A Passage Theory of Time

This paper proposes a view of time that takes passage to be the most basic temporal notion, instead of the usual A-theoretic and B-theoretic notions, and explores how we should think of a world that exhibits such a genuine temporal passage. It will be argued that an objective passage of time can only be made sense of from an atemporal point of view and only when it is able to constitute a genuine change of objects across time. This requires that passage can flip one fact into a contrary fact, even though neither side of the temporal passage is privileged over the other. We can make sense of this if the world is inherently perspectival. Such an inherently perspectival world is characterized by fragmentalism, a view that has been introduced by Fine in his ‘Tense and Reality’ (2005). Unlike Fine's tense-theoretic fragmentalism though, the proposed view will be a fragmentalist view based in a primitive notion of passage

Standpoints: a Study of a Metaphysical Picture

There is a type of metaphysical picture that surfaces in a range of philosophical discussions, is of intrinsic interest and yet remains ill-understood. According to this picture, the world contains a range of standpoints relative to which different facts obtain. Any true representation of the world cannot but adopt a particular standpoint. The aim of this paper is to propose a regimentation of a metaphysics that underwrites this picture. Key components are a factive notion of metaphysical relativity, a deflationary notion of adopting standpoints and two kinds of valid inference, one that allows one to abandon standpoints and one that doesn’t. To better understand how theories formulated in terms of this framework are situated in dialectical space, I sketch a theory in the philosophy of time that admits both temporal and atemporal standpoints

Content Disjunctivism and the Perception of Appearances

NWO275-20-055Philosophy of Knowledge and Cognitio

A fragmented world

Objects often manifest themselves in incompatible ways across perspectives that are on a par. Phenomena of this kind have been responsible for crucial revisions to our conception of the world, both philosophical and scientific. The standard response to them is to deny that the way things appear from different perspectives are ways things really are out there, a response that is based on an implicit metaphysical assumption that the world is a unified whole. This dissertation explores the possibility that this assumption is false, that the world is fragmented instead of unified. On the proposed understanding of such worldly fragmentation, there is a notion of co-obtainment according to which two facts may obtain without co-obtaining. Since not every fact that obtains also co-obtains with every other fact, two incompatible facts may both obtain, as long as they do not co-obtain in the introduced sense. The possibility of such fragmentation sheds new light on a range of phenomena. It allows us to explore a view of time that takes the notion of passage as its defining primitive. It bolsters a no-subject view of experience against the objection that it leads to solipsism. It allows a realist view about colours to withstand the objection from conflicting appearances. And, it makes room for a view on which things really have the properties that are attributed to objects and events across different frames of reference, such as length, mass, duration and simultaneity. Overall, fragmentalism changes the way in which the manifest image feeds into an objective conception of the world: what is manifest to us is not misleading in what sort of properties it shows the world to have, it's only misleading in making it seem more unified than it really is

Standpoints and Subjective Facts about Consciousness

The starting point of this paper is the thought that the phenomenal appearances that accompany mental states are somehow only there, or only real, from the standpoint of the subject of those mental states. The world differs across subjects in terms of which appearances obtain. Not only are subjects standpoints across which the world varies, subjects are standpoints that we can moreover ‘adopt’ in our own theorizing about the world (or stand back from). The picture that is suggested by these claims stands in need of regimentation. This paper explores and motivates a metaphysical account of what it is for subjects to be standpoints, what it is to adopt standpoints in our representations and, most importantly, how these notions might help us better understand the subjective nature of conscious mental states. Some well-known observations by Thomas Nagel serve as starting points and the paper concludes with revisiting Nagel’s argument for the inevitable incompleteness of objective accounts of mental states, which will be reframed in terms of the central commitments of the proposed framework

In defense of disjointism

Disjointism is the view that co-located objects do not share any parts. A human-shaped statue is composed from a torso, head and limbs; the co-located lumpof clay is only composed from chunks of clay. This essay discusses the tenability of this relatively neglected view, focusing on two objections. The first objection is that disjointism implies co-located copies of microphysical particles. I argue that it doesn’t imply this and that there are more plausible disjointist views of tiny parts available. The second objection is that disjointism is at a loss to explain how material objects can be co-located and why the weights of co-located objects don’t add up. The standard pluralist account appeals to the fact that co-located objects stand in mereological relations and this account is not available to the disjointist. I sketch an alternative account that appeals to a notion of ‘material identity’: the statue is taken to be the same matter as the lump of clay. The resort to a new theoretical primitive may seem to invite a quick rejection on grounds of unnecessary theoretical complexity but I argue that an abductive comparison with rival forms of pluralism shows that such a rejection is misguided

Pulmonary infections complicating ARDS.

Pulmonary infection is one of the main complications occurring in patients suffering from acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). Besides traditional risk factors, dysregulation of lung immune defenses and microbiota may play an important role in ARDS patients. Prone positioning does not seem to be associated with a higher risk of pulmonary infection. Although bacteria associated with ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP) in ARDS patients are similar to those in patients without ARDS, atypical pathogens (Aspergillus, herpes simplex virus and cytomegalovirus) may also be responsible for infection in ARDS patients. Diagnosing pulmonary infection in ARDS patients is challenging, and requires a combination of clinical, biological and microbiological criteria. The role of modern tools (e.g., molecular methods, metagenomic sequencing, etc.) remains to be evaluated in this setting. One of the challenges of antimicrobial treatment is antibiotics diffusion into the lungs. Although targeted delivery of antibiotics using nebulization may be interesting, their place in ARDS patients remains to be explored. The use of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation in the most severe patients is associated with a high rate of infection and raises several challenges, diagnostic issues and pharmacokinetics/pharmacodynamics changes being at the top. Prevention of pulmonary infection is a key issue in ARDS patients, but there is no specific measure for these high-risk patients. Reinforcing preventive measures using bundles seems to be the best option

The role of the RACK1 ortholog Cpc2p in modulating pheromone-induced cell cycle arrest in fission yeast

The detection and amplification of extracellular signals requires the involvement of multiple protein components. In mammalian cells the receptor of activated C kinase (RACK1) is an important scaffolding protein for signal transduction networks. Further, it also performs a critical function in regulating the cell cycle by modulating the G1/S transition. Many eukaryotic cells express RACK1 orthologs, with one example being Cpc2p in the fission yeast Schizosaccharomyces pombe. In contrast to RACK1, Cpc2p has been described to positively regulate, at the ribosomal level, cells entry into M phase. In addition, Cpc2p controls the stress response pathways through an interaction with Msa2p, and sexual development by modulating Ran1p/Pat1p. Here we describe investigations into the role, which Cpc2p performs in controlling the G protein-mediated mating response pathway. Despite structural similarity to Gβ-like subunits, Cpc2p appears not to function at the G protein level. However, upon pheromone stimulation, cells overexpressing Cpc2p display substantial cell morphology defects, disorientation of septum formation and a significantly protracted G1 arrest. Cpc2p has the potential to function at multiple positions within the pheromone response pathway. We provide a mechanistic interpretation of this novel data by linking Cpc2p function, during the mating response, with its previous described interactions with Ran1p/Pat1p. We suggest that overexpressing Cpc2p prolongs the stimulated state of pheromone-induced cells by increasing ste11 gene expression. These data indicate that Cpc2p regulates the pheromone-induced cell cycle arrest in fission yeast by delaying cells entry into S phase