Seaweed Micro-Business Enterprises’ Support on Forming the Information Centre of Seaweed Farming

Saat ini rumput laut mengalami penurunan dalam jumlah petani maupun produktivitas yang diakibatkan oleh banyak faktor yang mana. Pemicu utamanya adalah adanya asimetris informasi dalam rantai pasok budidaya rumput laut di Kabupaten Maluku Tenggara. Salah satu solusi yang dapat ditawarkan adalah pembukaan pusat informasi budidaya rumput laut. Hal ini mengingat kondisi geografis wilayah Kabupaten Maluku Tenggara yang berbentuk kepulauan dan akses jalan, internet serta jaringan telepon seluler yang terbatas. Tujuan penelitian adalah untuk mengestimasi persepsi pelaku usaha mikro rumput laut baik distributor, penjual bibit maupun petani pada gagasan dibentuknya pusat informasi budaya rumput laut. Proses pengumpulan data dilaksanakan pada bulan Januari hingga Mei 2018 menggunakan metode purposive sampling pada 13 desa di 6 kecamatan dengan jumlah sampel sebanyak 232 responden. Metode analisis data yang digunakan adalah deskriptif dan regresi logistic. Data-data yang digunakan diperoleh dengan menggunakan kuesioner dan in-depth interview.  Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dari sisi sosial ekonomi semakin berumur dan semakin tinggi tingkat pendidikan maka tingkat dukungan pelaku usaha mikro rumput laut pada pusat informasi rumput laut semakin rendah. Khusus bagi pelaku usaha, distributor rumput laut di wilayah ini cenderung menolak adanya pusat informasi rumput lat, hal ini terkait kemampuan mereka dalam memanipulasi harga jual dan kualitas produk. Currently, seaweed has decreased in the number of farmers and productivity caused by many factors, the main trigger of which is the asymmetric information in the supply chain of seaweed cultivation in Southeast Maluku District. Thus, one of the solutions that can be offered is by the opening of the seaweed cultivation information center. The objective of the present research was to estimate the perception of micro seaweed business enterprises namely distributors, sellers of seeds and farmers on the idea of forming the seaweed farming information center in Southeast Maluku District. The data collection was conducted from January to May 2018, using purposive sampling on 13 villages spread over 6 districts with a total sample of 232 respondents. Data analysis methods used in this research was descriptive analysis and logistic regression. The Data was obtained by using questionnaires and in-depth interview. The results showed that from social economic factor, the older and higher education level, tend not to support seaweed information center. In addition, based on the role on seaweed, the distributors in this region tend to reject the idea of forming the information center of seaweed farming, because it will weaken their ability to manipulate the selling price and product quality

Efficient Supply Chain Contracting with Loss-averse Players in Presence of Multiple Plausible Breaches

The legal literature distinguishes between the liquidated damage and the penalty clauses in contracts, and holds that penalties designed for the prevention of breach are excessive compared to the liquidated damages. In an efficient supply chain contract, the penalty must satisfy the participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the signatories. Considering loss-averse players, we have calculated optimal penalties in a supply chain contract and compared those with the liquidated damages. Two possible breaches are considered – a breach in quality of the delivery and a breach in the process. In the absence of any penalty, a process breach reduces the supplier’s delivery risk and cost of delivery. Determining the parametric conditions for efficient contracts, numerically we show the effects of various variables on the zone of efficient contract. We show that the optimal penalties need not be excessive compared to the liquidated damages

The impact of operational decisions on the design of salesforce incentives

When facing high levels of overstock inventories, firms often push their salesforce to work harder than usual to attract more demand, and one way to achieve that is to offer attractive incentives. However, most research on the optimal design of salesforce incentives ignores this dependency and assumes that operational decisions of production/inventory management are separable from design of salesforce incentives. We investigate this dependency in the problem of joint salesforce incentive design and inventory/production control. We develop a dynamic Principal‐Agent model with both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in which the principal is strategic and risk‐neutral but the agent is myopic and risk‐averse. We find the optimal joint incentive design and inventory control strategy, and demonstrate the impact of operational decisions on the design of a compensation package. The optimal strategy is characterized by a menu of inventory‐dependent salesforce compensation contracts. We show that the optimal compensation package depends highly on the operational decisions; when inventory levels are high, (a) the firm offers a more attractive contract and (b) the contract is effective in inducing the salesforce to work harder than usual. In contrast, when inventory levels are low, the firm can offer a less attractive compensation package, but still expect the salesforce to work hard enough. In addition, we show that although the inventory/production management and the design of salesforce compensation package are highly correlated, information acquisition through contract design allows the firm to implement traditional inventory control policies: a market‐based state‐dependent policy (with a constant base‐stock level when the inventory is low) that makes use of the extracted market condition from the agent is optimal. This work appears to be the first article on operations that addresses the important interplay between inventory/production control and salesforce compensation decisions in a dynamic setting. Our findings shed light on the effective integration of these two significant aspects for the successful operation of a firm. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 320–340, 2014Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/107557/1/nav21585.pd

Supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and partial vertical integration

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The Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Consumer Subsidies for Green Technology Adoption

This paper studies government subsidies for green technology adoption while considering the manufacturing industry’s response. Government subsidies offered directly to consumers impact the supplier’s production and pricing decisions. Our analysis expands the current understanding of the price-setting newsvendor model, incorporating the external influence from the government, who is now an additional player in the system. We quantify how demand uncertainty impacts the various players (government, industry, and consumers) when designing policies. We further show that, for convex demand functions, an increase in demand uncertainty leads to higher production quantities and lower prices, resulting in lower profits for the supplier. With this in mind, one could expect consumer surplus to increase with uncertainty. In fact, we show that this is not always the case and that the uncertainty impact on consumer surplus depends on the trade-off between lower prices and the possibility of underserving customers with high valuations. We also show that when policy makers such as governments ignore demand uncertainty when designing consumer subsidies, they can significantly miss the desired adoption target level. From a coordination perspective, we demonstrate that the decentralized decisions are also optimal for a central planner managing jointly the supplier and the government. As a result, subsidies provide a coordination mechanism

Designing Service Level Contracts for Supply Chain Coordination

Supply contracts are used to coordinate the activities of the supply chain partners. In many industries, service level-based supply contracts are commonly used. Under such a contract, a company agrees to achieve a certain service level and to pay a financial penalty if it misses it. The service level used in our study refers to the fraction of a manufacturer's demand filled by the supplier. We analyze two types of service level-based supply contracts that are designed by a manufacturer and offered to a supplier. The first type of contract is a flat penalty contract, under which the supplier pays a fixed penalty to the manufacturer in each period in which the contract service level is not achieved. The second type of contract is a unit penalty contract, under which a penalty is due for each unit delivered fewer than specified by the parameters of the contract. We show how the supplier responds to the contracts and how the contract parameters can be chosen, such that the supply chain is coordinated. We also derive structural results about optimal values of the contract parameters, provide numerical results, and connect our service level measures to traditional service level measures. The results of our analyses can be used by decision makers to design optimal service level contracts and to provide them with a solid foundation for contract negotiations

Multiperiod optimisation and strategic planning for chemical processes

Il tema è l'ottimizzazione multiperiodale applicata a processi chimici, in particolare ottimizzazione dei livelli di scorte e pianificazione strategica