Sensing Capacity for Markov Random Fields

This paper computes the sensing capacity of a sensor network, with sensors of limited range, sensing a two-dimensional Markov random field, by modeling the sensing operation as an encoder. Sensor observations are dependent across sensors, and the sensor network output across different states of the environment is neither identically nor independently distributed. Using a random coding argument, based on the theory of types, we prove a lower bound on the sensing capacity of the network, which characterizes the ability of the sensor network to distinguish among environments with Markov structure, to within a desired accuracy.Comment: To appear in the proceedings of the 2005 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, Adelaide, Australia, September 4-9, 200

The Economics of Small Worlds

We examine a simple economic model of network formation where agents benefit from indirect relationships. We show that small-world features—short path lengths between nodes together with highly clustered link structures—necessarily emerge for a wide set of parameters

On a Bounded Budget Network Creation Game

We consider a network creation game in which each player (vertex) has a fixed budget to establish links to other players. In our model, each link has unit price and each agent tries to minimize its cost, which is either its local diameter or its total distance to other players in the (undirected) underlying graph of the created network. Two versions of the game are studied: in the MAX version, the cost incurred to a vertex is the maximum distance between the vertex and other vertices, and in the SUM version, the cost incurred to a vertex is the sum of distances between the vertex and other vertices. We prove that in both versions pure Nash equilibria exist, but the problem of finding the best response of a vertex is NP-hard. We take the social cost of the created network to be its diameter, and next we study the maximum possible diameter of an equilibrium graph with n vertices in various cases. When the sum of players' budgets is n-1, the equilibrium graphs are always trees, and we prove that their maximum diameter is Theta(n) and Theta(log n) in MAX and SUM versions, respectively. When each vertex has unit budget (i.e. can establish link to just one vertex), the diameter of any equilibrium graph in either version is Theta(1). We give examples of equilibrium graphs in the MAX version, such that all vertices have positive budgets and yet the diameter is Omega(sqrt(log n)). This interesting (and perhaps counter-intuitive) result shows that increasing the budgets may increase the diameter of equilibrium graphs and hence deteriorate the network structure. Then we prove that every equilibrium graph in the SUM version has diameter 2^O(sqrt(log n)). Finally, we show that if the budget of each player is at least k, then every equilibrium graph in the SUM version is k-connected or has diameter smaller than 4.Comment: 28 pages, 3 figures, preliminary version appeared in SPAA'1