Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in the atmospheres of two French alpine valleys: sources and temporal patterns

International audienceAlpine valleys represent some of the most important crossroads for international heavy-duty traffic in Europe, but the full impact of this traffic on air quality is not known due to a lack of data concerning these complex systems. As part of the program "Pollution des Vallées Alpines" (POVA), we performed two sampling surveys of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in two sensitive valleys: the Chamonix and Maurienne Valleys, between France and Italy. Sampling campaigns were performed during the summer of 2000 and the winter of 2001, with both periods taking place during the closure of the "Tunnel du Mont-Blanc". The first objective of this paper is to describe the relations between PAH concentrations, external parameters (sampling site localization, meteorological parameters, sources), and aerosol characteristics, including its carbonaceous fraction (OC and EC). The second objective is to study the capacity of PAH profiles to accurately distinguish the different emission sources. Temporal evolution of the relative concentration of an individual PAH (CHR) and the PAH groups BghiP+COR and BbF+BkF is studied in order to differentiate wood combustion, gasoline, and diesel emissions, respectively. The results show that the total particulate PAH concentrations were higher in the Chamonix valley during both seasons, despite the cessation of international traffic. Seasonal cycles, with higher concentrations in winter, are also stronger in this valley. During winter, particulate PAH concentration can reach very high levels (up to 155 ng.m-3) in this valley during cold anticyclonic periods. The examination of sources shows the impact during summer of heavy-duty traffic in the Maurienne valley and of gasoline vehicles in the Chamonix valley. During winter, Chamonix is characterized by the strong influence of wood combustion in residential fireplaces, even if the temporal evolution of specific PAH ratios are difficult to interpret. Information on sources given by PAH profiles can only be considered in qualitative terms

The joy of ruling: an experimental investigation on collective giving

We analyse team dictator games with different voting mechanisms in the laboratory. Individuals vote to select a donation for all group members. Standard Bayesian analysis makes the same prediction for all three mechanisms: participants should cast the same vote regardless of the voting mechanism used to determine the common donation level. Our experimental results show that subjects fail to choose the same vote. We show that their behaviour is consistent with a joy of ruling: individuals get an extra utility when they determine the voting outcome

Are individuals more risk and ambiguity averse in a group environment or alone? Results from an experimental study

Most decision-making research in economics focuses on individual decisions. Yet, we know, from psychological research in particular, that individual preferences can be sensitive to social pressures. In this paper, we study the impact of a group environment on individual preferences for risky (i.e., known probabilities) and ambiguous (i.e., unknown probabilities) prospects. In our experiment, each participant was invited to make a series of lottery-choice decisions in two different conditions. In the Alone condition, individuals made private choices, whereas in the Group condition, individuals belonged to a three-person group and group members' choices were aggregated according to either a majority or unanimity rule. This design allows us to study the impact of a group environment on individuals' attitude towards both risky and ambiguous prospects, while controlling for the decision rule used in the group. Our experimental results show that when individuals are in the Group condition, they tend to be less risk averse and more ambiguity averse than when they are not part of a group (Alone condition). Our experiment also suggests that the decision rule matters as it shows that these two trends tend to be stronger when the group implements a unanimity rule. Specifically, we found that individuals who belong to a group implementing a unanimity rule are significantly less risk averse than individuals who belong to a group that relies on the majority rule. We obtained a similar-but non-significant-result under ambiguity

Cracking down on bribery

Do crackdowns on bribery impact corrupt behavior in the long run? In this paper we observe the long-run impact of a short-term punishment institution (i.e., a crackdown) on bribery behavior in a lab setting. We conduct lab experiments in two countries with cultures that differ in corruption norms, and which experience very different levels of bribery: the US and Pakistan. Bribery is implemented in the laboratory as a repeated three-player sequential game, consisting of a firm, a government official and a citizen. The design contains three phases: pre-crackdown, crackdown, and post-crackdown. Results show that post-crackdown behavior is not significantly different from pre-crackdown behavior in either country. We conclude that short-term crackdowns may impact behavior in the short run, depending on the strength of the existing corruption norms in the country. More importantly, in our setting crackdowns are completely ineffective in the long run, as corrupt behavior rebounds to pre-crackdown levels

Behavioral aspects of communication in organizations

International audienc

Both loved and feared: third party punishers are viewed as formidable and likeable, but these reputational benefits may only be open to dominant individuals

Journal ArticleResearch Support, Non-U.S. Gov'tCopyright: © 2014 Gordon et al.The datasets associated with this article are available in ORE at http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15639Third party punishment can be evolutionarily stable if there is heterogeneity in the cost of punishment or if punishers receive a reputational benefit from their actions. A dominant position might allow some individuals to punish at a lower cost than others and by doing so access these reputational benefits. Three vignette-based studies measured participants' judgements of a third party punisher in comparison to those exhibiting other aggressive/dominant behaviours (Study 1), when there was variation in the success of punishment (Study 2), and variation in the status of the punisher and the type of punishment used (Study 3). Third party punishers were judged to be more likeable than (but equally dominant as) those who engaged in other types of dominant behaviour (Study 1), were judged to be equally likeable and dominant whether their intervention succeeded or failed (Study 2), and participants believed that only a dominant punisher could intervene successfully (regardless of whether punishment was violent or non-violent) and that subordinate punishers would face a higher risk of retaliation (Study 3). The results suggest that dominance can dramatically reduce the cost of punishment, and that while individuals can gain a great deal of reputational benefit from engaging in third party punishment, these benefits are only open to dominant individuals. Taking the status of punishers into account may therefore help explain the evolution of third party punishment.School of Psychology, University of Exete