Preparedness for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Pandemic in Africa

Africa’s strategies for pandemic influenza must also strengthen overall public health capacity

Chlorine Inactivation of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus (H5N1)

To determine resistance of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) virus to chlorination, we exposed allantoic fluid containing 2 virus strains to chlorinated buffer at pH 7 and 8, at 5°C. Free chlorine concentrations typically used in drinking water treatment are sufficient to inactivate the virus by >3 orders of magnitude

Human Influenza Surveillance: the Demand to Expand

The potential of avian A/H5N1 to cause a global human pandemic is uncertain because it cannot be predicted with current knowledge

Avian Influenza A Virus (H5N1) Outbreaks, Kuwait, 2007

Phylogenetic analysis of influenza A viruses (H5N1) isolated from Kuwait in 2007 show that (H5N1) sublineage clade 2.2 viruses continue to spread across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Virus isolates were most closely related to isolates from central Asia and were likely vectored by migratory birds

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus (H5N1) Outbreak in Captive Wild Birds and Cats, Cambodia

From December 2003 through January 2004, the Phnom Tamao Wildlife Rescue Centre, Cambodia, was affected by the highly pathogenic influenza virus (H5N1). Birds from 26 species died. Influenza virus subtype H5N1 was detected in 6 of 7 species tested. Cats from 5 of 7 species were probably infected; none died

Phylogenetics and Pathogenesis of Early Avian Influenza Viruses (H5N1), Nigeria

Three highly pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 and 4 Newcastle disease viruses were isolated from sick or dead chickens in southwestern Nigeria. Sequencing and phylogenetic analysis placed them within H5N1 subclade 2.2.2. Intravenous and intranasal pathogenicity tests produced systemic disease with vascular endothelial cell tropism in chickens

Identifying Influenza Viruses with Resequencing Microarrays

Resequencing microarrays rapidly identify influenza viruses

Matrix Protein 2 Vaccination and Protection against Influenza Viruses, Including Subtype H5N1

Vaccination of mice with influenza matrix protein 2 induced cross-reactive antibody responses

Ferrets develop fatal influenza after inhaling small particle aerosols of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1)

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>There is limited knowledge about the potential routes for H5N1 influenza virus transmission to and between humans, and it is not clear whether humans can be infected through inhalation of aerosolized H5N1 virus particles. Ferrets are often used as a animal model for humans in influenza pathogenicity and transmissibility studies. In this manuscript, a nose-only bioaerosol inhalation exposure system that was recently developed and validated was used in an inhalation exposure study of aerosolized A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1) virus in ferrets. The clinical spectrum of influenza resulting from exposure to A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1) through intranasal verses inhalation routes was analyzed.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Ferrets were successfully infected through intranasal instillation or through inhalation of small particle aerosols with four different doses of <it>Influenza virus </it>A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1). The animals developed severe influenza encephalomyelitis following intranasal or inhalation exposure to 10¹, 10², 10³, or 10⁴infectious virus particles per ferret.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Aerosolized <it>Influenza virus </it>A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (H5N1) is highly infectious and lethal in ferrets. Clinical signs appeared earlier in animals infected through inhalation of aerosolized virus compared to those infected through intranasal instillation.</p