Regulation and Competition in Mobile Telephony in Latin America

This paper addresses three areas of regulatory policy involving mobile telephony in Latin America. These questions are examined in relation to case studies on Colombia, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic, followed by policy recommendations. First, in the area of access regulation, government regulation and the adoption of private-sector agreements on the basis of a model contract are preferable to voluntary negotiations. Second, local fixed-line service providers should ideally be excluded from mobile telephony. When this is not possible, they should only participate in geographic areas where they do not dominate local fixed-line service, and they should be required to maintain strict managerial, accounting, and legal separation of mobile and fixed-line activities. Third, unlimited entry into mobile phone markets is preferable to concessions through exclusive licenses or auctions.

MARA: Melodies arrelades per a l’aula de música

Treball Final de Grau en Mestre o Mestra d'Educació Primària. Codi: MP1040. Curs acadèmic: 2018/2019La modalitat escollida per a realitzar aquest Treball Final de Grau és el model didàctic. El projecte MARA (Melodies arrelades per a l’aula de música) i l’objectiu d’aquest TFG és realitzar una proposta educativa per introduir la música tradicional valenciana a les aules de música de les escoles públiques. Aquesta introducció es realitzaria mitjançant la prèvia elecció de 6 melodies tradicionals d’arreu del territori valencià que adaptades als diferents instruments de l’aula (flautes, instruments Orff, bombo, caixa, panderos, triangle...) així com amb la introducció del flabiol valencià permetran conèixer, aprendre i interpretar aquestes melodies. A més, aquest projecte musical també pretén connectar i relacionar cada poble amb les diverses melodies i comprendre d’aquesta manera que la música tradicional té nexes d’unió entre els diferents pobles escollits. Aquest projecte sorgeix de la necessitat personal de transmetre i fer conèixer les melodies més tradicionals de les nostres comarques als i les alumnes d’educació primària. Per tant, aquesta proposta es desenvoluparia mitjançant una metodologia participativa a l’aula amb xiquets i xiquetes d’entre 10 i 11 anys; cercant les localitats per saber la seua localització geogràfica, investigant com, qui o quan es tocava la melodia en concret i cercant fonts sonores, vídeos o fotografies que exemplifiquen la informació anterior. A més, es plantegen com a objectius els següents ítems; fomentar i afavorir l’aprenentatge de la música tradicional valenciana a l’escola, despertar i alimentar l’afició d’escoltar, gaudir i tocar música tradicional, fomentar l’estudi històric de les melodies tradicionals i conèixer la geografia valenciana

No uniformidades y estabilidad lineal de contactores esféricos en plasmas no magnetizados

Se estudia la estabilidad y respuesta dinámica lineales de configuraciones estacionarias de dos plasmas a contracorriente con una capa electrostática doble (CD) intermedia y delgada, que se forman en torno a un contactor de plasma. Se considera el caso específico de un contactor anódico con simetría esférica en un plasma no magnetizado. Se realiza primero una revisión del modelo estacionario que incluye algunas aportaciones novedosas sobre la influencia de los haces de partículas acelerados por la CD en la solución y sobre los límites de validez del modelo. La respuesta dinámica se estudia con un modelo de pequeñas perturbaciones en armónicos esféricos. Se analiza el comportamiento tanto de los modos radiales (unidimensionales) como de los modos oblicuos (tridimensionales) en dos límites temporales distinguidos: frecuencias iónicas (dominio de la dinámica de iones con electrones cuasiestacionarios) y frecuencias electrónicas (dominio de la dinámica de electrones con iones cuasirrígidos). Para cada caso se obtienen las condiciones de contorno en el contactor, en el infinito y en la CD móvil. Estas últimas incluyen el efecto del desplazamiento de la CD en las condiciones de Langmuir y de Bohm no estacionarias. Se presentan soluciones numéricas y soluciones asintóticas tipo WKB. En cada rango de frecuencias, la respuesta del plasma consiste en una combinación de modos, de características distintas a cada lado de la CD pero acoplados a través de ésta. Para frecuencias altas la CD se hace cuasirrígida por efecto de los iones confinados, y la transmisión de perturbaciones se realiza a través de los haces que la cruzan. En el límite de frecuencia cero, se obtienen las soluciones estacionarias con falta leve de simetría esférica. El resultado principal de la Tesis es que, en todo el rango usual de parámetros de la solución estacionaria, se presentan una inestabilidad de corriente electrón-electrón, y una inestabilidad ion-electrón oblicua, más débil; la inestabilidad de Buneman, propuesta por varios autores como la inestabilidad principal, no puede existir. El comportamiento peculiar de la CD es determinante en el desarrollo de las inestabilidade

A Critique of Light-Handed Regulation: The Case of British Gas February 1999

Although attractive in theory, the implementation of light-handed regulation in the United Kingdom has faced several problems. First, light-handed regulation has not worked as anticipated to avoid the need for lengthy regulatory proceedings. Second, light-handed regulation has unintentionally created inefficient incentives for regulated companies. Third, light-handed regulation has not successfully constrained the monopoly power of incumbents. We illustrate the problems with light-handed regulation principally by reference to the experience of British Gas. The British government established the Office of Gas Regulation, known as Ofgas, to regulate British Gas after its privatization. However, Ofgas was not able to set reasonable prices without instigating lengthy proceedings before the Monopolies and Mergers Commission that examined the costs of British Gas. We analyze a particular dispute over British Gas prices that took over four years to resolve. The desire to avoid heavy-handed regulation of British Gas also created inefficient incentives for the pipeline to add new customers. Light-handed regulation further left British Gas the scope to abuse its monopoly position over existing customers. We conclude from the British Gas experience that the United Kingdom\u27s privatization policy in the 1980s did not adequately anticipate the complexities of regulating private companies with monopoly power. The United States regulatory experience may have seemed quite unattractive when compared to an optimistic vision of light-handed regulation, but appears less so when compared to the difficulties encountered by British regulation in practice. Other countries now establishing regulatory systems will benefit from a careful comparison of international experience, and would do well to avoid the extremes of either heavy-handed or light-handed regulation

Network Industries, Third Party Access and Competition Law in the European Union

This article addresses a set of issues that arise in the context of market liberalization for a special and important class of industries, the so-called network industries, which include electricity, natural gas, rail transportation and telecommunications. Each of these industries combines activities that are potentially competitive, such as generation of electricity, with ones that are naturally monopolistic, such as transmission of electricity. This combination produces a unique set of challenges to competition law and policy in designing a market structure and regulatory framework which maximize the benefits of liberalization while effectively controlling any tendencies to monopolistic abuse. We analyze Chicago School theories that would support negotiated access as an efficient option. After exploring the apparent contradictions between Chicago School predictions and British Gas\u27s behavior, we analyze the theoretical weaknesses in the Chicago School approach and identify several reasons why voluntary negotiations should not form the basis of government policy. We review the limited experience with negotiated access to electricity transmission in Germany, which confirms our conclusion that negotiated access would deter the development of competition in the European gas and electricity industries. We propose an alternative frame for regulation based on vertical separation of the network and regulated third party access with cost-based pricing. Incumbents may merit compensation for past investments or for continuing obligations such as universal service. However, any such compensation should be provided by transparent and competitively neutral funding mechanisms

A Critique of Light-Handed Regulation: The Case of British Gas February 1999

Although attractive in theory, the implementation of light-handed regulation in the United Kingdom has faced several problems. First, light-handed regulation has not worked as anticipated to avoid the need for lengthy regulatory proceedings. Second, light-handed regulation has unintentionally created inefficient incentives for regulated companies. Third, light-handed regulation has not successfully constrained the monopoly power of incumbents. We illustrate the problems with light-handed regulation principally by reference to the experience of British Gas. The British government established the Office of Gas Regulation, known as Ofgas, to regulate British Gas after its privatization. However, Ofgas was not able to set reasonable prices without instigating lengthy proceedings before the Monopolies and Mergers Commission that examined the costs of British Gas. We analyze a particular dispute over British Gas prices that took over four years to resolve. The desire to avoid heavy-handed regulation of British Gas also created inefficient incentives for the pipeline to add new customers. Light-handed regulation further left British Gas the scope to abuse its monopoly position over existing customers. We conclude from the British Gas experience that the United Kingdom\u27s privatization policy in the 1980s did not adequately anticipate the complexities of regulating private companies with monopoly power. The United States regulatory experience may have seemed quite unattractive when compared to an optimistic vision of light-handed regulation, but appears less so when compared to the difficulties encountered by British regulation in practice. Other countries now establishing regulatory systems will benefit from a careful comparison of international experience, and would do well to avoid the extremes of either heavy-handed or light-handed regulation

Study of a three component Cahn-Hilliard flow model

International audienceDans cet article, nous proposons un nouveau modèle de type interface diffuse pour l'étude des écoulements incompressibles visqueux à trois constituants non miscibles. L'originalité de notre étude réside dans la forme particulière de l'energie libre que nous proposons. Nous montrons que l'on doit prendre soin à bien choisir cette energie pour que le modèle donne des résultats physiquement cohérents. Plus précisément, nous donnons des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes sur la structure de cette énergie libre pour que le modele soit bien pose et soit algébriquement et dynamiquement consistant par rapport aux modèles diphasiques sous-jacents au système triphasique. Notons egalement que notre modèle est capable de prendre en compte certaines situations d'étalement total. Nous proposons de prendre en compte l'hydrodynamique du mélange via un couplage entre notre système de Cahn-Hilliard a trois constituants et l'equation de Navier-Stokes dans laquelle sont ajoutés les termes de forces capillaires entre les constituants. Finalement, nous présentons des resultats numériques qui illustrent notre analyse et qui confirment que notre modèle présente un meilleur comportement que d'autres modèles similaires que l'on pourrait considérer