Neural evidence for a distinction between short-term memory and the focus of attention

It is widely assumed that the short-term retention of information is accomplished via maintenance of an active neural trace. However, we demonstrate that memory can be preserved across a brief delay despite the apparent loss of sustained representations. Delay period activity may, in fact, reflect the focus of attention, rather than STM. We unconfounded attention and memory by causing external and internal shifts of attention away from items that were being actively retained. Multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI indicated that only items within the focus of attention elicited an active neural trace. Activity corresponding to representations of items outside the focus quickly dropped to baseline. Nevertheless, this information was remembered after a brief delay. Our data also show that refocusing attention toward a previously unattended memory item can reactivate its neural signature. The loss of sustained activity has long been thought to indicate a disruption of STM, but our results suggest that, even for small memory loads not exceeding the capacity limits of STM, the active maintenance of a stimulus representation may not be necessary for its short-term retention

Imaginary relish and exquisite torture: The elaborated intrusion theory of desire

The authors argue that human desire involves conscious cognition that has strong affective connotation and is potentially involved in the determination of appetitive behavior rather than being epiphenomenal to it. Intrusive thoughts about appetitive targets are triggered automatically by external or physiological cues and by cognitive associates. When intrusions elicit significant pleasure or relief, cognitive elaboration usually ensues. Elaboration competes with concurrent cognitive tasks through retrieval of target-related information and its retention in working memory. Sensory images are especially important products of intrusion and elaboration because they simulate the sensory and emotional qualities of target acquisition. Desire images are momentarily rewarding but amplify awareness of somatic and emotional deficits. Effects of desires on behavior are moderated by competing incentives, target availability, and skills. The theory provides a coherent account of existing data and suggests new directions for research and treatment

Resonant Neural Dynamics of Speech Perception

What is the neural representation of a speech code as it evolves in time? How do listeners integrate temporally distributed phonemic information across hundreds of milliseconds, even backwards in time, into coherent representations of syllables and words? What sorts of brain mechanisms encode the correct temporal order, despite such backwards effects, during speech perception? How does the brain extract rate-invariant properties of variable-rate speech? This article describes an emerging neural model that suggests answers to these questions, while quantitatively simulating challenging data about audition, speech and word recognition. This model includes bottom-up filtering, horizontal competitive, and top-down attentional interactions between a working memory for short-term storage of phonetic items and a list categorization network for grouping sequences of items. The conscious speech and word recognition code is suggested to be a resonant wave of activation across such a network, and a percept of silence is proposed to be a temporal discontinuity in the rate with which such a resonant wave evolves. Properties of these resonant waves can be traced to the brain mechanisms whereby auditory, speech, and language representations are learned in a stable way through time. Because resonances are proposed to control stable learning, the model is called an Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, model.Air Force Office of Scientific Research (F49620-01-1-0397); National Science Foundation (IRI-97-20333); Office of Naval Research (N00014-01-1-0624)

When Good Observers Go Bad: Change Blindness, Inattentional Blindness, and Visual Experience

Several studies (e.g., Becklen & Cervone, 1983; Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser & Becklen, 1975) have found that observers attending to a particular object or event often fail to report the presence of unexpected items. This has been interpreted as inattentional blindness (IB), a failure to see unattended items (Mack & Rock, 1998). Meanwhile, other studies (e.g., Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons, 1996) have found that observers often fail to report the presence of large changes in a display when these changes occur simultaneously with a transient such as an eye movement or flash of the display. This has been interpreted as change blindness (CB), a failure to see unattended changes (Rensink et al., 1997). In both cases there is a striking failure to report an object or event that would be quite visible under other circumstances. And in both cases there is a widespread (although not universal) belief that the underlying cause has to do with the absence of attention. The question then arises as to how these effects might be related. Is CB the same thing as IB? If not, what is the relation between them? And given that these phenomena deal with failures of subjective perception, what can they teach us about the nature of our visual experience? In particular, what can they teach us about the role played by visual attention

A habituation account of change detection in same/different judgments

We investigated the basis of change detection in a short-term priming task. In two experiments, participants were asked to indicate whether or not a target word was the same as a previously presented cue. Data from an experiment measuring magnetoencephalography failed to find different patterns for “same” and “different” responses, consistent with the claim that both arise from a common neural source, with response magnitude defining the difference between immediate novelty versus familiarity. In a behavioral experiment, we tested and confirmed the predictions of a habituation account of these judgments by comparing conditions in which the target, the cue, or neither was primed by its presentation in the previous trial. As predicted, cue-primed trials had faster response times, and target-primed trials had slower response times relative to the neither-primed baseline. These results were obtained irrespective of response repetition and stimulus–response contingencies. The behavioral and brain activity data support the view that detection of change drives performance in these tasks and that the underlying mechanism is neuronal habituation

Neural Models of Normal and Abnormal Behavior: What Do Schizophrenia, Parkinsonism, Attention Deficit Disorder, and Depression Have in Common?

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Office of Naval Research (N00014-95-1-0409); National Science Foundation (IRI-97-20333

A new empirical challenge for local theories of consciousness

Local theories of consciousness state that one is conscious of a feature if it is adequately represented and processed in sensory brain areas, given some background conditions. We challenge the core prediction of local theories based on recently discovered long-lasting postdictive effects demonstrating that features can be represented for hundreds of milliseconds in perceptual areas without being consciously perceived. Unlike previous empirical data aimed against local theories, proponents of local theories cannot explain these effects away by conjecturing that subjects are phenomenally conscious of features that they cannot report. Only a strong and counterintuitive version of this claim can account for long-lasting postdictive effects. Although possible, we argue that adopting this strong version of the “overflow hypothesis” would have the effect of nullifying the weight of the evidence taken to support local theories of consciousness in the first place. We also discuss several alternative explanations that proponents of local theories could offer

Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems

ABSTRACTA longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between knowthatand know-how. This traditional “anti-intellectualist” view is soentrenched in folk psychology that it is often invoked in supportof an allegedly equivalent distinction between explicit and implicitmemory, derived from the so-called “standard model of memory.”In the last two decades, the received philosophical view has beenchallenged by an “intellectualist” view of know-how. Surprisingly, defenders of the anti-intellectualist view have turned to the cognitivescience of memory, and to the standard model in particular, todefend their view. Here, I argue that this strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer scrutiny, the evidence from cognitivepsychology and neuroscience of memory does not support theanti-intellectualist approach, mainly because the standard modelof memory is likely wrong. However, this need not be interpretedas good news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that theempirical evidence necessarily supp..

Distributed Hypothesis Testing, Attention Shifts and Transmitter Dynatmics During the Self-Organization of Brain Recognition Codes

BP (89-A-1204); Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (90-0083); National Science Foundation (IRI-90-00530); Air Force Office of Scientific Research (90-0175, 90-0128); Army Research Office (DAAL-03-88-K0088