Kripke Semantics for Fuzzy Logics

Kripke frames (and models) provide a suitable semantics for sub-classical logics; for example, intuitionistic logic (of Brouwer and Heyting) axiomatizes the reflexive and transitive Kripke frames (with persistent satisfaction relations), and the basic logic (of Visser) axiomatizes transitive Kripke frames (with persistent satisfaction relations). Here, we investigate whether Kripke frames/models could provide a semantics for fuzzy logics. For each axiom of the basic fuzzy logic, necessary and sufficient conditions are sought for Kripke frames/models which satisfy them. It turns out that the only fuzzy logics (logics containing the basic fuzzy logic) which are sound and complete with respect to a class of Kripke frames/models are the extensions of the Gödel logic (or the super-intuitionistic logic of Dummett); indeed this logic is sound and strongly complete with respect to reflexive, transitive and connected (linear) Kripke frames (with persistent satisfaction relations). This provides a semantic characterization for the Gödel logic among (propositional) fuzzy logics

One-variable fragments of intermediate logics over linear frames

A correspondence is established between one-variable fragments of (first-order) intermediate logics defined over a fixed countable linear frame and Gödel modal logics defined over many-valued equivalence relations with values in a closed subset of the real unit interval. It is also shown that each of these logics can be interpreted in the one-variable fragment of the corresponding constant domain intermediate logic, which is equivalent to a Gödel modal logic defined over (crisp) equivalence relations. Although the latter modal logics in general lack the finite model property with respect to their frame semantics, an alternative semantics is defined that has this property and used to establish co-NP-completeness results for the one-variable fragments of the corresponding intermediate logics both with and without constant domains

One-Variable Fragments of First-Order Many-Valued Logics

In this thesis we study one-variable fragments of first-order logics. Such a one-variable fragment consists of those first-order formulas that contain only unary predicates and a single variable. These fragments can be viewed from a modal perspective by replacing the universal and existential quantifier with a box and diamond modality, respectively, and the unary predicates with corresponding propositional variables. Under this correspondence, the one-variable fragment of first-order classical logic famously corresponds to the modal logic S5. This thesis explores some such correspondences between first-order and modal logics. Firstly, we study first-order intuitionistic logics based on linear intuitionistic Kripke frames. We show that their one-variable fragments correspond to particular modal Gödel logics, defined over many-valued S5-Kripke frames. For a large class of these logics, we prove the validity problem to be decidable, even co-NP-complete. Secondly, we investigate the one-variable fragment of first-order Abelian logic, i.e., the first-order logic based on the ordered additive group of the reals. We provide two completeness results with respect to Hilbert-style axiomatizations: one for the one-variable fragment, and one for the one-variable fragment that does not contain any lattice connectives. Both these fragments are proved to be decidable. Finally, we launch a much broader algebraic investigation into one-variable fragments. We turn to the setting of first-order substructural logics (with the rule of exchange). Inspired by work on, among others, monadic Boolean algebras and monadic Heyting algebras, we define monadic commutative pointed residuated lattices as a first (algebraic) investigation into one-variable fragments of this large class of first-order logics. We prove a number of properties for these newly defined algebras, including a characterization in terms of relatively complete subalgebras as well as a characterization of their congruences

De Jongh's Theorem for Intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory

We prove that the propositional logic of intuitionistic set theory IZF is intuitionistic propositional logic IPC. More generally, we show that IZF has the de Jongh property with respect to every intermediate logic that is complete with respect to a class of finite trees. The same results follow for CZF.Comment: 12 page

Forward refutation for Gödel-Dummett Logics

We propose a refutation calculus to check the unprovability of a formula in Gödel-Dummett logics. From refutations we can directly extract countermodels for unprovable formulas, moreover the calculus is designed so to support a forward proof-search strategy that can be understood as a top-down construction of a model

Through and beyond classicality: analyticity, embeddings, infinity

Structural proof theory deals with formal representation of proofs and with the investigation of their properties. This thesis provides an analysis of various non-classical logical systems using proof-theoretic methods. The approach consists in the formulation of analytic calculi for these logics which are then used in order to study their metalogical properties. A specific attention is devoted to studying the connections between classical and non-classical reasoning. In particular, the use of analytic sequent calculi allows one to regain desirable structural properties which are lost in non-classical contexts. In this sense, proof-theoretic versions of embeddings between non-classical logics - both finitary and infinitary - prove to be a useful tool insofar as they build a bridge between different logical regions

G\"odel-Dummett linear temporal logic

We investigate a version of linear temporal logic whose propositional fragment is G\"odel-Dummett logic (which is well known both as a superintuitionistic logic and a t-norm fuzzy logic). We define the logic using two natural semantics: first a real-valued semantics, where statements have a degree of truth in the real unit interval and second a `bi-relational' semantics. We then show that these two semantics indeed define one and the same logic: the statements that are valid for the real-valued semantics are the same as those that are valid for the bi-relational semantics. This G\"odel temporal logic does not have any form of the finite model property for these two semantics: there are non-valid statements that can only be falsified on an infinite model. However, by using the technical notion of a quasimodel, we show that every falsifiable statement is falsifiable on a finite quasimodel, yielding an algorithm for deciding if a statement is valid or not. Later, we strengthen this decidability result by giving an algorithm that uses only a polynomial amount of memory, proving that G\"odel temporal logic is PSPACE-complete. We also provide a deductive calculus for G\"odel temporal logic, and show this calculus to be sound and complete for the above-mentioned semantics, so that all (and only) the valid statements can be proved with this calculus.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2205.00574, arXiv:2205.0518