détecté que le trafic chiffré par le protocole ESP d’IPSec ne peut pas être classé correctement par les routeurs de bordure. Afin de surmonter ce problème, nous avons développé un protocole, Q-ESP, permettant la classification des trafics chiffrés et offrant les services de sécurité fournis par les protocoles AH et ESP combinés. Plusieurs techniques de gestion de bande passante ont été développées en vue d’optimiser la gestion du trafic réseau. Pour évaluer les performances offertes par ces techniques et identifier laquelle serait la plus appropriée dans notre cas, nous avons effectué une comparaison basée sur le critère du délai, par le biais de tests expérimentaux. En dernière étape, nous avons évalué et comparé les performances de la passerelle de sécurité que nous proposons par rapport à trois produits commerciaux offrant les fonctions de passerelle de sécurité logicielle en vue de déterminer les points forts et faibles de notre implémentation pour la développer ultérieurement. Le manuscrit s’organise en deux parties : la première est rédigée en français et représente un résumé détaillé de la deuxième partie qui est, quant à elle, rédigée en anglais. ABSTRACT : QoS and security are two precious objectives for network systems to attain, especially for critical networks with temporal constraints. Unfortunately, they often conflict; while QoS tries to minimize the processing delay, strong security protection requires more processing time and causes traffic delay and QoS degradation. Moreover, real-time systems, QoS and security have often been studied separately and by different communities. In the context of the avionic data network various domains and heterogeneous applications with different levels of criticality cooperate for the mutual exchange of information, often through gateways. It is clear that this information has different levels of sensitivity in terms of security and QoS constraints. Given this context, the major goal of this thesis is then to increase the robustness of the next generation e-enabled avionic data network with respect to security threats and ruptures in traffic characteristics. From this perspective, we surveyed the literature to establish state of the art network security, QoS and applications with time constraints. Then, we studied the next generation e-enabled avionic data network. This allowed us to draw a map of the field, and to understand security threats. Based on this study we identified both security and QoS requirements of the next generation e-enabled avionic data network. In order to satisfy these requirements we proposed the architecture of QoS capable integrated security gateway to protect the next generation e-enabled avionic data network and ensure the availability of critical traffic. To provide for a true integration between the different gateway components we built an integrated session table to store all the needed session information and to speed up the packet processing (firewall stateful inspection, NAT mapping, QoS classification and routing). This necessitates the study of the existing session table structure and the proposition of a new structure to fulfill our objective. Also, we present the necessary processing algorithms to access the new integrated session table. In IPSec VPN component we identified the problem that IPSec ESP encrypted traffic cannot be classified appropriately by QoS edge routers. To overcome this problem, we developed a Q-ESP protocol which allows the classifications of encrypted traffic and combines the security services provided by IPSec ESP and AH. To manage the network traffic wisely, a variety of bandwidth management techniques have been developed. To assess their performance and identify which bandwidth management technique is the most suitable given our context we performed a delay-based comparison using experimental tests. In the final stage, we benchmarked our implemented security gateway against three commercially available software gateways. The goal of this benchmark test is to evaluate performance and identify problems for future research work. This dissertation is divided into two parts: in French and in English respectively. Both parts follow the same structure where the first is an extended summary of the second

Instalación de Cableado Estructurado en el Palacio de Lila

El proyecto consiste en el diseño del cableado estructurado para el edificio Casa Palacio de los Lilas, situado en la calle Sopranis número 13 en la ciudad de Cádiz. El edificio consta de 5 plantas y 60 trabajadores con necesidades de conectividad. Una vez obtenidos los requisitos por parte del cliente, se procederá con los siguientes pasos: realizar un estudio del tráfico de red con el que averiguaremos la tecnología a emplear para poder realizar el diseño lo más óptimo posible; después, realizaremos un estudio y comparativa para los dispositivos correspondientes a la electrónica de red para poder elegir los más convenientes para dicho proyecto. Una vez tengamos todo lo necesario le daremos al cliente una solución con el diseño, los planos, el pliego y por último el presupuesto de todo el proyect

Secure Communication in Disaster Scenarios

Während Naturkatastrophen oder terroristischer Anschläge ist die bestehende Kommunikationsinfrastruktur häufig überlastet oder fällt komplett aus. In diesen Situationen können mobile Geräte mithilfe von drahtloser ad-hoc- und unterbrechungstoleranter Vernetzung miteinander verbunden werden, um ein Notfall-Kommunikationssystem für Zivilisten und Rettungsdienste einzurichten. Falls verfügbar, kann eine Verbindung zu Cloud-Diensten im Internet eine wertvolle Hilfe im Krisen- und Katastrophenmanagement sein. Solche Kommunikationssysteme bergen jedoch ernsthafte Sicherheitsrisiken, da Angreifer versuchen könnten, vertrauliche Daten zu stehlen, gefälschte Benachrichtigungen von Notfalldiensten einzuspeisen oder Denial-of-Service (DoS) Angriffe durchzuführen. Diese Dissertation schlägt neue Ansätze zur Kommunikation in Notfallnetzen von mobilen Geräten vor, die von der Kommunikation zwischen Mobilfunkgeräten bis zu Cloud-Diensten auf Servern im Internet reichen. Durch die Nutzung dieser Ansätze werden die Sicherheit der Geräte-zu-Geräte-Kommunikation, die Sicherheit von Notfall-Apps auf mobilen Geräten und die Sicherheit von Server-Systemen für Cloud-Dienste verbessert