Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Each Issue

We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on a fixed set of issues, where each member of the society may vote for one of several positions on each issue, but the combination of votes on the various issues is restricted to a set of feasible voting patterns. We require the aggregation to be supportive, i.e. for every issue $j$ the corresponding component $f_j$ of every aggregator on every issue should satisfy $f_j(x_1, ,\ldots, x_n) \in \{x_1, ,\ldots, x_n\}$. We prove that, in such a set-up, non-dictatorial aggregation of votes in a society of some size is possible if and only if either non-dictatorial aggregation is possible in a society of only two members or a ternary aggregator exists that either on every issue $j$ is a majority operation, i.e. the corresponding component satisfies $f_j(x,x,y) = f_j(x,y,x) = f_j(y,x,x) =x, \forall x,y$, or on every issue is a minority operation, i.e. the corresponding component satisfies $f_j(x,x,y) = f_j(x,y,x) = f_j(y,x,x) =y, \forall x,y.$ We then introduce a notion of uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator, which is defined to be an aggregator that on every issue, and when restricted to an arbitrary two-element subset of the votes for that issue, differs from all projection functions. We first give a characterization of sets of feasible voting patterns that admit a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator. Then making use of Bulatov's dichotomy theorem for conservative constraint satisfaction problems, we connect social choice theory with combinatorial complexity by proving that if a set of feasible voting patterns $X$ has a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity then the multi-sorted conservative constraint satisfaction problem on $X$, in the sense introduced by Bulatov and Jeavons, with each issue representing a sort, is tractable; otherwise it is NP-complete

On the Computational Complexity of Non-dictatorial Aggregation

We investigate when non-dictatorial aggregation is possible from an algorithmic perspective, where non-dictatorial aggregation means that the votes cast by the members of a society can be aggregated in such a way that the collective outcome is not simply the choices made by a single member of the society. We consider the setting in which the members of a society take a position on a fixed collection of issues, where for each issue several different alternatives are possible, but the combination of choices must belong to a given set $X$ of allowable voting patterns. Such a set $X$ is called a possibility domain if there is an aggregator that is non-dictatorial, operates separately on each issue, and returns values among those cast by the society on each issue. We design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides, given a set $X$ of voting patterns, whether or not $X$ is a possibility domain. Furthermore, if $X$ is a possibility domain, then the algorithm constructs in polynomial time such a non-dictatorial aggregator for $X$. We then show that the question of whether a Boolean domain $X$ is a possibility domain is in NLOGSPACE. We also design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether $X$ is a uniform possibility domain, that is, whether $X$ admits an aggregator that is non-dictatorial even when restricted to any two positions for each issue. As in the case of possibility domains, the algorithm also constructs in polynomial time a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator, if one exists. Then, we turn our attention to the case where $X$ is given implicitly, either as the set of assignments satisfying a propositional formula, or as a set of consistent evaluations of an sequence of propositional formulas. In both cases, we provide bounds to the complexity of deciding if $X$ is a (uniform) possibility domain.Comment: 21 page

Models of Manipulation on Aggregation of Binary Evaluations

We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations, i.e., permissible combinations of positions on the issues. Among other things, this framework admits the modeling of preference aggregation, judgment aggregation, classification, clustering and facility location. An important notion in aggregation of evaluations is strategy-proofness. In the general framework we discuss here, several definitions of strategy-proofness may be considered. We present here 3 natural \textit{general} definitions of strategy-proofness and analyze the possibility of designing an annonymous, strategy-proof aggregation rule under these definitions

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota

Judgment Aggregation with Abstentions under Voters' Hierarchy

International audienceSimilar to Arrow’s impossibility theorem for preference aggregation, judgment aggregation has also an intrinsic impossibility for generating consistent group judgment from individual judgments. Removing some of the pre-assumed conditions would mitigate the problem but may still lead to too restrictive solutions. It was proved that if completeness is removed but other plausible conditions are kept, the only possible aggregation functions are oligarchic, which means that the group judgment is purely determined by a certain subset of participating judges. Instead of further challenging the other conditions, this paper investigates how the judgment from each individual judge affects the group judgment in an oligarchic environment. We explore a set of intuitively demanded conditions under abstentions and design a feasible judgment aggregation rule based on the agents’ hierarchy. We show this proposed aggregation rule satisfies the desirable conditions. More importantly, this rule is oligarchic with respect to a subset of agenda instead of the whole agenda due to its literal-based characteristics

Group communication and the transformation of judgments: an impossibility result

While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones, there is much less formal work on the transformation of judgments in group communication. I develop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baseline impossibility theorem: Any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible conditions is the identity function, under which no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility and argue that the kind of group communication envisaged by deliberative democrats must be 'holistic': It must focus on webs of connected propositions, not on one proposition at a time, which echoes the Duhem-Quine 'holism thesis' on scientific theory testing. My approach provides a map of the logical space in which different possible group communication processes are located

The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation

In the framework of judgment aggregation, we assume that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and that both Independence (formula-wise aggregation) and Unanimity Preservation hold for them. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is compatible with conclusion-based aggregation, as defined by Unanimity Preservation on the non-premisses, depends on how the premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We state necessary and sufficient conditions under which the combination of both approaches leads to dictatorship (resp. oligarchy), either just on the premisses or on the whole agenda. Our analysis is inspired by the doctrinal paradox of legal theory and is arguably relevant to this field as well as political science and political economy. When the set of premisses coincides with the whole agenda, a limiting case of our assumptions, we obtain several existing results in judgment aggregation theory