49,103 research outputs found
Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games
suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection
pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak.
I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings
and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect)
zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in
evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more
lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation
of fellows unless the selection pressure is very strong. Then, zealous
cooperators can transform the population to be even fully cooperative under
standard evolutionary dynamics.Comment: 5 figure
Small games and long memories promote cooperation
Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing
evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary
biologists in particular the question is often how such behaviors can arise
\textit{de novo} in a simple evolving system. How can group behaviors such as
collective action, or decision making that accounts for memories of past
experience, emerge and persist? Evolutionary game theory provides a framework
for formalizing these questions and admitting them to rigorous study. Here we
develop such a framework to study the evolution of sustained collective action
in multi-player public-goods games, in which players have arbitrarily long
memories of prior rounds of play and can react to their experience in an
arbitrary way. To study this problem we construct a coordinate system for
memory- strategies in iterated -player games that permits us to
characterize all the cooperative strategies that resist invasion by any mutant
strategy, and thus stabilize cooperative behavior. We show that while larger
games inevitably make cooperation harder to evolve, there nevertheless always
exists a positive volume of strategies that stabilize cooperation provided the
population size is large enough. We also show that, when games are small,
longer-memory strategies make cooperation easier to evolve, by increasing the
number of ways to stabilize cooperation. Finally we explore the co-evolution of
behavior and memory capacity, and we find that longer-memory strategies tend to
evolve in small games, which in turn drives the evolution of cooperation even
when the benefits for cooperation are low
Eco-Evolutionary Feedback and the Invasion of Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism), thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on interdependent networks with Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift Game
The world in which we are living is a huge network of networks and should be
described by interdependent networks. The interdependence between networks
significantly affects the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on them.
Meanwhile, due to the diversity and complexity of social and biological
systems, players on different networks may not interact with each other by the
same way, which should be described by multiple models in evolutionary game
theory, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift Game. We therefore study
the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation on two interdependent networks playing
different games respectively. We clearly evidence that, with the increment of
network interdependence, the evolution of cooperation is dramatically promoted
on the network playing Prisoner's Dilemma. The cooperation level of the network
playing Snowdrift Game reduces correspondingly, although it is almost
invisible. In particular, there exists an optimal intermediate region of
network interdependence maximizing the growth rate of the evolution of
cooperation on the network playing Prisoner's Dilemma. Remarkably, players
contacting with other network have advantage in the evolution of cooperation
than the others on the same network.Comment: 6 pages, 6 figure
Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation
Real social interactions occur on networks in which each individual is
connected to some, but not all, of others. In social dilemma games with a fixed
population size, heterogeneity in the number of contacts per player is known to
promote evolution of cooperation. Under a common assumption of positively
biased payoff structure, well-connected players earn much by playing
frequently, and cooperation once adopted by well-connected players is
unbeatable and spreads to others. However, maintaining a social contact can be
costly, which would prevent local payoffs from being positively biased. In
replicator-type evolutionary dynamics, it is shown that even a relatively small
participation cost extinguishes the merit of heterogeneous networks in terms of
cooperation. In this situation, more connected players earn less so that they
are no longer spreaders of cooperation. Instead, those with fewer contacts win
and guide the evolution. The participation cost, or the baseline payoff, is
irrelevant in homogeneous populations but is essential for evolutionary games
on heterogeneous networks.Comment: 4 figures + 3 supplementary figure
Coevolutionary games - a mini review
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in
that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring
players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges
faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory
provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of
cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent
advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be
insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior.
Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been
recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend
the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the
understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to
evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another
property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary
rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of
players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on
evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a
didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with
the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research
that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects
of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely
open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.Comment: 24 two-column pages, 10 figures; accepted for publication in
BioSystem
The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote
cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward
and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and
investigated, mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently, Sasaki et
al. (2012, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:1165-1169) considered optional
participation as well as institutional incentives and described how the
interplay between these mechanisms affects the evolution of cooperation in
public good games. Here, we present a full classification of these evolutionary
dynamics. Specifically, whenever penalties are large enough to cause the
bi-stability of both cooperation and defection in cases in which participation
in the public good game is compulsory, these penalties will ultimately result
in cooperation if participation in the public good game is optional. The global
stability of coercion-based cooperation in this optional case contrasts
strikingly with the bi-stability that is observed in the compulsory case. We
also argue that optional participation is not so effective at improving
cooperation under rewards.Comment: 20 pages, 4 figure
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