27,616 research outputs found
Diversification Preferences in the Theory of Choice
Diversification represents the idea of choosing variety over uniformity.
Within the theory of choice, desirability of diversification is axiomatized as
preference for a convex combination of choices that are equivalently ranked.
This corresponds to the notion of risk aversion when one assumes the
von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model, but the equivalence fails to
hold in other models. This paper studies axiomatizations of the concept of
diversification and their relationship to the related notions of risk aversion
and convex preferences within different choice theoretic models. Implications
of these notions on portfolio choice are discussed. We cover model-independent
diversification preferences, preferences within models of choice under risk,
including expected utility theory and the more general rank-dependent expected
utility theory, as well as models of choice under uncertainty axiomatized via
Choquet expected utility theory. Remarks on interpretations of diversification
preferences within models of behavioral choice are given in the conclusion
Risk, ambiguity, and the separation of utility and beliefs.
We introduce a general model of static choice under uncertainty, arguably the weakest model achieving a separation of cardinal utility and a unique representation of beliefs. Most of the non-expected utility models existing in the literature are special cases of it. Such separation is motivated by the view that tastes are constant, whereas beliefs change with new information. The model has a simple and natural axiomatization. Elsewhere (forthcoming) we show that it can be very helpful in the characterization of a notion of ambiguity aversion, as separating utility and beliefs allows to identify and remove aspects of risk attitude from the decision makerās behavior. Here we show that the model allows to generalize several results on the characterization of risk aversion in betting behavior. These generalizations are of independent interest, as they show that some traditional results for subjective expected utility preferences can be formulated only in terms of binary acts.
A subjective spin on roulette wheels.
We provide a behavioral foundation to the notion of āmixtureā of acts, which is used to great advantage in he decision setting introduced by Anscombe and Aumann. Our construction allows one to formulate mixture-space axioms even in a fully sub-jective setting, without assuming the existence of randomizing devices. This simplifies the task of developing axiomatic models which only use behavioral data. Moreover, it is immune from the difficulty that agents may ādistortā the probabilities associated with randomizing devices. For illustration, we present simple subjective axiomatizations of some models of choice under uncertainty, including the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler, and Bewleyās model of choice with incomplete preferences.
From Wald to Savage: homo economicus becomes a Bayesian statistician
Bayesian rationality is the paradigm of rational behavior in neoclassical economics. A rational agent in an economic model is one who maximizes her subjective expected utility and consistently revises her beliefs according to Bayesās rule. The paper raises the question of how, when and why this characterization of rationality came to be endorsed by mainstream economists. Though no definitive answer is provided, it is argued that the question is far from trivial and of great historiographic importance. The story begins with Abraham Waldās behaviorist approach to statistics and culminates with Leonard J. Savageās elaboration of subjective expected utility theory in his 1954 classic The Foundations of Statistics. It is the latterās acknowledged fiasco to achieve its planned goal, the reinterpretation of traditional inferential techniques along subjectivist and behaviorist lines, which raises the puzzle of how a failed project in statistics could turn into such a tremendous hit in economics. A couple of tentative answers are also offered, involving the role of the consistency requirement in neoclassical analysis and the impact of the postwar transformation of US business schools.Savage, Wald, rational behavior, Bayesian decision theory, subjective probability, minimax rule, statistical decision functions, neoclassical economics
A Behavioral Characterization of Plausible Priors
One of the last great novels of JosĆ© Saramago, Death with Interruptions, begins with an epigraph taken from Ludwig Wittgenstein: āIf, for example, you were to think more deeply about death, then it would be truly strange if, in so doing, you did not encounter new images, new linguistic fieldsā. The aim of my paper is to ponder on what kind of a new language game the Portuguese writer is offering us in his book and how to interpret his investigations from the angle of another contemporary literary and philosophical thanatological discourses.One of the last great novels of JosĆ© Saramago, Death with Interruptions, begins with an epigraph taken from Ludwig Wittgenstein: āIf, for example, you were to think more deeply about death, then it would be truly strange if, in so doing, you did not encounter new images, new linguistic fieldsā. The aim of my paper is to ponder on what kind of a new language game the Portuguese writer is offering us in his book and how to interpret his investigations from the angle of another contemporary literary and philosophical thanatological discourses
Rational Preferences under Ambiguity
This paper analyzes preferences in the presence of ambiguity that are rational in the sense of satisfying the classical ordering condition as well as monotonicity. Under technical conditions that are natural in an Anscombe-Aumann environment, we show that even for such general preference model it is possible to identify a set of priors, as first envisioned by Ellsberg (1961). We then discuss ambiguity attitudes, as well as unambiguous acts and events, for the class of rational preferences we consider.Rational Preferences; Ambiguity; Unambiguous Acts and Events
Decision-Making in the Context of Imprecise Probabilistic Beliefs
Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modelled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations admitting a multiple-prior representation. Under a structural assumption of Equidivisibility, we provide an axiomatization of such relations and show uniqueness of the representation. In the second part of the paper, we formulate a behaviorally general axiom relating preferences and probabilistic beliefs which implies that preferences over unambiguous acts are probabilistically sophisticated and which entails representability of preferences over Savage acts in an Anscombe-Aumann-style framework. The motivation for an explicit and separate axiomatization of beliefs for the study of decision-making under ambiguity is discussed in some detail.
Awareness-Dependent Subjective Expected Utility
We develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2011a) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. We observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and only if her choices reveal that the event is ``null'' and the negation of the event is ``null''. Moreover, we characterize ``impersonal'' expected utility that is behaviorally indistinguishable from awareness-dependent subject expected utility and assigns probability zero to some subsets of states that are not necessarily events. We discuss in what sense probability zero can model unawareness.unawareness, awareness, unforeseen contingencies, null, probability zero, subjective probability, Anscombe-Aumann, small worlds
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