Were Bush Tax Cut Supporters “Simply Ignorant?” A Second Look at Conservatives and Liberals in “Homer Gets a Tax Cut”

In a recent edition of Perspectives on Politics, Larry Bartels examines the high levels of support for tax cuts signed into law by President Bush in 2001. In so doing, he characterizes the opinions of “ordinary people” as being based on “simple-minded and sometimes misguided considerations of self interest” and concludes that “the strong plurality support for Bush’s tax cut...is entirely attributable to simple ignorance.” Our analysis of the same data reveals different results. We show that for a large and politically relevant class of respondents – people who describe themselves as “conservative” or “Republican” – increasing information levels increase support for the tax cuts to the extent that they have any affect at all. Indeed, using Bartels’ measure of political information, we show that the Republican respondents rated most informed supported the tax cuts at extraordinarily high levels (over 96%). For these citizens, Bartels’ claim that “better-informed respondents were much more likely to express negative views about the 2001 tax cut” is simply untrue. We then show that Bartels’ results depend on a very strong assumption about how information affects public opinion. He restricts all respondents -- whether liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat – to respond to increasing information levels in identical ways. In other words, he assumes that if more information about the tax cut makes liberals less likely to support it, then conservatives must follow suit. This assumption is very presumptive about the policy and value trade- offs that different people should make. Our analysis, by contrast, allows people of different partisan or ideological identities to react to higher information levels in varying ways. This flexibility has many benefits, one of which is a direct test of Bartels’ restrictive assumption. We demonstrate that the assumption is untrue. Examined several ways, our findings suggest that much of the support for the tax cut was attributable to something other than “simple ignorance.” Bartels’ approach is based on a very strong presumption about how citizens should think and what they should think about. We advocate a different approach, one that takes questions of public policy seriously while respecting ideological and partisan differences in opinion and interest. Indeed, citizens have reasons for the opinions and interests they have. We may or may not agree with them. However, we, as social scientists, can contribute more by offering reliable explanations of these reasons than we can by judging them prematurely. By turning our attention to explaining differences of opinion, we can help to forge a stronger and more credible foundation for progress in meeting critical social needs.public opinion, tax policy, incomplete information, welfare economics

Were Bush Tax Cut Supporters "Simply Ignorant?" A Second Look at Conservatives and Liberals in "Homer Gets a Tax Cut"

In a recent edition of Perspectives on Politics, Larry Bartels examines the high levels of support for tax cuts signed into law by President Bush in 2001. In so doing, he characterizes the opinions of “ordinary people” as lacking “a moral basis” and as being based on “simple-minded and sometimes misguided considerations of self interest.” He concludes that “the strong plurality support for Bush’s tax cut...is entirely attributable to simple ignorance.” Our analysis of the same data reveals different results. We show that for a large and politically relevant class of respondents – people who describe themselves as “conservative” or “Republican” – rising information levels increase support for the tax cuts. Indeed, using Bartels’ measure of political information, we show that the Republican respondents rated “most informed” supported the tax cuts at extraordinarily high levels (over 96%). For these citizens, Bartels’ claim that “better-informed respondents were much more likely to express negative views about the 2001 tax cut” is simply untrue. We then show that Bartels’ results depend on a very strong assumption about how information affects public opinion. He restricts all respondents -- whether liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat – to respond to increasing information levels in identical ways. In other words, he assumes that if more information about the tax cut makes liberals less likely to support it, then conservatives must follow suit. This assumption is very presumptive about the policy trade-offs that different people should make. Our analysis, by contrast, allows people of different partisan or ideological identities to react to higher information levels in varying ways. This flexibility has many benefits, one of which is a direct test of Bartels’ restrictive assumption. We demonstrate that the assumption is untrue. Examined several ways, our findings suggest that much of the support for the tax cut was attributable to something other than “simple ignorance.” Bartels’ approach is based on a very strong presumption about how citizens should think and what they should think about. We advocate a different approach, one that takes questions of public policy seriously while respecting ideological and partisan differences in opinion and interest. Indeed, citizens have reasons for the opinions and interests they have. We may or may not agree with them. However, we, as social scientists, can contribute more by offering reliable explanations of these reasons than we can by judging them prematurely. By turning our attention to explaining differences of opinion, we can help to forge a stronger and more credible foundation for progress in meeting critical social needs.tax cut; President Bush; Republicans; conservatives; information; competence; public policy

Which Public Goods are Endangered?: How Evolving Communication Technologies Affect The Logic of Collective Action

The theory in Mancur Olson's The Logicof Collective Action is built fromhistorically uncontroversial assumptionsabout interpersonal communication. Today,evolving technologies are changingcommunication dynamics in ways thatinvalidate some of these onceuncontroversial assumptions. How dothese changes affect Olson's thesis? Usingresearch tools that were not available toOlson, we differentiate collective actionsthat new communication technologies helpfrom the endeavors that they hurt. In theprocess, we refine some of Olson'sbest-known ideas. For example, we find thatevolving communication technologieseliminate many of the organizationaladvantages that Olson attributed to smallgroups.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45506/1/11127_2004_Article_5142797.pd

When select committees speak, do newspapers listen?

It is frequently claimed that the House of Commons’ select committees have grown in prominence since key reforms were implemented in 2010. Brian J. Gaines, Mark Goodwin, Stephen Holden Bates and Gisela Sin test this claim specifically in relation to press coverage. They find a pattern of increased newspaper attention after the reforms, but caution that these results show no consistent sustained increase, and also vary considerably depending on committee

Were Bush Tax Cut Supporters "Simply Ignorant?" A Second Look at Conservatives and Liberals in "Homer Gets a Tax Cut"

In a recent edition of Perspectives on Politics, Larry Bartels examines the high levels of support for tax cuts signed into law by President Bush in 2001. In so doing, he characterizes the opinions of “ordinary people” as lacking “a moral basis” and as being based on “simple-minded and sometimes misguided considerations of self interest.” He concludes that “the strong plurality support for Bush’s tax cut...is entirely attributable to simple ignorance.” Our analysis of the same data reveals different results. We show that for a large and politically relevant class of respondents – people who describe themselves as “conservative” or “Republican” – rising information levels increase support for the tax cuts. Indeed, using Bartels’ measure of political information, we show that the Republican respondents rated “most informed” supported the tax cuts at extraordinarily high levels (over 96%). For these citizens, Bartels’ claim that “better-informed respondents were much more likely to express negative views about the 2001 tax cut” is simply untrue. We then show that Bartels’ results depend on a very strong assumption about how information affects public opinion. He restricts all respondents -- whether liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat – to respond to increasing information levels in identical ways. In other words, he assumes that if more information about the tax cut makes liberals less likely to support it, then conservatives must follow suit. This assumption is very presumptive about the policy trade-offs that different people should make. Our analysis, by contrast, allows people of different partisan or ideological identities to react to higher information levels in varying ways. This flexibility has many benefits, one of which is a direct test of Bartels’ restrictive assumption. We demonstrate that the assumption is untrue. Examined several ways, our findings suggest that much of the support for the tax cut was attributable to something other than “simple ignorance.” Bartels’ approach is based on a very strong presumption about how citizens should think and what they should think about. We advocate a different approach, one that takes questions of public policy seriously while respecting ideological and partisan differences in opinion and interest. Indeed, citizens have reasons for the opinions and interests they have. We may or may not agree with them. However, we, as social scientists, can contribute more by offering reliable explanations of these reasons than we can by judging them prematurely. By turning our attention to explaining differences of opinion, we can help to forge a stronger and more credible foundation for progress in meeting critical social needs

Overweight/Obesity and Respiratory and Allergic Disease in Children: International Study of Asthma and Allergies in Childhood (ISAAC) Phase Two

BackgroundChildhood obesity and asthma are increasing worldwide. A possible link between the two conditions has been postulated.MethodsCross-sectional studies of stratified random samples of 8–12-year-old children (n = 10 652) (16 centres in affluent and 8 centres in non-affluent countries) used the standardized methodology of ISAAC Phase Two. Respiratory and allergic symptoms were ascertained by parental questionnaires. Tests for allergic disease were performed. Height and weight were measured, and overweight and obesity were defined according to international definitions. Prevalence rates and prevalence odds ratios were calculated.ResultsOverweight (odds ratio = 1.14, 95%-confidence interval: 0.98; 1.33) and obesity (odds ratio = 1.67, 95%-confidence interval: 1.25; 2.21) were related to wheeze. The relationship was stronger in affluent than in non-affluent centres. Similar results were found for cough and phlegm, rhinitis and eczema but the associations were mostly driven by children with wheeze. There was a clear association of overweight and obesity with airways obstruction (change in FEV1/FVC, −0.90, 95%-confidence interval: −1.33%; −0.47%, for overweight and −2.46%, 95%-confidence interval: −3.84%; −1.07%, for obesity) whereas the results for the other objective markers, including atopy, were null.ConclusionsOur data from a large international child population confirm that there is a strong relation of body mass index with wheeze especially in affluent countries. Moreover, body mass index is associated with an objective marker of airways obstruction (FEV1/FVC) but no other objective markers of respiratory and allergic disorders

Education on the way : el paper de les organitzacions internacionals governamentals i no governamentals en l'educació dels menors refugiats a Turquia

Treball de Fi de Grau en Dret. Curs 2015-2016Tutora: Sílvia Morgades GilTurquia s’ha convertit en el país que acull més refugiats i sol·licitants d’asil. Davant la/ncreixent onada de persones que en els últims quatre anys, a causa, principalment, de la guerra/ni la presència de l’Estat Islàmic a Síria, han anat arribant als camps de refugiats i a les àrees/nurbanes de Turquia i tenint en consideració l’elevat nombre de menors que hi ha entre ells, és/nimportant fer èmfasi en l’educació, un dret bàsic i fonamental que sovint queda desatès, ja/nsigui de manera intermitent o permanent, en aquests contextos. A través de l’anàlisi de/ndiversos documents sobre la matèria, entrevistes i experiència personal s’ha estudiat la tasca/nde les organitzacions internacionals governamentals, com l’Alt Comissionat de les Nacions/nUnides pels Refugiats (ACNUR) i el Fons de Nacions Unides per la Infantesa (UNICEF), i no/ngovernamentals, com Qnushyo, the Assyrian-Sirian School in Istanbul, en l’educació dels/nmenors refugiats a Turquia. Es conclou que juguen un paper fonamental en la protecció, el/nbenestar, la integració, el desenvolupament i l’estabilitat dels menors refugiats però que/naquest queda debilitat a causa de la insuficiència de recursos econòmics i acció en el camp,/nambdós aspectes millorables. D’altra banda, s’observa la importància i la necessitat de/nfomentar l’educació per a la pau com a eina de canvi

Vetos parciales e intentos de insistencia en legislaturas multipartidistas

This paper analyzes the dynamics of vetoes and veto overrides in the context of a multiparty legislature using an original dataset from the period 1983–2007 in Argentina. We argue that the President can use an “item” or “partial” veto to selectively delete articles, while keeping enough distributive goods in the bill to break up the coalition responsible for its passage, thereby eliminating support for an override. Our research reveals that total vetoes – which affect all legislators equally – are more likely to be overridden than partial vetoes. Contradicting the received wisdom that in multiparty legislatures override attempts are more likely under a divided government, we find that override attempts are more likely in plurality governments. We use case analyses to illustrate the main arguments developed in this paper.El trabajo estudia las dinámicas desatadas por la práctica del veto presidencial e insistencias del congreso, en el contexto de legislaturas multipartidarias, a través del análisis de una base de datos original que abarca el período 1983-2007 en Argentina. El trabajo argumenta que el presidente puede usar el veto parcial para quitar del texto, en forma selectiva, artículos puntuales, dejando al mismo tiempo en el texto bienes distributivos suficientes como para romper la coalición responsable de la aprobación del proyecto, de manera tal de eliminar la posibilidad de una insistencia. La investigación revela que los vetos totales, que afectan por igual a todos los legisladores, son más factibles de ser insistidos que los vetos parciales. En contra de lo sostenido al momento acerca de que en legislaturas multipartidarias los intentos de insistencia son más factibles bajo gobierno dividido, este trabajo encuentra que son más factibles cuando el gobierno cuenta con al menos una pluralidad en una de las cámaras. Además del análisis cuantitativo, presentamos estudios de casos para ilustrar los argumentos desarrollados en el artículo