Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibrium payoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.Bimatrix Games, Generic Finiteness

Notes on stochastic choice

A general formalism on stochastic choice is presented. Tje Rationalizability and Recoverability (Identification) problems are discussed. For the identification issue parametric examples are analyzed by means of techniques of mathematical tomography (Random transforms).Stochastic choice, recoverability, identification, random transform

The European Space of Higher Education: Incentive and Governance Issues

This lecture offers thoughts on some issues concerning the effective development of the European space of higher education currently being pushed by the twin forces of the Bologna process and the Lisbon declaration of the EU. It is pointed out that the USA example is a good reference point but cannot be imitated mechanically, given the more segmented reality of Europe. It is noted that the European space could develop first at the graduate level and that the competition for students through reputation effects may play an essential role. The significance of policy initiatives for promoting reform is emphasized. Finally, matters of governance and of incentives (including tenure) are identified as key factors of reform

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.Uncoupled, Nash equilibrium, stochastic dynamics, bounded recall

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.Bargaining, Commitment, Nash variable threat

The European pathways of Catalonia : research

The need for research permit me to put on the table the ideological viewpoint from which I address today's reflections to you. It is that of historical Catalanism, in its more international version, which in these times I would accept as the will and ambition not to be just another European country. We aspire to be what we are not yet: a first-line country in Europe. I have to persuade you that this statement is closely tied to today's theme. I have to convince you that, for Catalonia to be in this first line, it will have to be a country strong in research