202 research outputs found
A Power-Gated 8-Transistor Physically Unclonable Function Accelerates Evaluation Speeds
\ua9 2023 by the authors.The proposed 8-Transistor (8T) Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), in conjunction with the power gating technique, can significantly accelerate a single evaluation cycle more than 100,000 times faster than a 6-Transistor (6T) Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) PUF. The 8T PUF is built to swiftly eliminate data remanence and maximise physical mismatch. Moreover, a two-phase power gating module is devised to provide controllable power on/off cycles for the chosen PUF clusters in order to facilitate fast statistical measurements and curb the in-rush current. The architecture and hardware implementation of the power-gated PUF are developed to accommodate fast multiple evaluations of PUF Responses. The fast speed enables a new data processing method, which coordinates Dark-bit masking and Multiple Temporal Majority Voting (TMV) in different Process, Voltage and Temperature (PVT) corners or during field usage, hence greatly reducing the Bit Error Rate (BER) and the hardware penalty for error correction. The designs are based on the UMC 65 nm technology and aim to tape out an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) chip. Post-layout Monte Carlo (MC) simulations are performed with Cadence, and the extracted PUF Responses are processed with Matlab to evaluate the 8T PUF performance and statistical metrics for subsequent inclusion in PUF Responses, which comprise the novelty of this approach
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Intrinsic Functions for Securing CMOS Computation: Variability, Modeling and Noise Sensitivity
A basic premise behind modern secure computation is the demand for lightweight cryptographic primitives, like identifier or key generator. From a circuit perspective, the development of cryptographic modules has also been driven by the aggressive scalability of complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) technology. While advancing into nano-meter regime, one significant characteristic of today\u27s CMOS design is the random nature of process variability, which limits the nominal circuit design. With the continuous scaling of CMOS technology, instead of mitigating the physical variability, leveraging such properties becomes a promising way. One of the famous products adhering to this double-edged sword philosophy is the Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), which extract secret keys from uncontrollable manufacturing variability on integrated circuits (ICs). However, since PUFs take advantage of microscopic process variations, thus many specialized issues including variability, modeling attacks and noise sensitivity need to be considered and addressed.
In this dissertation, we present our recent work on PUF based secure computation from three aspects: variability, modeling and noise sensitivity, which are deemed the foundations of our study. Moreover, we found that the three factors coordinate with each other in our study, for example, the modeling technique can be utilized to improve the unsatisfied reliability caused by noise sensitivity, quantifying the variability can effectively eliminate the impact from noise, and modeling can help with characterizing the physical variability precisely
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Design of Hardware with Quantifiable Security against Reverse Engineering
Semiconductors are a 412 billion dollar industry and integrated circuits take on important roles in human life, from everyday use in smart-devices to critical applications like healthcare and aviation. Saving today\u27s hardware systems from attackers can be a huge concern considering the budget spent on designing these chips and the sensitive information they may contain. In particular, after fabrication, the chip can be subject to a malicious reverse engineer that tries to invasively figure out the function of the chip or other sensitive data. Subsequent to an attack, a system can be subject to cloning, counterfeiting, or IP theft. This dissertation addresses some issues concerning the security of hardware systems in such scenarios.
First, the issue of privacy risks from approximate computing is investigated in Chapter 2. Simulation experiments show that the erroneous outputs produced on each chip instance can reveal the identity of the chip that performed the computation, which jeopardizes user privacy.
The next two chapters deal with camouflaging, which is a technique to prevent reverse engineering from extracting circuit information from the layout. Chapter 3 provides a design automation method to protect camouflaged circuits against an adversary with prior knowledge about the circuit\u27s viable functions. Chapter 4 provides a method to reverse engineer camouflaged circuits. The proposed reverse engineering formulation uses Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) solving in a way that incorporates laser fault injection and laser voltage probing capabilities to figure out the function of an aggressively camouflaged circuit with unknown gate functions and connections.
Chapter 5 addresses the challenge of secure key storage in hardware by proposing a new key storage method that applies threshold-defined behavior of memory cells to store secret information in a way that achieves a high degree of protection against invasive reverse engineering. This approach requires foundry support to encode the secrets as threshold voltage offsets in transistors. In Chapter 6, a secret key storage approach is introduced that does not rely on a trusted foundry. This approach only relies on the foundry to fabricate the hardware infrastructure for key generation but not to encode the secret key. The key is programmed by the IP integrator or the user after fabrication via directed accelerated aging of transistors. Additionally, this chapter presents the design of a working hardware prototype on PCB that demonstrates this scheme.
Finally, chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and summarizes possible future research
Techniques for Improving Security and Trustworthiness of Integrated Circuits
The integrated circuit (IC) development process is becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious activities because untrusted parties could be involved in this IC development flow. There are four typical problems that impact the security and trustworthiness of ICs used in military, financial, transportation, or other critical systems: (i) Malicious inclusions and alterations, known as hardware Trojans, can be inserted into a design by modifying the design during GDSII development and fabrication. Hardware Trojans in ICs may cause malfunctions, lower the reliability of ICs, leak confidential information to adversaries or even destroy the system under specifically designed conditions. (ii) The number of circuit-related counterfeiting incidents reported by component manufacturers has increased significantly over the past few years with recycled ICs contributing the largest percentage of the total reported counterfeiting incidents. Since these recycled ICs have been used in the field before, the performance and reliability of such ICs has been degraded by aging effects and harsh recycling process. (iii) Reverse engineering (RE) is process of extracting a circuit’s gate-level netlist, and/or inferring its functionality. The RE causes threats to the design because attackers can steal and pirate a design (IP piracy), identify the device technology, or facilitate other hardware attacks. (iv) Traditional tools for uniquely identifying devices are vulnerable to non-invasive or invasive physical attacks. Securing the ID/key is of utmost importance since leakage of even a single device ID/key could be exploited by an adversary to hack other devices or produce pirated devices. In this work, we have developed a series of design and test methodologies to deal with these four challenging issues and thus enhance the security, trustworthiness and reliability of ICs. The techniques proposed in this thesis include: a path delay fingerprinting technique for detection of hardware Trojans, recycled ICs, and other types counterfeit ICs including remarked, overproduced, and cloned ICs with their unique identifiers; a Built-In Self-Authentication (BISA) technique to prevent hardware Trojan insertions by untrusted fabrication facilities; an efficient and secure split manufacturing via Obfuscated Built-In Self-Authentication (OBISA) technique to prevent reverse engineering by untrusted fabrication facilities; and a novel bit selection approach for obtaining the most reliable bits for SRAM-based physical unclonable function (PUF) across environmental conditions and silicon aging effects
A Physical Unclonable Function Based on Inter-Metal Layer Resistance Variations and an Evaluation of its Temperature and Voltage Stability
Keying material for encryption is stored as digital bistrings in non-volatile memory (NVM) on FPGAs and ASICs in current technologies. However, secrets stored this way are not secure against a determined adversary, who can use probing attacks to steal the secret. Physical Unclonable functions (PUFs) have emerged as an alternative. PUFs leverage random manufacturing variations as the source of entropy for generating random bitstrings, and incorporate an on-chip infrastructure for measuring and digitizing the corresponding variations in key electrical parameters, such as delay or voltage. PUFs are designed to reproduce a bitstring on demand and therefore eliminate the need for on-chip storage. In this dissertation, I propose a kind of PUF that measures resistance variations in inter-metal layers that define the power grid of the chip and evaluate its temperature and voltage stability. First, I introduce two implementations of a power grid-based PUF (PG-PUF). Then, I analyze the quality of bit strings generated without considering environmental variations from the PG-PUFs that leverage resistance variations in: 1) the power grid metal wires in 60 copies of a 90 nm chip and 2) in the power grid metal wires of 58 copies of a 65 nm chip. Next, I carry out a series of experiments in a set of 63 chips in IBM\u27s 90 nm technology at 9 TV corners, i.e., over all combination of 3 temperatures: -40oC, 25oC and 85oC and 3 voltages: nominal and +/-10% of the nominal supply voltage. The randomness, uniqueness and stability characteristics of bitstrings generated from PG-PUFs are evaluated. The stability of the PG-PUF and an on-chip voltage-to-digital (VDC) are also evaluated at 9 temperature-voltage corners. I introduce several techniques that have not been previously described, including a mechanism to eliminate voltage trends or \u27bias\u27 in the power grid voltage measurements, as well as a voltage threshold, Triple-Module-Redundancy (TMR) and majority voting scheme to identify and exclude unstable bits
Comprehensive Designs of Innovate Secure Hardware Devices against Machine Learning Attacks and Power Analysis Attacks
Hardware security is an innovate subject oriented from growing demands of cybersecurity and new information vulnerabilities from physical leakages on hardware devices. However, the mainstream of hardware manufacturing industry is still taking benefits of products and the performance of chips as priority, restricting the design of hardware secure countermeasures under a compromise to a finite expense of overheads. Consider the development trend of hardware industries and state-of-the-art researches of architecture designs, this dissertation proposes some new physical unclonable function (PUF) designs as countermeasures to side-channel attacks (SCA) and machine learning (ML) attacks simultaneously. Except for the joint consideration of hardware and software vulnerabilities, those designs also take efficiencies and overhead problems into consideration, making the new-style of PUF more possible to be merged into current chips as well as their design concepts. While the growth of artificial intelligence and machine-learning techniques dominate the researching trends of Internet of things (IoT) industry, some mainstream architectures of neural networks are implemented as hypothetical attacking model, whose results are used as references for further lifting the performance, the security level, and the efficiency in lateral studies. In addition, a study of implementation of neural networks on hardware designs is proposed, this realized the initial attempt to introduce AI techniques to the designs of voltage regulation (VR). All aforementioned works are demonstrated to be of robustness to threats with corresponding power attack tests or ML attack tests. Some conceptional models are proposed in the last of the dissertation as future plans so as to realize secure on-chip ML models and hardware countermeasures to hybrid threats
On microarchitectural mechanisms for cache wearout reduction
Hot carrier injection (HCI) and bias temperature instability (BTI) are two of the main deleterious effects that increase a transistor's threshold voltage over the lifetime of a microprocessor. This voltage degradation causes slower transistor switching and eventually can result in faulty operation. HCI manifests itself when transistors switch from logic ''0'' to ''1'' and vice versa, whereas BTI is the result of a transistor maintaining the same logic value for an extended period of time. These failure mechanisms are especiall in those transistors used to implement the SRAM cells of first-level (L1) caches, which are frequently accessed, so they are critical to performance, and they are continuously aging. This paper focuses on microarchitectural solutions to reduce transistor aging effects induced by both HCI and BTI in the data array of L1 data caches. First, we show that the majority of cell flips are concentrated in a small number of specific bits within each data word. In addition, we also build upon the previous studies, showing that logic ''0'' is the most frequently written value in a cache by identifying which cells hold a given logic value for a significant amount of time. Based on these observations, this paper introduces a number of architectural techniques that spread the number of flips evenly across memory cells and reduce the amount of time that logic ''0'' values are stored in the cells by switchingThis work was supported in part by the Spanish Ministerio de EconomĂa y Competitividad within the Plan E Funds under Grant TIN2015-66972-C5-1-R, in part by the HiPEAC Collaboration Grant funded by the FP7 HiPEAC Network of Excellence under Grant 287759, and in part by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council under Grant EP/K 026399/1 and Grant EP/J016284/1
Low Power Memory/Memristor Devices and Systems
This reprint focusses on achieving low-power computation using memristive devices. The topic was designed as a convenient reference point: it contains a mix of techniques starting from the fundamental manufacturing of memristive devices all the way to applications such as physically unclonable functions, and also covers perspectives on, e.g., in-memory computing, which is inextricably linked with emerging memory devices such as memristors. Finally, the reprint contains a few articles representing how other communities (from typical CMOS design to photonics) are fighting on their own fronts in the quest towards low-power computation, as a comparison with the memristor literature. We hope that readers will enjoy discovering the articles within
Secure and Robust Key-Trapped Design-for-Security Architecture for Protecting Obfuscated Logic
Having access to the scan chain of Integrated Circuits (ICs) is an integral requirement of the debug/testability process within the supply chain. However, the access to the scan chain raises big concerns regarding the security of the chip, particularly when the secret information, such as the key of logic obfuscation, is embedded/stored inside the chip. Hence, to relieve such concerns, numerous secure scan chain architectures have been proposed in the literature to show not only how to prevent any unauthorized access to the scan chain but also how to keep the availability of the scan chain for debug/testability. In this paper, we first provide a holistic overview of all secure scan chain architectures. Then, we discuss the key leakage possibility and some substantial architectural drawbacks that moderately affect both test flow and design constraints in the state-of-the-art published design-for-security (DFS) architectures. Then, we propose a new key-trapped DFS (kt-DFS) architecture for building a secure scan chain architecture while addressing the potential of key leakage. The proposed kt-DFS architecture allows the designer to perform the structural test with no limitation, enabling an untrusted foundry to utilize the scan chain for manufacturing fault testing without needing to access the scan chain. Finally, we evaluate and compare the proposed architecture with state-of-the-art ones in terms of security, testability time and complexity, and area/power/delay overhead
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