Analysing Relations involving small number of Monomials in AES S- Box

In the present day, AES is one the most widely used and most secure Encryption Systems prevailing. So, naturally lots of research work is going on to mount a significant attack on AES. Many different forms of Linear and differential cryptanalysis have been performed on AES. Of late, an active area of research has been Algebraic Cryptanalysis of AES, where although fast progress is being made, there are still numerous scopes for research and improvement. One of the major reasons behind this being that algebraic cryptanalysis mainly depends on I/O relations of the AES S- Box (a major component of the AES). As, already known, that the key recovery algorithm of AES can be broken down as an MQ problem which is itself considered hard. Solving these equations depends on our ability reduce them into linear forms which are easily solvable under our current computational prowess. The lower the degree of these equations, the easier it is for us to linearlize hence the attack complexity reduces. The aim of this paper is to analyze the various relations involving small number of monomials of the AES S- Box and to answer the question whether it is actually possible to have such monomial equations for the S- Box if we restrict the degree of the monomials. In other words this paper aims to study such equations and see if they can be applicable for AES.Comment: 5 pages, 1 tabl

The Law and Economics of Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information from Non-Cartel Investigations to Prosecute Cartels

I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures that govern information use. Reviewing the management and corporate strategy literature, I note that M&As form a vital part of firms’ core business strategy, with the longer-run strategic aspects being more important. These longer-run strategies could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which would punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect. I also discuss the potential downsides related to Type 1 errors and administrative costs. Overall, I argue that the proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the fight against hardcore cartels that operate within jurisdictions as well as internationally.cartels, enforcement, law and economics

Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?

Does improving creditor coordination by strengthening CACs lead to efficiency gains in the functioning of sovereign bond markets? We address this question in a model featuring both debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information. Conditional on default, we characterize the interim efficient CAC threshold and show that strengthening CACs away from unanimity results in interim welfare gains. However, once the impact of strengthening CACs on debtor’s incentives are taken into account, we demonstrate the robust possibility of a conflict between ex ante and interim efficiency. We calibrate our model to quantify such a welfare trade-o¤ and discuss the policy implications of our results.Sovereign Debt, Coordination, Moral Hazard, Collective Action Clauses, Ex Ante, Ex Post, Efficiency