Social Facts Explained and Presupposed

Attempts are often made to explain collective action in terms of the interaction of individuals. A common objection to such attempts is that they are circular: Since every interaction presupposes the existence of common practices and common practices involve collective action, no analysis of collective agency in terms of interaction can reduce collectivity away. In this essay I will argue that this does not constitute a real circularity. It is true that common practices are presupposed in every attempt to explain collective action. However, this does not mean that every analysis of collective action presupposes an understanding of collective action. Common practices do not involve or presuppose particular collective actions. They are more fundamental than individual or collective agency. The subject of a common practice is not a "us" or "them", but the impersonal "one": "One does this and that". What "one does" is not yet a joint activity. It is not a particular action at all

Collective Action Federalism and Its Discontents

An increasing number of scholars argue that the Commerce Clause is best read in light of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the Articles of Confederation. The work of these “collective action theorists” is reflected in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. Writing for four Justices, she stressed the “collective-action impasse” at the state level to which the Affordable Care Act responds. In its purest form, a collective action approach maintains that the existence of a significant problem of collective action facing two or more states is both necessary and sufficient for Congress to address the problem by relying on the Commerce Clause. Unlike nationalist defenders of unlimited federal commerce power, a collective action approach does not ask whether the regulated conduct substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate. Unlike federalist defenders of limited federal commerce power, a collective action approach does not focus on the distinction between economic and noneconomic conduct, or between regulating and requiring commerce. Accordingly, nationalists may agree that a collective action problem is sufficient for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree that it is necessary. By contrast, federalists may agree that a collective action problem is necessary for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree that it is sufficient. This Essay anticipates such criticism. Regarding the nationalist critique of a collective action approach, I argue that the nationalist “substantial effects” test imposes no judicially enforceable limits on the scope of the Commerce Clause. I also argue that nationalists may define multistate collective action problems too narrowly. In addition to races to the bottom, collective action problems include interstate externalities that do not cause races to the bottom. Broadening the definition of multistate collective action problems to include interstate externalities gives rise to the federalist objection that every subject Congress might want to address can plausibly be described as a collective action problem. Federalists may further object that the Commerce Clause is limited to “Commerce.” In response, I argue that “Commerce” is best understood broadly to encompass many social interactions outside markets, as Professors Jack Balkin and Akhil Amar have urged. I also argue that a collective action approach need not validate unlimited federal commerce power. Specifically, I identify three ways of limiting the kinds of interstate externalities that justify use of the Commerce Clause

Gender and collective action: A conceptual framework for analysis

"This paper presents a framework for investigating the intersection of collective action and gender; i.e. how gender-oriented analysis can foster more effective collective action in the context of agriculture and natural resource management and how collective action can be used as a vehicle for gender equity. We begin with definitions of the key concepts and then present three entry points for a gendered analysis of collective action-motivations, effectiveness, and impact on gender equity- vis-à-vis the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework(Oakerson 1992; Ostrom 1991). At the heart of this framework is the action arena, which is shaped by a host of initial conditions, including asset endowments, vulnerabilities, and legal and governance systems that influence a range of outcomes. Applying a gender lens to this framework, we present an analysis of how women and men experience the initial set of conditions differently and thus, have different motivations and capacities for engaging in collective action. Next, we look at how the gender composition of groups affects theeffectiveness of collective action, and finally, at the impact of collective action on gender equity and women's empowerment. We conclude with a discussion of how this framework can improve our understanding of gender and collective action in order to facilitate more effective collective action while fostering gender equity." Author's AbstractGender, Collective action,

Collective Intentionality

In this chapter, we focus on collective action and intention, and their relation to conventions, status functions, norms, institutions, and shared attitudes more generally. Collective action and shared intention play a foundational role in our understanding of the social. The three central questions in the study of collective intentionality are: (1) What is the ontology of collective intentionality? In particular, are groups per se intentional agents, as opposed to just their individual members? (2) What is the psychology of collective intentionality? Do groups per se have psychological states, in particular propositional attitudes? What is the psychology of the individuals who participate in collective intentional behavior? What is special about their participatory intentions, their we-intentions, as they are called (Tuomela and Miller 1988), as opposed to their I-intentions? (3) How is collective intentionality implicated in the construction of social reality? In particular, how does the content of we-intentions and the intentional activity of individual agents create social institutions, practices and structures? We first discuss collective action and shared intention in informal groups. Next we discuss mechanisms for constructing institutional structures out of the conceptual and psychological resources made available by our understanding of informal joint intentional action. Then we extend the discussion of collective action and intention to institutional groups, such as the Supreme Court, and explain how concepts of such organizations are constructed out of the concepts of a rule, convention, and status function. Finally we discuss collective attitudes beyond intention

Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8

The Framers of the United States Constitution wrote Article I, Section 8 in order to address some daunting collective action problems facing the young nation. They especially wanted to protect the states from military warfare by foreigners and from commercial warfare against one another. The states acted individually when they needed to act collectively, and Congress lacked power under the Articles of Confederation to address these problems. Section 8 thus authorized Congress to promote the “general Welfare” of the United States by tackling many collective action problems that the states could not solve on their own. Subsequent interpretations of Section 8, both outside and inside the courts, often have focused on the presence or absence of collective action problems involving multiple states—but not always. For example, the Supreme Court of the United States, in trying to distinguish the “truly national” from the “truly local” in the context of the Commerce Clause, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000), has differentiated “economic” activity, which Congress may regulate, from “noneconomic” activity, which Congress may not regulate. A federal constitution ideally gives the central and state governments the power to do what each does best. Economic activity does not generally cause collective action problems among the states, and noneconomic activity is not generally free from collective action problems. Consequently, Congress is not generally better at regulating economic activity, and the states are not generally better at regulating noneconomic activity. The distinction between economic and noneconomic activity seems mostly irrelevant to the problems of federalism. We propose a better foundation for American federalism in Section 8. Our theory distinguishes activities that pose collective action problems from those that do not. This approach flows directly from the relative advantages of the federal government and the states. We show that Section 8 mostly concerns collective action problems created by interstate externalities and national markets. We conclude that Section 8 authorizes Congress to tax, spend, and regulate to solve these collective action problems. Collective action federalism finds that the limits and expanse of congressional power in Section 8 turn on the difference between individual and collective action by the states. The theory uses this distinction to differentiate interstate commerce from intrastate commerce, not the economic/noneconomic distinction. Our distinction best explains why Congress may not ordinarily use its commerce power to regulate such crimes as assault or gun possession in schools. Collective action federalism also identifies a constitutional “hook” for Congress to regulate multi-state problems of collective action that may not involve commerce: Clause 1 of Section 8 authorizes some forms of regulation of noneconomic harms that spill over state boundaries, such as contagious diseases and certain kinds of environmental pollution

Collective action in space: assessing how collective action varies across an African landscape

This paper develops and applies a new approach for analyzing the spatial aspects of individual adoption of a technology that produces a mixed public-private good. The technology is an animal insecticide treatment called a “pouron” that individual households buy and apply to their animals. Private benefits accrue to households whose animals are treated, while the public benefits accrue to all those who own animals within an area of effective suppression. A model of household demand for pourons is presented. As a private good, household demand for the variable input depends upon output price, input cost, and household characteristics. Input costs for pouron treatments include both the market price of the pourons and the transaction costs that the household must incur to obtain the treatments. Demand also depends upon the way that each household expects its neighbors to respond to one's own behavior. Free-riding is expected in communities with no tradition or formal organization to support collective action. Greater cooperation is expected in communities that have organizations that reward cooperative behavior and punish deviant behavior. Data for estimation of the model were collected for all of the 5,000 households that reside within the study area of 350 square kilometers in southwest Ethiopia. Geographic reference data were collected for every household using portable Geographic Positioning System units. GIS software was used to generate spatial variables. Variables for distance from the household to the nearest treatment center and number of cattle-owning neighbors within a 1-kilometer radius of the household were created. The density of cattle-owning neighbors was used as a measure of the potential benefits from cooperation; this variable was expected to have a positive effect on household pouron demand in communities able to support effective collective action and a negative effect in communities not able to support effective collective action. A set of community binary variables was interacted with the density variable to capture differences between communities. The results confirm the importance of the household-level variables. The results also indicate large differences in ability to cooperate between local administrative units. Everything else equal, the areas least able to cooperate were located farthest from the treatment center, were ethnically heterogenous, and had a different ethnic composition than areas around the treatment centers.

Water governance and institutional change

This dissertation is about water governance and institutional change. The focus on water governance means that we are interested in collective action with respect to water issues, which is not restricted to government action by public authorities, but includes involvement and participative action by private stakeholders. Furthermore, it means that we are not only interested in the `action aspect¿ of collective action, but also in the complexity of the\ud institutional context in which collective action is embedded and achieved. The focus on institutional change means that we are interested in the evolution of the public domain, the interaction with the private domain, and the shifting boundaries of the public/private divide

Perceiving and Feeling Personal Discrimination: Motivation or Inhibition for Collective action?

Relative deprivation and group consciousness theories differ in their predictions of how personal discrimination and personal discontent will be related to taking collective action. According to relative deprivation theory, assessments of personal status should be unrelated to taking collective action. In contrast, group consciousness theories suggest that while perceiving personal discrimination is necessary for collective action to occur, feelings of personal discontent may inhibit it. Female students completed questionnaires assessing their perceptions of, and affective responses to personal discrimination, as well as their participation in collective actions. A hierarchical regression analysis found that personal discrimination and discontent interacted such that among women who perceived personal discrimination, women took the most collective actions when they did not feel personally discontent with their status. Implications for the relationship between negative emotions and intergroup behavior were discussed

Collective action in ant control:

Leaf-cutting ants (Atta. cephalotes) represents a serious problem to farmers in many parts of Latin America and accounts of ants eating up a whole cassava plot or destroying one or more fruit trees overnight are not uncommon. Ants do not respect farm boundaries. Therefore, farmers who control anthills on their own fields might still face damage on their crops caused by ants coming from neighboring fields where no control measures are taken. In that sense, crop damage caused by leaf-cutting ants constitutes a transboundary natural resource management problem which, in addition to technical interventions, requires organizational interventions to ensure a coordinated effort among farmers to be solved. This paper reports on a research effort initiated by CIAT and implemented jointly between CIAT and farmers in La Laguna - a small community in the Andean Hillsides of Southwestern Colombia. The objective of the research effort was two-fold: i) to identify low cost technical options for ant control, and ii) to analyze and visualize the transboundary nature of the ant control problem and thus identify organizational options to enable collective or coordinated ant control.