Consecuencia lógica: modelos conjuntistas y aspectos modales

According to Etchemendy, in attempting to offer an analysis of the modal features of the intuitive concept of logical consequence, Tarski has committed a modal fallacy. In this paper, I consider the thesis according to it is posible to analyze the modals properties of concept of logical consequence through of a generalization on set-theoretical interpretations. As is known, some philosophers have tried to argue for the transit from the general to the modal by showing that there are enough settheoretic interpretations so as to be able to represent the modal features of the intuitive concept of consequence. As is also known, those people have encountered a lot of difficulties. In the present paper, I will try to show that those problems are related not with the specific possibility of accounting for the modal features by means of a set-theoretic notion of model but with the possibility of coming up with a precise mathematical theory for the concept of interpretation, and, as such, they can be solved by way of appealing to the usual solutions to this problem

Hilary Putnam on the philosophy of logic and mathematics

This paper focuses on Putnam’s conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical practice and ontology. Putnam’s 1971 book Philosophy of Logic came one year later than Quine’s homonymous volume. In the first section, I compare these two Philosophies of Logic which exemplify realist-nominalist viewpoints in a most conspicuous way. The next section examines Putnam’s views on modality, moving from the modal qualification of his intuitive conception to his official generalized non-modal second-order set-theoretic concept of logical truth. In the third section, I emphasize how Putnam´s “mathematics as modal logic” departs from Quine’s “reluctant Platonism”. I also suggest a complementary view of Platonism and modalism showing them perhaps interchangeable but underlying different stages of research processes that make up a rich and dynamic mathematical practice. The final, more speculative section, argues for the pervasive platonistic conception enhancing the aims of inquiry in the practice of the working mathematician.Este artículo estudia la concepción de Putnam de verdad lógica que emana de su visión de la práctica de la matemática y de su ontología. Philosophy of Logic, el libro de 1971 de Putnam surge un año más tarde que el homónimo de Quine. En la primera sección, se comparan estas dos Filosofías de la Lógica que ejemplifican los puntos de vista del realismo y del nominalismo de modo conspicuo. La siguiente sección examina el enfoque de la modalidad de Putnam, que va desde la cualificación modal de su caracterización intuitiva de validez lógica a su concepción oficial generalizada no-modal conjuntista de segundo orden. La tercera sección subraya el modo en que «la matemática como lógica modal» de Putnam se distancia del «Platonism a regañadientes» de Quine. Aquí se sugiere una visión complementaria del Platonism y del modalismo, los cuales, aunque quizás intercambiables, se muestran subyaciendo a los diferentes estadios del proceso de investigación de una práctica de la matemática rica y dinámica. La sección final, más especulativa, conjetura algunas razones de la persistente concepción platónica implícita en la práctica del matemáticoThe research for this paper was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity and FEDER via the research projects FFI 2013-41415-P and FFI2017-82534-PS

Consecuencia lógica: modelos conjuntistas y aspectos modales

According to Etchemendy, in attempting to offer an analysis of the modal features of the intuitive concept of logical consequence, Tarski has committed a modal fallacy. In this paper, I consider the thesis according to it is posible to analyze the modals properties of concept of logical consequence through of a generalization on set-theoretical interpretations. As is known, some philosophers have tried to argue for the transit from the general to the modal by showing that there are enough settheoretic interpretations so as to be able to represent the modal features of the intuitive concept of consequence. As is also known, those people have encountered a lot of difficulties. In the present paper, I will try to show that those problems are related not with the specific possibility of accounting for the modal features by means of a set-theoretic notion of model but with the possibility of coming up with a precise mathematical theory for the concept of interpretation, and, as such, they can be solved by way of appealing to the usual solutions to this problem

Pravda a význam: dialektika teorie a praxe

Tarski's semantic conception of truth is arguably the most influential - certainly, most discussed - modern conception of truth. It has provoked many different interpretations and reactions, some thinkers celebrating it for successfully explicating the notion of truth, whereas others have argued that it is no good as a philosophical account of truth. The aim of the thesis is to offer a systematic and critical investigation of its nature and significance, based on the thorough explanation of its conceptual, technical as well as historical underpinnings. The methodological strategy adopted in the thesis reflects the author's belief that in order to evaluate the import of Tarski's conception we need to understand what logical, mathematical and philosophical aspects it has, what role they play in his project of theoretical semantics, which of them hang in together, and which should be kept separate. Chapter 2 therefore starts with a detailed exposition of the conceptual and historical background of Tarski's semantic conception of truth and his method of truth definition for formalized languages, situating it within his project of theoretical semantics, and Chapter 3 explains the formal machinery of Tarski's truth definitions for increasingly more complex languages. Chapters 4-7 form the core of the...Tarského sémantická koncepce pravdy je patrně nevlivnější - určitě nejdiskutovanější - moderní koncepce pravdy, která vzbudila nespočet různých interpretací a reakcí. Zatímco někteří filosofové ji oslavovali jako úspěšnou explikaci pojmu pravdy, jiní argumentovali, že nám neposkytuje adekvátní filosofický výklad tohoto pojmu. Cílem dizertace je podat systematické a kritické prozkoumání povahy a signifikance Tarského koncepce, založené na pečlivé expozici jejich konceptuálních, technických I historických předpokladů. Metodologická strategie aplikována v práci obráží autorovo přesvědčení, že nelze patřičně zhodnotit přínos Tarského koncepce bez pochopení jejich logických, matematických a filosofických aspektů, a toho jakou roli hraji v jeho širším projektu teoretické sémantiky, jak spolu souvisí (případně nesouvisí). Kapitola 2 je detailní expozicí konceptuálního i historického pozadí Tarského koncepce pravdy a metody definovaní pojmu pravdy pro formalizované jazyky, a v kapitole 3 se vysvětluje formální aparát pravdivostních definicí pro 3 typy jazyků různé komplexity. Kapitoly 4-7, které tvoří jádro celé práce, jsou věnovány ústřední otázce signifikance Tarského koncepce. V kapitole 4 se vysvětlují její logicko-matematické aspekty a přínos pro matematickou logiku, v souvislosti s výsledky Kurta...Institute of Philosophy and Religious StudiesÚstav filosofie a religionistikyFilozofická fakultaFaculty of Art