2,826 research outputs found
From 'scientific revolution' to 'unscientific revolution': an analysis of approaches to the history of generative linguistics
This paper is devoted to the challenge that generative linguistics poses for linguistic historiography. As a first step, it presents a systematic overview of 19 approaches to the history of generative linguistics. Second, it analyzes the approaches overviewed by asking and answering the following questions: (a) To what extent and how are the views at issue biased? (b) What central topics do the approaches discuss, how successfully do they tackle them, and how do the various standpoints converge and diverge? (c) How do the approaches relate to
general trends in the philosophy and history of science? The concluding step summarizes our findings with respect to Chomskyâs impact on linguistic historiography
Foundations of generative linguistics
This paper gives a broad overview of the ideas underlying the Chomskyan approach to linguistics. It identifies the main innovation of generative grammar in linguistics and clarifies some recurring misunderstandings about the language faculty, recursion and language universals. The paper also discusses some of the main empirical results of generative syntax
Merging Generative Linguistics and Psycholinguistics
The author acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres/Units of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-490)
Weighted Constraints in Generative Linguistics
Harmonic Grammar (HG) and Optimality Theory (OT) are closely related formal frameworks for the study of language. In both, the structure of a given language is determined by the relative strengths of a set of constraints. They differ in how these strengths are represented: as numerical weights (HG) or as ranks (OT). Weighted constraints have advantages for the construction of accounts of language learning and other cognitive processes, partly because they allow for the adaptation of connectionist and statistical models. HG has been little studied in generative linguistics, however, largely due to influential claims that weighted constraints make incorrect predictions about the typology of natural languages, predictions that are not shared by the more popular OT. This paper makes the case that HG is in fact a promising framework for typological research, and reviews and extends the existing arguments for weighted over ranked constraints
Introduction: converging data sources in cognitive linguistics
The aim of the paper is to outline the topic of the present special issue. In the first section, the authors give a concise overview of current discussions on the structure and function of linguistic data and evidence in general. They argue that one of the main insights which the discussions led to is the need to integrate different data sources in linguistic theorising. The second section deals with the specific manifestation of these discussions in cognitive
linguistics. The authors raise the questions which the papers in the special issue address with respect to cognitive linguistics: What data sources can be integrated?; How can different data sources be integrated?; How does the integration of different data sources affect the acceptability of hypotheses? Finally, in the last section, the structure of the special issue is summarised
Generative Linguistics Meets Normative Inferentialism: Part 1
This is the first installment of a two-part essay. Limitations of space prevented the publication of the full essay in present issue of the Journal. The second installment will appear in the next issue, 2021 (1). My overall goal is to outline a strategy for integrating generative linguistics with a broadly pragmatist approach to meaning and communication. Two immensely useful guides in this venture are Robert Brandom and Paul Pietroski. Squarely in the Chomskyan tradition, Pietroskiâs recent book, Conjoining Meanings, offers an approach to natural-language semantics that rejects foundational assumptions widely held amongst philosophers and linguists. In particular, he argues against extensionalismâthe view that meanings are (or determine) truth and satisfaction conditions. Having arrived at the same conclusion by way of Brandomâs deflationist account of truth and reference, Iâll argue that both theorists have important contributions to make to a broader anti-extensionalist approach to language. What appears here as Part 1 of the essay is largely exegetical, laying out what I see as the core aspects of Brandomâs normative inferentialism (§1) and Pietroskiâs naturalistic semantics (§2). In Part 2 (next issue), I argue that there are many convergences between these two theoretical frameworks and, contrary to fi rst appearances, very few points of substantive disagreement between them. If the integration strategy that I propose is correct, then what appear to be sharply contrasting commitments are better seen as interrelated verbal differences that come down to differentâbut complementaryâexplanatory goals. The residual disputes are, however, stubborn. I end by discussing how to square Pietroskiâs commitment to predicativism with Brandomâs argument that a predicativist language is in principle incapable of expressing ordinary conditionals
Generative Linguistics Meets Normative Inferentialism: Part 1
This is the first installment of a two-part essay. Limitations of space prevented the publication of the full essay in present issue of the Journal. The second installment will appear in the next issue, 2021 (1). My overall goal is to outline a strategy for integrating generative linguistics with a broadly pragmatist approach to meaning and communication. Two immensely useful guides in this venture are Robert Brandom and Paul Pietroski. Squarely in the Chomskyan tradition, Pietroskiâs recent book, Conjoining Meanings, offers an approach to natural-language semantics that rejects foundational assumptions widely held amongst philosophers and linguists. In particular, he argues against extensionalismâthe view that meanings are (or determine) truth and satisfaction conditions. Having arrived at the same conclusion by way of Brandomâs deflationist account of truth and reference, Iâll argue that both theorists have important contributions to make to a broader anti-extensionalist approach to language. What appears here as Part 1 of the essay is largely exegetical, laying out what I see as the core aspects of Brandomâs normative inferentialism (§1) and Pietroskiâs naturalistic semantics (§2). In Part 2 (next issue), I argue that there are many convergences between these two theoretical frameworks and, contrary to fi rst appearances, very few points of substantive disagreement between them. If the integration strategy that I propose is correct, then what appear to be sharply contrasting commitments are better seen as interrelated verbal differences that come down to differentâbut complementaryâexplanatory goals. The residual disputes are, however, stubborn. I end by discussing how to square Pietroskiâs commitment to predicativism with Brandomâs argument that a predicativist language is in principle incapable of expressing ordinary conditionals
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