A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support

Reciprocal preferences have been introduced in the literature of social choice theory in order to deal with preference intensities. They allow individuals to show preference intensities in the unit interval among each pair of options. In this framework, majority based on difference in support can be used as a method of aggregation of individual preferences into a collective preference: option a is preferred to option b if the sum of the intensities for a exceeds the aggregated intensity of b in a threshold given by a real number located between 0 and the total number of voters. Based on a three dimensional geometric approach, we provide a geometric analysis of the non transitivity of the collective preference relations obtained by majority rule based on difference in support. This aspect is studied by assuming that each individual reciprocal preference satisfies a g-stochastic transitivity property, which is stronger than the usual notion of transitivit

Please, talk about it! When hotel popularity boosts preferences

Many consumers post on-line reviews, affecting the average evaluation of products and services. Yet, little is known about the importance of the number of reviews for consumer decision making. We conducted an on-line experiment (n= 168) to assess the joint impact of the average evaluation, a measure of quality, and the number of reviews, a measure of popularity, on hotel preference. The results show that consumers' preference increases with the number of reviews, independently of the average evaluation being high or low. This is not what one would expect from an informational point of view, and review websites fail to take this pattern into account. This novel result is mediated by demographics: young people, and in particular young males, are less affected by popularity, relying more on quality. We suggest the adoption of appropriate ranking mechanisms to fit consumer preferences. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd

La voluntad general de Rousseau como un límite al voto estratégico autointeresado

Condorcet’s voting method, as its extension known as the Kemeny-Young rule, is often seen as the incarnation of Rousseau’s general will. But the Kemeny-Young rule has problems when cycles in the social ranking arise. In particular, it can lead to choose a “covered” alternative, i.e. one for which there are candidates with better performances in pairwise comparisons. On the other hand, the uncovered set, the set of all the alternatives that are not covered, puts limits to insincere votes of sophisticated voters under certain conditions. Basically, voting insincerelly for a non-preferred alternative in order to favor the actually preferred candidate would lead to the choice of an uncovered alternative. We argue that Rousseau’s general will could be embodied in a different kind of rule than Kemeny-Young’s, with both epistemic credentials and whose outcomes are within the uncovered set altogether. In this work we begin to explore that possibility.Fil: Bodanza, Gustavo Adrian. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Linares, Sebastián. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Economía. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur; Argentin

Is the Endangered Species Act Endangering Species?

We develop theory and present a suite of theoretically consistent empirical measures to explore the extent to which market intervention inadvertently alters resource allocation in a sequentialmove principal/agent game. We showcase our approach empirically by exploring the extent to which the U.S. Endangered Species Act has altered land development patterns. We report evidence indicating significant acceleration of development directly after each of several events deemed likely to raise fears among owners of habitat land. Our preferred estimate suggests an overall acceleration of land development by roughly one year. We also find from complementary hedonic regression models that habitat parcels declined in value when the habitat map was published, which is consistent with our estimates of the degree of preemption. These results have clear implications for policymakers, who continue to discuss alternative regulatory frameworks for species preservation. More generally, our modeling strategies can be widely applied -- from any particular economic environment that has a sequential-move nature to the narrower case of the political economy of regulation.

A Domain-General Perspective on Deviancy: People’s Sensitivity to Deviancy and its Social Consequences

In this dissertation, I propose that people’s sensitivity to deviancy is a domain-general phenomenon—an aspect of the individual experience that manifests across distinct domains. Supporting this possibility, across a multi-faceted approach (cross-cultural, developmental, nonconscious processes), I document that people’s responses to deviancy—their evaluative and affective responses to distortions in regularities and patterns—overlap across highly divergent domains (e.g., nonsocial stimuli, social actions, physical characteristics, nonvisual stimuli, visual stimuli). Additionally, in line with this broad conceptualization of deviancy, I find that people’s domain-general responding towards deviancy is largely negative in affect, emerges at a young age, exists cross-culturally, and may even causally contribute to complex social phenomena, such as prejudice. Collectively, these findings highlight the potential of adopting a broad domain-general conceptual understanding of deviancy to gain new traction on fundamental questions asked in social and cognitive psychology

Congressional Vote Options

Among political practitioners, there is conventional wisdom about the outcomes of critical and salient legislative votes. 'This vote,' we hear, ' will either win by a little or lose by a lot.' Real-world examples suggest coalition leaders purchase 'hip-pocket' votes and "if you need me" pledges, which are converted to favorable votes when they will yield a victory. When the outcome is uncertain, such a process -- securing commitments in advance and calling them in if necessary -- is advantageous relative to traditional vote buying. Excess votes are not bought, nor are votes purchased for a losing effort. In effect, the leader secures options on votes. Given uncertainty, buying vote options yields two outcomes in conceivably winnable situations, one a narrow victory, the other a substantial loss. Such a distribution of outcomes is not explicable in a traditional vote-buying framework. We look for evidence of this pattern -- the tracings of 'if you need me pledges' -- by examining all Congressional Quarterly key votes from 1975 through 1998. On these critical and salient votes, narrow victories are much more frequent than narrow losses. Furthermore, when leaders lose key votes, as predicted, they lose by bigger margins than when they win. Finally, we discuss leadership strategies for keeping 'narrow wins' from unraveling into 'big losses.'