Knowing who likes who: The early developmental basis of coalition understanding

Group biases based on broad category membership appear early in human development. However, like many other primates humans inhabit social worlds also characterised by small groups of social coalitions which are not demarcated by visible signs or social markers. A critical cognitive challenge for a young child is thus how to extract information concerning coalition structure when coalitions are dynamic and may lack stable and outwardly visible cues to membership. Therefore, the ability to decode behavioural cues of affiliations present in everyday social interactions between individuals would have conferred powerful selective advantages during our evolution. This would suggest that such an ability may emerge early in life, however, little research has investigated the developmental origins of such processing. The present paper will review recent empirical research which indicates that in the first 2 years of life infants achieve a host of social-cognitive abilities that make them well adapted to processing coalition-affiliations of others. We suggest that such an approach can be applied to better understand the origins of intergroup attitudes and biases. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

What happened? Do preschool children and capuchin monkeys spontaneously use visual traces to locate a reward?

This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (grant agreement no. 639072). Edinburgh Zoo's Living Links Research Facility is core supported by the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland (registered charity no.: SC004064) through funding generated by its visitors, members and supporters.The ability to infer unseen causes from evidence is argued to emerge early in development and to be uniquely human. We explored whether preschoolers and capuchin monkeys could locate a reward based on the physical traces left following a hidden event. Preschoolers and capuchin monkeys were presented with two cups covered with foil. Behind a barrier, an experimenter (E) punctured the foil coverings one at a time, revealing the cups with one cover broken after the first event and both covers broken after the second. One event involved hiding a reward, the other event was performed with a stick (order counterbalanced). Preschoolers and, with additional experience, monkeys could connect the traces to the objects used in the puncturing events to find the reward. Reversing the order of events perturbed the performance of 3-year olds and capuchins, while 4-year-old children performed above chance when the order of events was reversed from the first trial. Capuchins performed significantly better on the ripped foil task than they did on an arbitrary test in which the covers were not ripped but rather replaced with a differently patterned cover. We conclude that by 4 years of age children spontaneously reason backwards from evidence to deduce its cause.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Linking Language and Events: Spatiotemporal Cues Drive Children’s Expectations About the Meanings of Novel Transitive Verbs

How do children map linguistic representations onto the conceptual structures that they encode? In the present studies, we provided 3-4 year old children with minimal-pair scene contrasts in order to determine the effect of particular event properties on novel verb learning. Specifically, we tested whether spatiotemporal cues to causation also inform children’s interpretation of transitive verbs either with or without the causal/inchoative alternation (She broke the lamp/the lamp broke). In Experiment 1, we examined spatiotemporal continuity. Children saw scenes with puppets that approached a toy in a distinctive manner, and toys that lit up or played a sound. In the causal events, the puppet contacted the object, and activation was immediate. In the noncausal events, the puppet stopped short before reaching the object, and the effect occurred after a short pause (apparently spontaneously). Children expected novel verbs used in the inchoative transitive/intransitive alternation to refer to spatiotemporally intact causal interactions rather than to 'gap' control scenes. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the temporal order of sub-events, holding spatial relationships constant, and provided evidence for only one verb frame (either transitive or intransitive). Children mapped transitive verbs to scenes where the agent's action closely preceded the activation of the toy over scenes in which the timing of the two events was switched, but did not do so when they heard an intransitive construction. These studies reveal that children’s expectations about transitive verbs are at least partly driven by their nonlinguistic understanding of causal events: children expect transitive syntax to refer to scenes where the agent's action is a plausible cause of the outcome. These findings open a wide avenue for exploration into the relationship between children’s linguistic knowledge and their nonlinguistic understanding of events.LinguisticsPsychologyOther Research Uni

Infants\u27 reasoning about agents\u27 identity: the case of sociomoral kinds

Recent studies in development psychology suggest that early on infants are able to distinguish characters who display a cooperative behavior from characters who display an antisocial behavior. The current research builds on these findings and aims at determining the extent to which infants possess the sociomoral distinction of “good” and “mean” agents. In particular, we propose that infants represent sociomoral behaviors through kind-based categories. This hypothesis was tested in the current research across 5 different experiments by investigating how infants represent the identity of agents in sociomoral situations. Experiment 1 used a looking-time paradigm to demonstrate 11-month-old infants’ bias to individuate distinct agents based upon their “mean” and “nice” behaviors in a spatiotemporal ambiguous situation. Experiment 2 and 3 ruled out alternative explanations of this effect by controlling for the number of actions presented and differences in motion, respectively. These findings suggest that infants expect agents to display coherent sociomoral behaviors over time in a particular context. Experiment 4 tested whether infants’ are biased to identify prosocial agents more by their internal than their external properties. Fourteen-month-olds showed a bias to identify the ‘helper’ character based on the color of its internal properties. Experiment 5 aimed to clarify whether infants have this biased because they attribute a causal role to the agents’ internal properties. In two different conditions the causal relevance of the agents’ internal or external property was manipulated. We hypothesized that when the causal relevance of the internal property was undermined infants would no longer be biased toward the agents’ internal properties when identifying it as the “helper” character. So far, the results do not show a clear support for this hypothesis. Overall, the results of all these experiments indicate that infants represent sociomoral behaviors in a relatively categorical fashion, and more strongly associated to the agents’ internal rather than external properties. These findings are discussed from both a strong version of kind-based representations in terms of intrinsic natural kinds, and a weaker version in terms of more graded and extrinsic sociomoral kinds

Too heavy to be popular? : lay theories about weight and social status in adolescence

The present research examines causal lay theories about the relation between weight and social status in adolescence. We hypothesize that these causal schemata are expected to manifest in social information processing in the presence of weight and social status cues. Participants include 80 ninth grade adolescents and 203 college adults. First, in probabilistic judgment scenarios (Part 1), we show that participants expect statistical covariation between weight and social status when inferring others’ social status. Next, in a weight social categorization task (Part 2), participants were more likely to use weight cues to categorize people when they were presented with cues that were inconsistent with their lay theories (e.g., weight causes certain social status). Lastly, in a weight attribution task (Part 3), young adults tended to make more negative, dispositional attribution to overweight targets relative to thin targets when interpreting ambiguously-caused negative social events. As an initial test of the developmental process model, the findings support our theoretical predictions that adolescents’ and young adults’ causal lay theories about weight and social status serve as mental models that guide social information processing in judgment of others’ social status.Psycholog

Perceiving Agency

When we look around the world, some things are inert and others are ‘alive’. What is it to ‘look alive’? An account of animacy perception is crucial, both for a proper understanding of visual experience, and for downstream questions about the epistemology of social cognition. I argue that empirical work on animacy supports the view that animacy is genuinely perceptual. We should construe perception of animacy as perception of agents and perception of behavior. My proposal explains how static and dynamic animacy cues relate, and offers a plausible account of how animacy perception relates to social cognition more broadly. Animacy perception draws perceptual attention to objects that are apt to be well-understood folk psychologically, and in doing so enables us to marshal our folk psychological resources efficiently

Social categorization and joint attention: Interacting effects of age, sex, and social status.

In the present study, we examine how person categorization conveyed by the combination of multiple cues modulates joint attention. In three experiments, we tested the combinatory effect of age, sex, and social status on gaze-following behaviour and pro-social attitudes. In Experiments 1 and 2, young adults were required to perform an instructed saccade towards left or right targets while viewing a to-be-ignored distracting face (female or male) gazing left or right, that could belong to a young, middle-aged, or elderly adult of high or low social status. Social status was manipulated by semantic knowledge (Experiment 1) or through visual appearance (Experiment 2). Results showed a clear combinatory effect of person perception cues on joint attention (JA). Specifically, our results showed that age and sex cues interacted with social status information depending on the modality through which it was conveyed. In Experiment 3, we further investigated our results by testing whether the identities used in Experiments 1 and 2 triggered different pro-social behaviour. The results of Experiment 3 showed that the identities resulting as more distracting in Experiments 1 and 2 were also perceived as more in need and prompt helping behaviour. Taken together, our evidence shows a combinatorial effect of age, sex, and social status in modulating the gaze following behaviour, highlighting a complex and dynamic interplay between person categorization and joint attention

Building Machines That Learn and Think Like People

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has renewed interest in building systems that learn and think like people. Many advances have come from using deep neural networks trained end-to-end in tasks such as object recognition, video games, and board games, achieving performance that equals or even beats humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration and performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in crucial ways. We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn, and how they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (a) build causal models of the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition problems; (b) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology, to support and enrich the knowledge that is learned; and (c) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete challenges and promising routes towards these goals that can combine the strengths of recent neural network advances with more structured cognitive models.Comment: In press at Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Open call for commentary proposals (until Nov. 22, 2016). https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/information/calls-for-commentary/open-calls-for-commentar

Children\u27s Ability to Distinguish between Memories from Multiple Sources: Implications for the Quality and Accuracy of Eyewitness Statements

Identifying the sources of memories (e.g., who carried out an action, whether an event happened or was suggested, when an instance of a repeated event occurred) is an important skill in providing accurate accounts of events in forensic investigations. Sensitivity to the nature and development of children’s source-monitoring skills can inform interviewing practices. Five perspectives addressing alternate aspects of the development of children’s source monitoring are outlined (source-monitoring theory, fuzzy-trace theory, schema theory, the person-based perspective, and the mental-state reasoning model). Six main areas of empirical research stemming from these theories are then discussed with emphasis on how the findings relate to the forensic arena: The similarity of sources, the identity of the agent, prospective processing, the relation of source monitoring to other cognitive skills, metacognitive understanding, and the stringency of source-monitoring decisions. The research reviewed is used to address two main applications to forensic investigations: (a) expectations of child witnesses, and (b) interviewing protocols