PAI -1 INHIBITOR AS BIOMARKER OF CARDIORENAL DAMAGE

Plasminogen activator inhibitor 1 (PAI-1), which belongs to the family of serine protease inhibitors  is the primary regulator of plasminogen activity. PAI-1 is synthesized as a single-chain glycopeptide and is deposited in the platelets in a latent form, from which it is released upon their activation. It is spontaneously converted into stable molecules, unless it reacts with proteins from the plasma. As a powerful inhibitor of fibrinolysis, it participates in the pathogenesis of endothelial damage, processes of accelerated atherosclerosis and thromboembolism. All the diseases of the cardiovascular system which are dominated by the processes of fibrosis and thrombosis lead to an increase in PAI-1 in the circulation. In the emergence and development of atherosclerosis, it plays a role not only in the formation of intraluminal thrombus but also in neointimal proliferation. PAI-1 is not normally present in kidney tissue, but its concentration increases significantly in its acute and chronic kidney disease, thanks to the synthesis by the intrarenally localized inflammatory cells. In addition to genetic predisposition, the factors that directly influence the production of PAI-1 are the following: glycemia, insulin and various neurohumoral factors. It is not normally present in the kidney tissue, but its intrarenal concentration increases significantly in acute and chronic kidney diseases. Numerous studies have confirmed the significant role of PAI-1 in the development of diabetes complications. During the last decade there has been a growth of interest in the introduction of non-invasive methods or biomarkers that would assess the degree of fibrosis in the kidney. Many studies have confirmed association between kidney and heart disease. It is not only that these diseases share common risk factors, but many other mechanisms have been suggested. Plasminogen activator inhibitor -1 plays a role in the pathogenesis of endothelial damage, processes of fibrosis and thrombosis, development of diabetes complications and acute and chronic kidney diseases

Načelo zabrane sprječavanja ispunjenja i odredbe o produljenju roka isporuke u ugovorima o gradnji broda prema engleskom pravu

This paper deals with a well-established English law principle known as the “prevention principle“ in the context of shipbuilding contracts. Under the principle, no party to a contract should benefit from its own failure to perform. In the context of shipbuilding contracts, this principle should give protection to a shipyard in the event of delays in delivery of the vessel that are caused by the buyer, and no liquidated damages should be payable by the shipyard, and the contractual delivery date should be replaced by a time reasonably required to complete the vessel. In other words, where the buyer’s default (such as delay in the buyer’s supplies, interfering with agreed modifications, failure to promptly provide and approve the vessel’s design and drawings, late payments of the contract price, etc.) affect the build schedule which results in a delay in construction and in the delivery of the vessel. Such actions by the buyer might represent an act of prevention. In consequence, the delivery date set out in the shipbuilding contract should not be further binding on the builder and the contractual time for delivery of the vessel should become time at large. On the other hand, it is equally common that most shipbuilding contracts contain extension of time clauses granting shipyards an extension of the delivery period in certain events. However, pursuant to a number of English court cases, the prevention principle does not apply where the shipbuilding contract contains extension of time clauses governing permissible delays, and the liquidated damages shall still be payable, subject to extension of time clauses. This paper deals with a difficult question: if the shipyard fails (or is time barred) to claim the application of the extension of time clauses for delays caused by the buyer’s default(s), does the prevention principle still apply?Ovaj rad razmatra općeprihvaćeno načelo engleskoga prava poznato kao “načelo zabrane sprječavanja ispunjenja“ u kontekstu ugovora o gradnji broda. Sukladno tome načelu, ni jedna ugovorna strana ne bi trebala uživati plodove neispunjenja svoje ugovorne obveze. U kontekstu ugovora o gradnji broda ovo načelo bi trebalo zaštititi brodograditelja u slučaju njegovog kašnjenja s isporukom broda, a koje kašnjenje je prouzročio sam naručitelj, te brodograditelj ne bi trebao plaćati ugovornu kaznu uslijed takvoga kašnjenja. Nadalje, u takvim okolnostima ugovoreni rok isporuke broda prestaje biti relevantan, a umjesto njega rok isporuke postaje razuman period vremena koji je potreban za izgradnju i isporuku broda. Drugim riječima, kada naručitelj ne ispunjava svoje ugovorne obveze (npr. kasni s dostavom svoje opreme i materijala, zahtijeva nepotrebne izmjene u projektu broda, ne dostavlja ili ne odobrava na vrijeme projektnu i radioničku dokumentaciju, kasni s plaćanjem ugovorne cijene i dr.) on time utječe na plan gradnje broda, a što za posljedicu može imati kašnjenje isporuke broda. Takvo postupanje naručitelja može se tumačiti kao sprječavanje brodograditelja u ispunjenju njegovih obveza. Uslijed takvoga postupanja ugovoreni rok isporuke više ne bi obvezivao brodograditelja te bi bio bez pravnog učinka. S druge, pak, strane uobičajeno je da ugovori o gradnji broda sadržavaju odredbe temeljem kojih se, uslijed određenih okolnosti, ugovoreni rok isporuke može odgoditi. Međutim, značajan broj odluka engleskih sudova upućuje na zaključak da se načelo zabrane sprječavanja ispunjenja neće primijeniti u slučajevima kada sam ugovor sadržava odredbe o produljenju roka Tada će se odredbe o ugovornoj kazni i dalje primjenjivati, ovisno o odredbama o produljenju roka isporuke. U ovome se radu razmatra složeno pitanje: ako brodograditelj propusti (ili je u zastari) primijeniti ugovorne odredbe o produljenju roka isporuke broda, do kojeg produljenja je došlo uslijed propusta naručitelja, može li se načelo o zabrani sprječavanja ispunjenja primijeniti ili ne

Effective partitioning method for computing weighted Moore-Penrose inverse

We introduce a method and an algorithm for computing the weighted Moore-Penrose inverse of multiple-variable polynomial matrix and the related algorithm which is appropriated for sparse polynomial matrices. These methods and algorithms are generalizations of algorithms developed in [M.B. Tasic, P.S. Stanimirovic, M.D. Petkovic, Symbolic computation of weighted Moore-Penrose inverse using partitioning method, Appl. Math. Comput. 189 (2007) 615-640] to multiple-variable rational and polynomial matrices and improvements of these algorithms on sparse matrices. Also, these methods are generalizations of the partitioning method for computing the Moore-Penrose inverse of rational and polynomial matrices introduced in [P.S. Stanimirovic, M.B. Tasic, Partitioning method for rational and polynomial matrices, Appl. Math. Comput. 155 (2004) 137-163; M.D. Petkovic, P.S. Stanimirovic, Symbolic computation of the Moore-Penrose inverse using partitioning method, Internat. J. Comput. Math. 82 (2005) 355-367] to the case of weighted Moore-Penrose inverse. Algorithms are implemented in the symbolic computational package MATHEMATICA

Molecular and biochemical characterization of pseudomonas putida isolated from bottled uncarbonated mineral drinking water

Pseudomonas putida belongs to a group of opportunistic pathogens that can cause disease in people with weakened or damaged immune systems. Some strains have medical significance, and for most ingestion is not the primary route of infection. If water used by predisposed subjects is contaminated by P. putida, they may become ill. The aim of this work was the biochemical and molecular characterization of strain ST3 of P. putida isolated from non-carbonated bottled drinking water from Jakov Do 4 on Mt. Vlasina. Characterization of P. putida was performed to assess the risk to human health of the indigenous strains present in the water. Biochemical characterization of strains was performed using the manual identification system ID 32 GN (BioMerieux). Identification was obtained using the database identification software ATB System (Bio-Merieux). Molecular characterization was performed by PCR amplification and 16S rDNA "thermal cycling sequencing". Biochemical identification of the strain ST3 was accurate (Id = 99.8%). Comparing the sequences obtained for strain ST3 with NCBI gene bank sequences for 16S rRNA, the highest similarity of our strain (96% identity) with a strain of P. putida, designated as biotype A (gi vertical bar 18076625 vertical bar emb vertical bar AJ308311.1 vertical bar.PPU308311) isolated in New Zealand, was obtained. While comparison with the NCBI collection of all deposited sequences showed that the 16S rRNA gene sequence of strain ST3 has very high homology, it is not identical, indicating indirectly that strain ST-3 is an indigenous strain

SOCIAL NETWORKS AND PROVING: NEW DILEMMAS FOR A NEW AGE

The development of social networks is one of the significant turning points in the shorthistory of the Internet. The human need to “see” and “be seen”, to project a good impressionof themselves in the virtual world, is embodied in sharing information, photos and recordingsabout themselves, as well as about third parties. In the era of digital technologies, suchbehavior entails specific legal consequences but, above all, it has a significant impact on thetransformation or (at least) adaptation of some conventional institutes, such as the burdenof proof. This paper focuses on the issues of obtaining, adducing and evaluating evidenceobtained from social networks in the course of civil procedure. The author analyzes the existinglegal provisions on this matter, in an attempt to provide answers to the questions: whether thecontent found on social networks can be used as evidence in civil court proceedings, whetherits usage depends on the fact that the content is publicly available or “locked”; and whetherit implies the court-imposed duty to submit content from one’s own and/or another’s profileas evidence. The relationship between privacy on the Internet, protection of personaldata, and the endeavor to accurately and comprehensively establish the factual grounds ina particular lawsuit have been reflected in the long-standing dilemma related to the use ofevidence obtained in (il)legal ways

Međunarodna konvencija za izjednačavanje nekih pravila o privremenom zaustavljanju pomorskih brodova, iz 1952. (Konvencija o zaustavljanju) : Pregled pojedinih odredaba

This paper expresses the author\u27s critical view on certain provisions of the Arrest Convention 1952, particularly in respect of lack of uniformity in application of the Convention\u27s Rules by the Courts in member countries, inconsistency in implementation of the Rules into member countries\u27 legislations, the position of shipbuilders who have been left out of the scope of the Convention and open questions regarding jurisdiction. The author also suggest that furher discussion on the subject should take place in Croatia in order to initiate necessary amendments to the Convention and encourage a review of Croatian law and practice of arrest of ships.Ovaj rad izražava autorov kritički pogled na određene odredbe Međunarodne konvencije za izjednačavanje nekih pravila o privremenom zaustavljanju pomorskih brodova, iz 1952. (Konvencija o zaustavljanju). Posebnu je pozornost autor obratio na nepostojanje jedinstvenosti u primjeni odredaba Konvencije od strane sudova zemalja članica, na nedosljednost u inkorporiranju odredaba u unutrašnje zakonodavstvo država članica, na položaj brodograditelja koji su ostali izvan primjene Konvencije te na neka nerazjašnjena pitanja glede sudske nadležnosti. Autor predlaže da se rasprava o ovoj temi u Hrvatskoj usmjeri na predlaganje izmjena Konvencije i na poticanje pregleda hrvatskog prava i prakse o materiji zaustavljanja brodova

Međunarodna konvencija za izjednačavanje nekih pravila o privremenom zaustavljanju pomorskih brodova, iz 1952. (Konvencija o zaustavljanju) : Pregled pojedinih odredaba

This paper expresses the author\u27s critical view on certain provisions of the Arrest Convention 1952, particularly in respect of lack of uniformity in application of the Convention\u27s Rules by the Courts in member countries, inconsistency in implementation of the Rules into member countries\u27 legislations, the position of shipbuilders who have been left out of the scope of the Convention and open questions regarding jurisdiction. The author also suggest that furher discussion on the subject should take place in Croatia in order to initiate necessary amendments to the Convention and encourage a review of Croatian law and practice of arrest of ships.Ovaj rad izražava autorov kritički pogled na određene odredbe Međunarodne konvencije za izjednačavanje nekih pravila o privremenom zaustavljanju pomorskih brodova, iz 1952. (Konvencija o zaustavljanju). Posebnu je pozornost autor obratio na nepostojanje jedinstvenosti u primjeni odredaba Konvencije od strane sudova zemalja članica, na nedosljednost u inkorporiranju odredaba u unutrašnje zakonodavstvo država članica, na položaj brodograditelja koji su ostali izvan primjene Konvencije te na neka nerazjašnjena pitanja glede sudske nadležnosti. Autor predlaže da se rasprava o ovoj temi u Hrvatskoj usmjeri na predlaganje izmjena Konvencije i na poticanje pregleda hrvatskog prava i prakse o materiji zaustavljanja brodova

On unit groups of lie centre-by- metabelian algebras

AbstractTasić, V., On unit groups of Lie centre-by-metabelian algebras, Journal of Pure and Applied Algebra 78 (1992) 195-201.We prove that the group of units of a Lie centre-by-metabelian algebra need not be centre-by-metabelian. This settles a question raised by Sharma and Srivastava

The Speaker the Court Forgot: Re-Evaluating NLRA Section 8(b)(4)(B)\u27s Secondary Boycott Restrictions in Light of Citizens United and Sorrell

In the staggeringly unpopularCitizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision, the Supreme Court overruled precedent and struck down a federal law that placed restrictions on campaign spending by corporations and unions. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, observed that “[t]he basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is . . . the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinction based on a speaker’s identity, including its ‘identity’ as a corporation.” Several commentators have argued that this basic premise will lead to the erosion or even the complete abandonment of the commercial speech doctrine, which holds that commercial speech—“speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction”—is a less protected form of speech under the First Amendment. As Tamara Piety, a fierce opponent of the deregulation of corporate and commercial speech, put it: “[i]f a for-profit corporation is entitled to full First Amendment protection when it engages in political speech—speech which is in some sense peripheral to its existence—then it would seem [that] full protection for [commercial speech,] its core expressive activity[,] should follow.” Piety’s observation was prescient: in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., decided barely a year and a half after Citizens United, the Supreme Court appears to have begun reformulating the commercial speech doctrine, reasoning that a Vermont statute regulating commercial speech warranted “heightened judicial scrutiny” because the law “impose[d] a content- and speaker-based burden on . . . speech.” Sorrell suggests that the Court intends to adhere to Citizens United’s basic premise and increasingly scrutinize—and strike down—restrictions on all forms of corporate speech. This leads to an obvious question without an obvious answer: if the First Amendment bars all regulatory distinction based on a speaker’s identity, including its identity as a corporation, does it also bar all regulatory distinctions based on the speaker’s identity as a labor union? If the Citizens United and Sorrell decisions existed in a legal, historical, and political vacuum, the answer to this question would surely be yes. After all, the law that the Court so vehemently struck down in Citizens United regulated the political expenditures of both corporations and unions. If the Court is now (albeit tacitly) applying Citizens United’s rationale to commercial speech—speech that is quintessentially an economic activity, not a form of self-expression—it follows that union speech, whether on political or economic matters, should be treated no differently by the Court than similar speech by corporations, non-corporate institutions, and individuals. But case law does not exist in a vacuum. For over half a century, the Supreme Court has evidenced a bias against union speech. The scope of this bias was eloquently conveyed by James Pope nearly three decades ago: [W]hile secondary boycott picketing by a civil rights organization demanding economic justice for blacks has been protected under the First Amendment, secondary boycott picketing by unions demanding economic justice for workers and protesting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not. . . . Corporate speech may not be restricted solely on the ground that the speaker is a corporation, but labor picketing may be restricted under statutes that apply only to labor unions, leaving other groups free to engage in precisely the same activities. . . . Civil rights organizations have been accorded First Amendment protection against anti-communist affidavit requirements; labor unions have not. Civil rights organizations have been permitted to conduct sit-in protests against private business practices on private property, labor unions have not. As noted by Pope, the double standard that the Court has applied to union speech is well illustrated in the context of secondary boycotts, which are restricted by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act. The term secondary boycott has been succinctly defined “as a combination to influence A by exerting economic or social pressure against persons with whom A deals.” The employer with which a union has a dispute is known as the “primary” employer. During secondary boycotts, unions employ handbilling, picketing, or striking to put pressure on a “secondary” employer—an employer “with which the primary employer has a business relationship”; “the object of such pressure usually is to alter that business relationship to the detriment of the primary employer and thereby to raise the cost to the primary employer of continuing the labor dispute.” The following example helps to illustrate how section 8(b)(4)(B) restricts unions’ ability to engage in a secondary boycott. Imagine the following scenario: two people stand in front of a Best Buy store, each carrying a sign. One of the two people is a unionist; her sign asks consumers to boycott the store because it sells iPads that are produced by non-union child labor in China. The second sign is carried by a Best Buy employee; her sign advertises that iPads are currently on sale in the store at a bargain price. While the store’s advertising activity in this scenario is legal, the unionist’s activity—known as secondary consumer picketing—is barred by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA because it is a form of secondary boycott. Even though this restriction is “a textbook example of viewpoint discrimination,” section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) has been upheld by the Court for over fifty years. Now picture a third person in front of the store, also holding a sign. This person is a human rights activist; her sign instructs consumers to boycott Best Buy because it sells iPads, which are manufactured by Apple, a company that exploits Chinese workers. “Like the unionist, the human rights activist is urging a secondary boycott of the store. However, her activity is not illegal under the [NLRA] because section 8(b)(4)(ii) applies only to unionists, leaving others to engage in precisely the same activities.” Even under pre-Citizens United jurisprudence, labor scholars argued that—because section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) applies only to unions—it “violates the First Amendment principle of neutrality among speakers.” But this argument was slightly off the mark because the neutrality principle that served as the argument’s foundation—the principle that “[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual”—was not consistently applied by the Court, even in the context of corporate political speech. And before Sorrell, the neutrality principle had never been invoked to justify heightened scrutiny in a commercial speech case. Citizens United’s re-affirmation of the neutrality principle in the context of corporate political speech and the Sorrell Court’s prompt extension of that principle to corporate commercial speech indicates a sea change. But will the ripples of that change reach the shores of labor law? In light of the Supreme Court’s historical anti-union bent, will the Court be willing to consistently apply the neutrality principle and re-evaluate its jurisprudence in the area of union speech? If the answer is no, this would indicate that the Court’s rhetoric denouncing speaker-based restrictions is nothing more than a facade. When the Court deals with speech by labor unions, it will continue to find ways to uphold speaker-based restrictions on the union’s expression by stating that the restrictions must be read so as to avoid Constitutional questions, or by labeling the expression as conduct rather than speech, or by asserting that the expression in question is too effective. But when the Court analyzes a restriction of corporate speech, it will conclude that the facial validity of the restriction simply must be considered, or proclaim that “[t]he Government may not. . . deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration,” or announce that the speech is subject to heightened scrutiny because it is content- and speaker-based. On the other hand, maybe the Court is prepared to harshly scrutinize all identity-based restrictions of speech—even restrictions that target labor unions. Indeed, the current Court has been praised for its “almost aggressive, pervasive and nearly unanimous protection of fairly basic First Amendment Principles” during the 2010 term. Because further speculation on this point is likely fruitless, this Note will assume that there is at least a possibility that the Court is willing to seriously reconsider its First Amendment jurisprudence in the area of union speech. Given this optimistic assumption, this Note will argue that Citizen United’s basic premise should lead the Court to strike down the restrictions on unions’ use of secondary boycotts that are imposed by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA. The argument that section 8(b)(4)(B) violates the First Amendment is not a novel one. But it is an argument that needs to be reformulated in light of Citizens United and Sorrell because the Court’s recent, seemingly unconditional embrace of the neutrality principle of the First Amendment provides union advocates with a powerful modern doctrine that makes section 8(b)(4)(B)’s demise a distinct possibility. This Note argues (1) that Citizen United’s neutrality principle in the context of corporate political speech should lead the Court to strike down the ban on political secondary boycotts and (2) that Sorrell’s use of the neutrality principle in the context of corporate commercial speech should lead the Court to strike down restrictions on economic secondary boycotts or—at the very least—to apply heightened scrutiny to such boycotts. After providing a brief background on the history that led to the adoption of section 8(b)(4)(B), Part I of this Note examines the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 8(b)(4)(B), focusing primarily on how the section has been applied in the context of secondary consumer picketing and political secondary boycotts. Part II discusses Citizens United, Sorrell, and the neutrality principle that is at the core of both decisions. Part III argues that, given the Court’s invocation of the neutrality principle in the context of corporate political and commercial speech, there is no principled justification for upholding section 8(b)(4)(B)’s secondary boycott restrictions