The Computation of a Coincidence of Two Mappings

algorithm;general equilibrium

On the Connectedness of Coincidences and Zero Points of Mappings

inequality;variation;general equilibrium;algorithm

A Model of Partnership Formation

This paper presents a model of partnership formation. A set of agents wants to conduct some business or other activities. Agents may act alone or seek a partner for cooperation and need in the latter case to consider with whom to cooperate and how to share the profit in a collaborative and competitive environment. We pro- vide necessary and su±cient conditions under which an equilibrium can be attained. In equilibrium, the partner formation and the payoff distribution are endogenously determined. Every agent realizes his full potential and has no incentive to deviate from either staying independent or from the endogenously determined partner and payoff. The partnership formation problem contains the classical assignment market problem as a special case.Partnership formation;equilibrium;indivisibility;assignment market

A simplicial algorithm for testing the integral properties of polytopes:A revision

Given an arbitrary polytope P in the n-dimensional Euclidean space R n , the question is to determine whether P contains an integral point or not. We propose a simplicial algorithm to answer this question based on a specifc integer labeling rule and a specific triangulation of R n . Starting from an arbitrary integral point ofR n , the algorithm terminates within a finite number of steps with either an integral point in P or proving there is no integral point inP. One prominent feature of the algorithm is that the structure of the algorithm is very simple and itcanbeeasily implemented on a computer. Moreover, the algorithm is computationally very simple, exible and stable.

Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game

In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory.For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced.The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core.Second, it is shown that the full core of a completionbalanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy.As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.game theory;cooperative games;general equilibrium