Calling vs Receiving Party Pays: Market Penetration and the Importance of the Call Externality

In this paper we study how the access price affects the choice of the tariff regime taken by the network operators. We show that for high values of the access price, that is taken as a parameter by the firms, networks decide to charge only the callers. Otherwise, for low values of the access charge, networks charge also the receivers. Moreover, we compare market penetration and total welfare between the two price regimes. Our model suggests that, for high values of call externality, market penetration and total welfare are larger in Receiving Party Pays regime when the access charge is close to zero.Gender Segregation, Occupational Aspirations, Children, Socialization, Agency, Personality Traits, Mechanisms, British Household Panel Survey

Calling vs receiving party pays : market penetration and the importance of the call externality

In this paper we study how the access price affects the choice of the tariff regime taken by the network operators. We show that for high values of the access price, that is taken as a parameter by the firms, networks decide to charge only the callers. Otherwise, for low values of the access charge, networks charge also the receivers. Moreover, we compare market penetration and total welfare between the two price regimes. Our model suggests that, for high values of call externality, market penetration and total welfare are larger in Receiving Party Pays regime when the access charge is close to zero

Understanding Variations in Relative Effectiveness : A Health Production Approach

BACKGROUND: Relative effectiveness has become a key concern of health policy. In Europe, this is because of the need for early information to guide reimbursement and funding decisions about new medical technologies. However, ways that effectiveness (does it work?) and efficacy (can it work?) might differ across health systems are poorly understood. METHODS: This study proposes an analytical framework, drawing on production function theory, to systematically identify and quantify the determinants of relative effectiveness and sources of variation between populations and healthcare systems. We consider how methods such as stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis using a Malmquist productivity index could in principle be used to generate evidence on, and improve understanding about, the sources of variation in relative effectiveness between countries and over time. RESULTS: Better evidence on factors driving relative effectiveness could: inform decisions on how to best use a new technology to maximum effectiveness; establish the need if any for follow-up post-launch studies, and provide evidence of the impact of new health technologies on outcomes in different healthcare systems. CONCLUSIONS: The health production function approach for assessment of relative effectiveness is complementary to traditional experimental and observational studies, focusing on identifying, collecting, and analyzing data at the national level, enabling comparisons to take place. There is a strong case for exploring the use of this approach to better understand the impact of new medicines and devices for improvements in health outcomes

The consequences of greater net price transparency for innovative medicines in Europe: Searching for a consensus

The merits of greater or lesser net price transparency (NPT) has been a topic for discussion for many years across business and industry in general. However, in the past few years, the debate on NPT of innovative medicines has intensified, with organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) leading calls for greater transparency in the pharmaceutical sector, specifically focused on prices. In May 2019 the World Health Assembly (WHA) approved a resolution to support the greater public disclosure of prices and research and development (R&D) costs for both medicines and other health products supported by several European and non-European governments. To contribute to the international debate on the transparency of medicine prices in Europe, Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD) asked Charles River Associates (CRA) to curate a panel of experts to develop evidence on the impact of greater NPT of innovative medicines. Professor Walter Van Dyck1 and Professor Massimo Riccaboni2 were asked by CRA to lead this research, supported by a wider panel of 10 experts from a range of European markets. A structured literature review was first conducted to summarise the theoretical consequences of greater NPT. This was supplemented with a survey of national payers and payer experts3 from a range of European markets. This was used as pre-read information for an expert advisory board of 12 economic and health economic experts representing 12 countries selected to give a range of market sizes, national income and payer approaches. The debate and the consensus reached by the advisory board have been summarised in this report. In addition, a computational model has been developed by two key investigators to provide new, empirical evidence to illustrate the impact of NPT on different European markets

An international comparative analysis and roadmap to sustainable biosimilar markets

Background: Although biosimilar uptake has increased (at a variable pace) in many countries, there have been recent concerns about the long-term sustainability of biosimilar markets. The aim of this manuscript is to assess the sustainability of policies across the biosimilar life cycle in selected countries with a view to propose recommendations for supporting biosimilar sustainability.Methods: The study conducted a comparative analysis across 17 countries from North America, South America, Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Biosimilar policies were identified and their sustainability was assessed based on country-specific reviews of the scientific and grey literature, validation by industry experts and 23 international and local non-industry experts, and two advisory board meetings with these non-industry experts.Results: Given that European countries tend to have more experience with biosimilars and more developed policy frameworks, they generally have higher sustainability scores than the other selected countries. Existing approaches to biosimilar manufacturing and R&D, policies guaranteeing safe and high-quality biosimilars, exemption from the requirement to apply health technology assessment to biosimilars, and initiatives counteracting biosimilar misconceptions are considered sustainable. However, biosimilar contracting approaches, biosimilar education and understanding can be ameliorated in all selected countries. Also, similar policies are sometimes perceived to be sustainable in some markets, but not in others. More generally, the sustainability of the biosimilar landscape depends on the nature of the healthcare system and existing pharmaceutical market access policies, the experience with biosimilar use and policies. This suggests that a general biosimilar policy toolkit that ensures sustainability does not exist, but varies from country to country.Conclusion: This study proposes a set of elements that should underpin sustainable biosimilar policy development over time in a country. At first, biosimilar policies should guarantee the safety and quality of biosimilars, healthy levels of supply and a level of cost savings. As a country gains experience with biosimilars, policies need to optimise uptake and combat any misconceptions about biosimilars. Finally, a country should implement biosimilar policies that foster competition, expand treatment options and ensure a sustainable market environment

Calling vs Receiving Party Pays: Market Penetration and the Importance of the Call Externality

JEL Classification: L96, L50In this paper we study how the access price affects the choice of the tariff regime taken by the network operators. We show that for high values of the access price, that is taken as a parameter by the firms, networks decide to charge only the callers. Otherwise, for low values of the access charge, networks charge also the receivers. Moreover, we compare market penetration and total welfare between the two price regimes. Our model suggests that, for high values of call externality, market penetration and total welfare are larger in Receiving Party Pays regime when the access charge is close to zero.Peer reviewe

Essays on the Industrial Organization of Telecommunications

La tesis consiste en tres diferentes ensayos que analizan de forma teórica distintos temas relacionados con la organización industrial de las telecomunicaciones. El primer ensayo trata de competencia oligopólica en los mercados de telecomunicaciones, cuando las empresas cobran tarifas planas a los usuarios finales. No obstante las tarifas planas sean muy comunes en la actualidad, los economistas han prestado poca atención a esta práctica de fijación de precios. Las teorías actuales argumentan que, bajo este esquema de competencia, la regulación del mercado no afecta el bienestar social si un duopolio de operadores compite para los usuarios finales. En la tesis se demuestra que, cuando hay competencia imperfecta entre por lo menos tres operador, el bienestar social es sensible a la regulación del precio de acceso. Además se analizan los efectos de asimetrías informativas en los niveles de eficiencia en la prestación de servicios de telecomunicaciones, y se caracterizan los precios de acceso óptimos. Se incluyen también otras indicaciones de políticas económicas. El segundo ensayo es un estudio sobre cómo el precio de acceso afecta la elección de los precios minoristas. Se demuestra que, cuando el precio de acceso es alto, los proveedores cobran un precio sólo a los llamantes. Sin embargo, cuando el precio de acceso es bajo, los proveedores cobran también los receptores. Además se comparan el nivel de penetración del mercado y el bienestar total entre los dos regímenes de precios. El modelo sugiere que, para valores altos de la externalidad de las llamadas, la penetración de mercado y el bienestar total son más grandes en un régimen de donde paga también el receptor si el precio de acceso es casi cero. Diversamente, cuando la externalidad de las llamadas es baja, el equilibrio de mercado es caracterizado por un régimen donde paga sólo el llamante si el precio de acceso es alto. El resultado es que la penetración del mercado y el bienestar total son máximos. Por último, en el tercer ensayo se desarrolla un modelo de competencia en la prestación de servicios de Internet y de contenido como un mercado de dos lados y se evalúan los efectos de la neutralidad de la red sobre los incentivos de los proveedores de servicios Internet (ISP) en las inversiones en innovación. En este marco, los ISP tienen capacidades asimétricas de red y los proveedores de contenidos (PC) distribuyen contenidos asimétricos. Los consumidores deciden con qué proveedor de Internet conectarse y cuál contenido navegar. Cuando los ISP priorizan uno de los contenidos, los usuarios finales migran desde el ISP más grande al más pequeño. Si los ISP pueden cobrar una cuota relativamente alta para proveer el servicio de prioridad, ambos ISP tienen menores incentivos para expandir sus redes en comparación con el caso en el cual se impone la neutralidad de la red.The thesis provides three different essays that theoretically analyze different topics regarding the industrial organization of telecommunications. The first essay discusses oligopolistic competition in telecommunications markets where flat tariffs are applied to the end-users. Despite fixed fees being very common at present, economists have paid little attention to this pricing practice. Current theories indicate that, under this scheme of competition, regulators cannot affect social welfare when a duopoly of telecom operators competes for end-users. In the thesis, I show that, when imperfect competition among at least three operators takes place, social welfare is sensitive to regulation of the access price. Moreover I allow for asymmetries in the efficiency of providing telecommunication services, and I characterize the optimal access prices. Further policy indications are also included. The second essay is a study on how the access price affects a network operator’s choice of the retail pricing regime. It is shown that, when the access price is high, providers decide to only charge the callers (Calling Party Pays). However, when the access price is low, providers also charge the receivers (Receiving Party Pays). Moreover, market penetration and total welfare are compared between the two pricing regimes. The model suggests that, for high values of the call externality, market penetration and total welfare are larger in a Receiving Party Pays regime when the access charge is close to zero. Conversely, when the call externality is low, a Calling Party Pays regime is the market outcome when the access charge is higher. As a result, market penetration and total welfare are maximized. Finally, in the third essay, it is developed develop a model of competition in Internet provision and content service as a two-sided market and evaluate the effects of network neutrality on the incentives of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to invest in innovation. In this framework, ISPs have asymmetric network capacities and Content Providers (CPs) distribute asymmetric contents. Consumers decide which provider to connect to and which content to browse. When ISPs prioritize one of the contents, end-users migrate from the larger ISP to the smaller. If ISPs can charge a relatively high fee to CPs to provide the prioritized service, both ISPs have lower incentives to expand their networks compared to the case where network neutrality is imposed

Essays on the industrial organization of telecommunications

Descripció del recurs: 24 gener 2013A portada: International Doctorate in Economic Analysis (IDEA)La tesis consiste en tres diferentes ensayos que analizan de forma teórica distintos temas relacionados con la organización industrial de las telecomunicaciones. El primer ensayo trata de competencia oligopólica en los mercados de telecomunicaciones, cuando las empresas cobran tarifas planas a los usuarios finales. No obstante las tarifas planas sean muy comunes en la actualidad, los economistas han prestado poca atención a esta práctica de fijación de precios. Las teorías actuales argumentan que, bajo este esquema de competencia, la regulación del mercado no afecta el bienestar social si un duopolio de operadores compite para los usuarios finales. En la tesis se demuestra que, cuando hay competencia imperfecta entre por lo menos tres operador, el bienestar social es sensible a la regulación del precio de acceso. Además se analizan los efectos de asimetrías informativas en los niveles de eficiencia en la prestación de servicios de telecomunicaciones, y se caracterizan los precios de acceso óptimos. Se incluyen también otras indicaciones de políticas económicas. El segundo ensayo es un estudio sobre cómo el precio de acceso afecta la elección de los precios minoristas. Se demuestra que, cuando el precio de acceso es alto, los proveedores cobran un precio sólo a los llamantes. Sin embargo, cuando el precio de acceso es bajo, los proveedores cobran también los receptores. Además se comparan el nivel de penetración del mercado y el bienestar total entre los dos regímenes de precios. El modelo sugiere que, para valores altos de la externalidad de las llamadas, la penetración de mercado y el bienestar total son más grandes en un régimen de donde paga también el receptor si el precio de acceso es casi cero. Diversamente, cuando la externalidad de las llamadas es baja, el equilibrio de mercado es caracterizado por un régimen donde paga sólo el llamante si el precio de acceso es alto. El resultado es que la penetración del mercado y el bienestar total son máximos. Por último, en el tercer ensayo se desarrolla un modelo de competencia en la prestación de servicios de Internet y de contenido como un mercado de dos lados y se evalúan los efectos de la neutralidad de la red sobre los incentivos de los proveedores de servicios Internet (ISP) en las inversiones en innovación. En este marco, los ISP tienen capacidades asimétricas de red y los proveedores de contenidos (PC) distribuyen contenidos asimétricos. Los consumidores deciden con qué proveedor de Internet conectarse y cuál contenido navegar. Cuando los ISP priorizan uno de los contenidos, los usuarios finales migran desde el ISP más grande al más pequeño. Si los ISP pueden cobrar una cuota relativamente alta para proveer el servicio de prioridad, ambos ISP tienen menores incentivos para expandir sus redes en comparación con el caso en el cual se impone la neutralidad de la red.The thesis provides three different essays that theoretically analyze different topics regarding the industrial organization of telecommunications. The first essay discusses oligopolistic competition in telecommunications markets where flat tariffs are applied to the end-users. Despite fixed fees being very common at present, economists have paid little attention to this pricing practice. Current theories indicate that, under this scheme of competition, regulators cannot affect social welfare when a duopoly of telecom operators competes for end-users. In the thesis, I show that, when imperfect competition among at least three operators takes place, social welfare is sensitive to regulation of the access price. Moreover I allow for asymmetries in the efficiency of providing telecommunication services, and I characterize the optimal access prices. Further policy indications are also included. The second essay is a study on how the access price affects a network operator's choice of the retail pricing regime. It is shown that, when the access price is high, providers decide to only charge the callers (Calling Party Pays). However, when the access price is low, providers also charge the receivers (Receiving Party Pays). Moreover, market penetration and total welfare are compared between the two pricing regimes. The model suggests that, for high values of the call externality, market penetration and total welfare are larger in a Receiving Party Pays regime when the access charge is close to zero. Conversely, when the call externality is low, a Calling Party Pays regime is the market outcome when the access charge is higher. As a result, market penetration and total welfare are maximized. Finally, in the third essay, it is developed develop a model of competition in Internet provision and content service as a two-sided market and evaluate the effects of network neutrality on the incentives of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to invest in innovation. In this framework, ISPs have asymmetric network capacities and Content Providers (CPs) distribute asymmetric contents. Consumers decide which provider to connect to and which content to browse. When ISPs prioritize one of the contents, end-users migrate from the larger ISP to the smaller. If ISPs can charge a relatively high fee to CPs to provide the prioritized service, both ISPs have lower incentives to expand their networks compared to the case where network neutrality is imposed

Calling vs receiving party pays : market penetration and the importance of the call externality

In this paper we study how the access price affects the choice of the tariff regime taken by the network operators. We show that for high values of the access price, that is taken as a parameter by the firms, networks decide to charge only the callers. Otherwise, for low values of the access charge, networks charge also the receivers. Moreover, we compare market penetration and total welfare between the two price regimes. Our model suggests that, for high values of call externality, market penetration and total welfare are larger in Receiving Party Pays regime when the access charge is close to zero

Lexique des termes ambigus et controversés sur la vie, la famille et les questions éthiques

Proportion of publications with an author giving a UK industry address and proportion with an author giving a UK non-industry address, by disease area. (XLSX 21 kb