Sovereignty and Multilateralism

In the remainder of this essay I explore several issues raised by the linkages between sovereignty and multilateralism. In Part II, I critique McGinnis\u27 positive claims about multilateral cooperation, and his attempt to normatively distinguish international trade law from other forms of multilateralism. Part III then inquires into the nature of the democracy problem in international law. I argue that a focus on the substance of international legal agreements is not compelling. I present a basic framework for analysis of the democracy problem, and use it to suggest a better approach, which instead focuses on the structure and process of international lawmaking. Part IV then briefly considers the question of sovereignty in light of recent theorizing on the changing nature and meaning of sovereignty. Part V concludes

Addressing the Global Tragedy of Needless Pain: Rethinking the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

The lack of medical availability of effective pain medication is an enduring and expanding global health calamity. Despite important medical advances, pain remains severely under-treated worldwide, particularly in developing countries. This article contributes to the discussion of this global health crisis by considering international legal and institutional mechanisms to promote wider accessibility to critical narcotic drugs for pain relief

The Domestication of International Commitments

International commitments generally become binding domestic law through a complex process of "domestication" or transformation. Without this process, international commitments frequently lack force or even meaning at the national level, where implementation actually takes place. This paper explores the legal process of implementation and examines how international commitments are transformed into domestic law in six OECD nations: the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. To the degree that institutional design affects the output of complex organizations (e.g. governments), the variations in the process of domestication should affect compliance with and the implementation of international commitments. The rules of ratification, interpretation, judicial challenge, and the priority or ranking of treaty commitments vis-a-vis ordinary statutory law are all surveyed and found to vary widely. These factors appear to interact in complex ways. In addition to some simple hypotheses derived from the institutional variations uncovered, three main conclusions emerge: formal institutional rules appear in practice to be substantially modified and/or elaborated by informal rules and methods; the complexity of both formal rules and actual practice in the domestication of international agreements raises doubts about the importance--and the ascertainability--of legality regarding international commitments; and, these first two conclusions are likely to become less certain over time as the insulation of the executive in foreign affairs--which is a major underlying cause of these conclusions--decreases in response to changes in the nature and scope of international law

The drivers of regulatory networking: policy learning between homophily and convergence

The literature on transnational regulatory networks identified interdependence as their main rationale, downplaying domestic factors. Typically, relevant contributions use the word “network” only metaphorically. Yet, informal ties between regulators constitute networked structures of collaboration, which can be measured and explained. Regulators choose their frequent, regular network partners. What explains those choices? This article develops an Exponential Random Graph Model of the network of European national energy regulators to identify the drivers of informal regulatory networking. The results show that regulators tend to network with peers who regulate similarly organised market structures. Geography and European policy frameworks also play a role. Overall, the British regulator is significantly more active and influential than its peers, and a divide emerges between regulators from EU-15 and others. Therefore, formal frameworks of cooperation (i.e. a European Agency) were probably necessary to foster regulatory coordination across the EU

Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System

This Article explores issues at the frontier of international law and constitutional law. It considers five key structural and systemic challenges that the international legal system now faces: (1) decentralization and disaggregation; (2) normative and institutional hierarchies; (3) compliance and enforcement; (4) exit and escape; and (5) democracy and legitimacy. Each of these issues raises questions of governance, institutional design, and allocation of authority paralleling the questions that domestic legal systems have answered in constitutional terms. For each of these issues, I survey the international legal landscape and consider the salience of potential analogies to domestic constitutions, drawing upon and extending the writings of international legal scholars and international relations theorists. I also offer some preliminary thoughts about why some treaties and institutions, but not others, more readily lend themselves to analysis in constitutional terms. And I distinguish those legal and political issues that may generate useful insights for scholars studying the growing intersections of international and constitutional law from other areas that may be more resistant to constitutional analogies