Causality in collective filtering

In this paper, we describe a proposal for improving the practice of web-based collective filtering, in particular for what regards discussions and selection of issues about policy, based on the intuitive concept of causality. Causality, especially when presented in visual form, is especially suited to the task since it is intuitive to understand and to use, and at the same time, it's rich enough to create a semantic network between the representations of real world facts. We give some examples of the suggested system workflow and we present guidelines for its implementation

Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics

We provide evidence that religious skeptics, as compared to believers, are both more reflective and effective in logical reasoning tasks. While recent studies have reported a negative association between an analytic cognitive style and religiosity, they focused exclusively on accuracy, making it difficult to specify potential underlying cognitive mechanisms. The present study extends the previous research by assessing both performance and response times on quintessential logical reasoning problems (syllogisms). Those reporting more religious skepticism made fewer reasoning errors than did believers. This finding remained significant after controlling for general cognitive ability, time spent on the problems, and various demographic variables. Crucial for the purpose of exploring underlying mechanisms, response times indicated that skeptics also spent more time reasoning than did believers. This novel finding suggests a possible role of response slowing during analytic problem solving as a component of cognitive style that promotes overriding intuitive first impressions. Implications for using additional processing measures, such as response time, to investigate individual differences in cognitive style are discussed

On the Reception and Detection of Pseudo-profound Bullshit

Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from philosophers, its reception (critical or ingenuous) has not, to our knowledge, been subject to empirical investigation. Here we focus on pseudo-profound bullshit, which consists of seemingly impressive assertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually vacuous. We presented participants with bullshit statements consisting of buzzwords randomly organized into statements with syntactic structure but no discernible meaning (e.g., “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena”). Across multiple studies, the propensity to judge bullshit statements as profound was associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style, supernatural belief). Parallel associations were less evident among profundity judgments for more conventionally profound (e.g., “A wet person does not fear the rain”) or mundane (e.g., “Newborn babies require constant attention”) statements. These results support the idea that some people are more receptive to this type of bullshit and that detecting it is not merely a matter of indiscriminate skepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive vagueness in otherwise impressive sounding claims. Our results also suggest that a bias toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity

It’s Still Bullshit: Reply to Dalton (2016)

In reply to Dalton (2016), the authors argue that bullshit is defined in terms of how it is produced, not how it is interpreted. They agree that it can be interpreted as profound by some readers (and assumed as much in the original paper). Nonetheless, they present additional evidence against the possibility that more reflective thinkers are more inclined to interpret bullshit statements as profound

Dunning-Kruger effects in reasoning: Theoretical implications of the failure to recognize incompetence

The Dunning-Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their incompetence. Here we investigate potential Dunning-Kruger effects in high-level reasoning and, in particular, focus on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the greatest number of errors on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) overestimated their performance on this test by a factor of more than three. Overestimation decreased as CRT performance increased and those who scored particularly high underestimated their performance. Evidence for this type of systematic miscalibration was also found on a self-report measure of analytic thinking disposition. Namely, genuinely non-analytic participants (based on CRT performance) over-reported their ‘Need for Cognition’ (NC), indicating that they were dispositionally analytic when their objective performance indicated otherwise. Furthermore, estimated CRT performance was just as strong a predictor of NC as was actual CRT performance. Our results provide evidence for Dunning-Kruger effects both in estimated performance on the CRT and in self-reported analytic thinking disposition. These findings indicate that part of the reason why people are biased is because they are either unaware of or indifferent to their own bias.Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Counci

Overconfidently Underthinking: Narcissism negatively predicts Cognitive Reflection

There exists a large body of work examining individual differences in the propensity to engage in reflective thinking processes. However, there is a distinct lack of empirical research examining the role of dispositional factors in these differences and understanding these associations could provide valuable insight into decision-making. Here we examine whether individual differences in cognitive reflection are related to narcissism (excessive self-focused attention) and impulsiveness (trait-based lack of inhibitory control). Participants across three studies completed measures of narcissism, impulsiveness and cognitive reflection. Results indicate that grandiose and vulnerable narcissists differ in their performance on problem-solving tasks (i.e., CRT) and preferences for intuitive thinking, as well as the degree to which they reflect on and understand their own thoughts and enjoy cognitively effortful activities. Additionally, though impulsiveness was significantly related to self-report measures of cognitive reflection (i.e., metacognitive reflection, metacognitive insight, and Need for Cognition), it showed no association with a behavioural measure of cognitive reflection (i.e., CRT scores). Our results suggest that certain individual differences in dispositional and personality characteristics may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in certain forms of reflective thinking.Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC

The neuroscience of conceptual learning in science and mathematics

Learning new concepts in mathematics and science often involves inhibiting prior beliefs or direct perceptual information. Recent neuroimaging work suggests that experts simply get better at inhibiting these pre-potent responses rather than replacing prior concepts with the newer concepts. A review of both behavioral and neuroimaging evidence with children suggests that improving inhibitory control is a key factor in learning new scientific and mathematical facts. This finding has implications for how these subjects are taught in the classroom and provides corroborating evidence for practices already in place

Minerality in Wine::Towards the Reality behind the Myths

Tasting minerality in wine is highly fashionable, but it is unclear what this involves. The present review outlines published work concerning how minerality in wine is perceived and conceptualised by wine professionals and consumers. Studies investigating physico-chemical sources of perceived minerality in wine are reviewed also. Unusually, for a wine sensory descriptor, the term frequently is taken to imply a genesis: the sensation is the taste of minerals in the wine that were transported through the vine from the vineyard rocks and soils. Recent studies exploring tasters’ definitions of minerality in wine support this notion. However, there are reasons why this cannot be. First, minerals in wine are nutrient elements that are related distantly only to vineyard geological minerals. Second, mineral nutrients in wine normally have minuscule concentrations and generally lack flavour. Results of reviewed studies overall demonstrate marked variability in both wine professionals’ and wine consumers’ definitions and sensory-based judgments of minerality in wine, although there is some consensus in terms of the other wine attributes that associate with the term mineral. The main wine composition predictors of perceived minerality involve a complex combination of organic compounds dependent on grape ripeness and/or derived from wine fermentations and redox status

Unclaimed Prize Information Increases the Appeal of Scratch Card Games

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Gambling Studies on 03 Nov 2020, available online:https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14459795.2020.1826558.Previous research suggests that intuitively appealing, yet uninformative unclaimed prize information is capable of biasing gambling-related judgments when people compare scratch cards that vary in the number of unclaimed prizes. However, it is unknown if the mere presence of unclaimed prize information alters a game’s attractiveness. Using an online crowdsourcing platform, we recruited 402 U.S. residents to participate in an online study. In a within-subjects design, participants made four gambling-related judgments (likelihood of winning, excitement to play, urge to gamble, and hypothetical card purchasing) for scratch cards presented with and without unclaimed prize information. Compared to cards presented without unclaimed prize information, those with unclaimed prize information were judged as more likely to win, produced more excitement to play, a greater urge to gamble, and were chosen more often during a hypothetical purchasing task. Therefore, unclaimed prize information increases the appeal of scratch card games, and may be an important aspect of the scratch card gambling environment to consider from a harm reduction perspective.Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC

Exploring relationships between problem gambling, scratch card gambling, and individual differences in thinking style

Background and aims: Scratch cards are a popular form of lottery gambling available in many jurisdictions. However, there is a paucity of research that examines associations between individual differences in thinking style, participation in scratch card gambling, and problem gambling severity. Methods: In three studies, we sought to examine the relationships among these variables in large, online samples of participants. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI), the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale, and self-reported their frequency of scratch card gambling. Results: Throughout all three studies, specific associations were reliably established. Specifically, negative associations were observed between participants’ CRT and PGSI scores, as well as between participants’ CRT scores and scratch card gambling frequency. In addition, we found a positive association between problem gambling severity and scratch card gambling frequency. Finally, problem gambling severity was shown to correlate positively with participants’ willingness to pay for irrelevant information in a scratch card gambling scenario. Discussion and conclusions: Overall, we observed that problem gambling severity is associated with an individuals’ thinking style and scratch card gambling behavior. This study adds to the existing literature examining problem gambling, and highlights the role of thinking style in understanding gambling behavior and problematic gambling