Allocation mechanisms, incentives, and endemic institutional externalities

Whether an economic agent’s decision creates an externality often depends on the institutional context in which the decision was made. Indeed, in orthodox economics, a technological or exogenous externality occurs just in case one agent’s economic welfare or production possibilities are directly affected by the market decisions of other agents. A pecuniary externality occurs just in case one consumer’s economic welfare or producer’s profit is affected indirectly by price changes caused by changes in other agents’ decisions. Similarly, an institutional or endogenous externality may arise whenever allocations are determined by a mechanism that is not strategy proof for some agent. Then even a resource balance constraint creates an institutional externality except in special cases such as when no individual agent’s action can affect market clearing prices — i.e., there are no pecuniary externalities

Der neue Osten : Wandlungen und Ausichten

http://www.ester.ee/record=b2111308*es

A note on the Lagrangian saddle-points

1 online resource (PDF, 17 pages

Which market protocols facilitate fair trading?

The evaluation of an exchange market is a multi-faceted problem. An important criterion is the ability to achieve allocative efficiency. Gode and Sunder (1993) shows that a continuous double auction for singleunit trades leads to an efficient allocation even when the traders exhibit “zero-intelligence”; in other words, market protocols are active contributors in the search for a better outcome. Under reasonable circumstances, most of the commonly used market protocols share the ability to help traders discover an efficient allocation

Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal–agent problems, and commons games, among others

Mathematical utility theory and the representability of demand by continuous homogeneous functions

The resort to utility-theoretical issues will permit us to propose a constructive procedure for deriving a homogeneous of degree one continuous function that gives raise to a primitive demand function under suitably mild conditions. This constitutes the first self-contained and elementary proof of a necessary and sufficient condition for an integrability problem to have a solution by continuous (subjective utility) functions.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio