Analysis of heavy truck maintenance issues

The objective of the study is to determine whether the scientific literature in the field of heavy truck maintenance parallels current development trends in maintenance. For this purpose, models related to fleet maintenance were analysed in terms of cost optimization, decision-making support and improving employees’ maintenance competencies. The analysis underlines the lack of research in the studied field and highlights the scientific gap in the development of methodological approaches to improving the competencies of truck drivers as important entities in the process of detection and elimination of technical issues. The analysis of heavy truck maintenance issues therefore serves as empirical support for the improvement of maintenance processes in the addressed industry as well as in logistics in general. The resulting research also synthesizes the scientific literature in the field of fleet maintenance, which represents an important support for future empirical studies

Maintenance optimization in industry 4.0

This work reviews maintenance optimization from different and complementary points of view. Specifically, we systematically analyze the knowledge, information and data that can be exploited for maintenance optimization within the Industry 4.0 paradigm. Then, the possible objectives of the optimization are critically discussed, together with the maintenance features to be optimized, such as maintenance periods and degradation thresholds. The main challenges and trends of maintenance optimization are, then, highlighted and the need is identified for methods that do not require a-priori selection of a predefined maintenance strategy, are able to deal with large amounts of heterogeneous data collected from different sources, can properly treat all the uncertainties affecting the behavior of the systems and the environment, and can jointly consider multiple optimization objectives, including the emerging ones related to sustainability and resilience

The Application of Ant Colony Optimization

The application of advanced analytics in science and technology is rapidly expanding, and developing optimization technics is critical to this expansion. Instead of relying on dated procedures, researchers can reap greater rewards by utilizing cutting-edge optimization techniques like population-based metaheuristic models, which can quickly generate a solution with acceptable quality. Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) is one the most critical and widely used models among heuristics and meta-heuristics. This book discusses ACO applications in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs), multi-robot systems, wireless multi-hop networks, and preventive, predictive maintenance

Riverine sustainment 2012

Student Integrated ProjectIncludes supplementary materialThis technical report analyzed the Navy's proposed Riverine Force (RF) structure and capabilities for 2012. The Riverine Sustainment 2012 Team (RST) examined the cost and performance of systems of systems which increased RF sustainment in logistically barren environments. RF sustainment was decomposed into its functional areas of supply, repair, and force protection. The functional and physical architectures were developed in parallel and were used to construct an operational architecture for the RF. The RST used mathematical, agent-based and queuing models to analyze various supply, repair and force protection system alternatives. Extraction of modeling data revealed several key insights. Waterborne heavy lift connectors such as the LCU-2000 are vital in the re-supply of the RF when it is operating up river in a non-permissive environment. Airborne heavy lift connectors such as the MV-22 were ineffective and dominated by the waterborne variants in the same environment. Increase in manpower and facilities did appreciable add to the operational availability of the RF. Mean supply response time was the biggest factor effecting operational availability and should be kept below 24 hours to maintain operational availability rates above 80%. Current mortar defenses proposed by the RF are insufficient.N

For the want of a nail: the Western Allies quest to synchronize maneuver and logistics during operations Torch and Overlord

Doctor of PhilosophyDepartment of HistoryDonald J. MrozekUnderstanding why the Western Allies failed to penetrate the western border of Germany in the fall of 1944 is a longer and more involved story than most histories of the topic imply. Allied performance in the European Theater of Operations during World War II is directly linked to their performance in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) and before that, in the North African theater. This study focuses on how the Western Allies conducted campaigns – how they ran combined headquarters in order to plan and supervise joint, theater-level operations, and how those activities changed over time as the key leaders involved gained combat experience. After looking at the efforts of the Allied over this longer window of time, a new conclusion about why the pursuit phase of Overlord failed to penetrate the Westwall becomes clear. LTG J. C. H. Lee’s Communication’s Zone (COMZ) was unprepared to fulfill the logistical requirements of the Allied fall campaign in France in 1944, contributing directly to disappointment over the outcome of the campaign. For those who expected two years of combat experience to result in more effective performance in subsequent action, the failure was surely surprising. This study examines why COMZ could not manage the theater’s logistics and distribution system, and how Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) failed to correct this shortcoming as it sought to synchronize joint operations with logistical requirements and the limitations they imposed. By contrasting the operational methods used by the United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (U.K). and by looking at how Torch and Overlord unfolded, this study reaches three conclusions. First, COMZ was woefully unprepared to execute its combat mission in August 1944, and its failures lengthened the war considerably. Second, this failure was directly linked to the U.S. Army’s inability to integrate lessons learned at European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA). Third, the work demonstrates how critical the integration of maneuver and sustainment is at the operational level of war and how U.S. doctrine and practice predating the war made this difficult to recognize. Finally, successful command at the theater and operational level relies upon consensus and cooperation, unlike the more directive nature of tactical control. COMZ and SHAEF were not prepared to fulfil their roles in August and September because the U.S. experience in World War One and the doctrine that emerged from that experience resulted in the adoption of a model for theater command that was eventually rejected in 1944. Although useful lessons were gained during Torch and implemented at Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), ETOUSA and Lee’s Service of Supply (SOS) did not integrate them. Those lessons were obscured when key personalities rotated or the org chart changed -- it took time for AFHQ, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA), and the functional components to gel. ETOUSA and SOS faced different challenges, were busy with Bolero, and suffered through personnel turnover and restrictions of their own. A final round of reorganization swept through the U.K. over the winter of 1943 and 1944 when much of the command team relocated from the MTO to London. These organizational changes left in question who exactly was in charge of the various aspects of the sustainment mission during Overlord. Lee proved less effective than his peers when it came to producing results that were valued by the operational commands, and SHAEF and the army groups gradually poached ownership of planning and integrating logistical support from SOS/COMZ as a result. Lee held on to running the communications zone in France, but then he did not properly prepare for the mission. By the time SHAEF realized COMZ did not know how to do its job, it was too late to save the fall campaign. Just how bad things had gotten by October and November was masked by poor recordkeeping during the pursuit, confusion over what was really happening within the subordinate commands, and a narrative advanced by Eisenhower in January 1945 designed to paint a more flattering picture of recent events. Eisenhower manipulated facts in a report submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to justify his decisions in France, dismiss any reported “mistakes” made during the fall, and ensure he retained personal control over the three army groups rather than reappointing a subordinate overall ground commander. In the process, Eisenhower initiated the cover-up that would make it so difficult to establish why the pursuit broke down

Construction material logistics management: the case of north-central Nigeria

The Management of Construction Material Logistics Systems plays a significant role in meeting the goals of cost, quality and time to completion of a construction project. Studies have revealed that the cost of construction materials is usually about 50%-60% of the total cost of the project and that the logistic cost accounts for between 17%-35% of the cost material. Fundamentally, it is accepted that any inefficiency in the delivery of construction material could lead to a time overrun and thus, a rise in construction costs addressing the operational performance of logistics would have a positive impact on the goals of a construction project. The aim of this study was to investigate and evaluate the operational performance of material logistics in North-Central Nigeria as there is little specific research conducted on its effectiveness and efficiency. The methodology used included an extensive literature review and a field study conducted on ten quantitative approach that is rooted in the positivist paradigm, and purposive sampling techniques, was adopted. The descriptive method of data analysis was employed, and the findings and interpretations presented through graphs and images. Analysis of the findings led to the conclusion that material logistics did not operate as a system. There was almost no collaboration and integration of the logistics systems to create a synergistic interrelationship between functions in pursuit of higher overall effectiveness and efficiency. Improvement was needed in warehouse and transport operations and processes; technology and automation of logistics operations were absent, and delivery of material to customers was not effective. The implication was that the current materials logistics system did not meet the delivery goals of cost, quality and time of a construction project. The recommendations suggested included the adoption of the framework developed in this study. This would serve as a guide towards effective and efficient logistics management for material manufacturing firms, and for construction professionals