Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is “smoother” in the sense that small variations in an agent’s bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. First, the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to efficiency as is desired.mechanism design, NIMBY

An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.Non-Transferable utility games, Shapley value, Ordinal Shapley value, consistency, fairness.

In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach

We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a one-stage multi-bidding mechanism where agents compete for the project by submitting bids. All Nash equilibria of this mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the agents satisfy intuitively appealing lower bounds..externalities, bidding, implementation

O relatório de Pedro Varaez sobre a profissâo de parteira e o resposta de Francisco Antonio Díez de Cabrera

Objetivos: se ha partido del objetivo de aportar información sobre la visión del oficio de comadre en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII. Constatar las posturas diferentes que, con relación a la práctica de esta actividad, existía en dicho periodo histórico. Método: se ha realizado un análisis pormenorizado de la información que incluye sobre esta temática un manuscrito inédito conservado en la Real Biblioteca de Madrid. Un interesante manuscrito inédito conservado en la Real Biblioteca de Madrid proporciona información sobre la profesión de partera. Consta de dos partes diferenciadas. La primera, más extensa, incluye el informe que redactó el licenciado Pedro Varaez para demostrar que los hijos de madres que practicaban este oficio no perdían sus privilegios nobiliarios en caso de poseerlos por nacimiento. En su exposición, recoge citas de los Libros Sagrados, de las obras de autores clásicos y, sobre todo, de expertos canonistas medievales y diferentes juristas de los siglos XVI y XVII. La segunda, escrita por el también licenciado Francisco Antonio Díez de Cabrera, rebate todos los argumentos esgrimidos por Varaez, pero sin mencionar apenas más que unas cuantas referencias. El documento contiene asimismo interesantes noticias para la historia de la profesión de comadre y el reconocimiento que éstas gozaron en diferentes periodos, como personas que velaban por la salud de las parturientas, poniendo en juego toda su práctica, y cuya presencia era relevante a la hora de garantizar los derechos de los primogénitos, en caso de nacimientos múltiples.Objetive: To provide information on the vision of the office of midwife in the Spain of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To describe the different positions in relation to the practice of this activity in this historical centuries. Method: Detailed analysis of the information on this subject that it’s included in an unpublished manuscript preserved in the Royal Library of Madrid. An interesting unpublished manuscript preserved in the Royal Library in Madrid provides information on the profession of midwife. It has two distinct parts. The first part includes the report that drafted the lawyer Pedro Varaez in order to show that children of mothers who practiced this profession didn’t lose their privileges in case of having by birth. In his presentation, collects quotes from the sacred books, the works of classical authors and, above all, expert medieval canonists and different jurists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The second, written by Antonio Diez also licensed Francisco Cabrera, rejected every argument put forward by Varaez, but without mentioning hardly more than a few references. The document also contains interesting information for the history of the profession of midwife and recognition they enjoyed in different periods, as people who ensured the health of women in labor, staking his entire practice, and whose presence was relevant when to guarantee the rights of the firstborn, in case of multiple births.Objetivo: Fornecer informações sobre a visão do escritório de parteira na Espanha dos séculos XVI e XVII. Observe as diferentes posições em relação à prática desta atividade foi nesse período histórico.Método: Análise detalhada das informações sobre este assunto inclui um manuscrito inédito preservado na Biblioteca Real de Madrid. Um manuscrito inédito interessante preservado na Biblioteca Real de Madrid fornece informações sobre a profissão de parteira. É constituída de duas partes distintas. A primeira, maior, inclui o relatório que elaborou o advogado Pedro Varaez para mostrar que filhos de mães que praticaram este ofício não perder seus privilégios nobres devem possuir pelo nascimento. Em sua apresentação, recolhe citações dos livros sagrados, as obras de autores clássicos e, acima de tudo, canonistas medievais especialistas e diferentes juristas dos séculos XVI e XVII. O segundo, escrito por Antonio Diez também licenciado Francisco Cabrera, rejeitou todos os argumentos apresentados pela Varaez, mas sem mencionar pouco mais do que algumas referências. O documento também contém notícias interessantes para a história da profissão de parteira e reconhecimento que se em diferentes períodos, como pessoas que assegurada a saúde das mulheres em trabalho de parto, estacando toda a sua prática, e cuja presença era relevante quando para garantir os direitos do primogênito, em caso de nascimentos múltiplos

An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.Non-Transferable utility games, Shapley value, consistency, fairness

Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein 2005) for economies with three or less agents.

Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.Ordinal Shapley Value, implementation, mechanism design

A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure

For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any, among the remaining objects. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies. That is, the mechanism leads to the maximum equilibrium prices and to an optimal matching.