Presentism remains

Here I examine some recent attempts to provide a new way of thinking about the philosophy of time that question the central role of ‘presentness’ within the definition of presentism. The central concern raised by these critics turns on the intelligibility and theoretical usefulness of the term ‘is present’ (cf. Correia and Rosenkrantz in Thought 4:19–27, 2015; Deasy in Nous, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12109; Williamson in Modal logic as metaphysics, OUP, Oxford, 2013). My overarching aim is to at least challenge such concerns. I begin with arguments due to Deasy (Nous, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12109). Deasy develops a view that he calls ‘transientism’ and that he takes to be a well-motivated version of presentism. I show that both this way of thinking about presentism and the argument supposedly motivating it all fail. I then move to an argument due to Correia and Rosenkrantz (Thought 4:19–27, 2015). Correia and Rosenkrantz purport to show that presentism can be salvaged without making recourse to the term ‘is present’. I demonstrate that their arguments fail. I then move on to a view, proposed and defended by Merricks (Truth and ontology, OUP, Oxford, 2007), Tallant (Erkenntnis 79:479–501, 2014), and Zimmerman (Philos Pap 25:115–126, 1996), and show that it has the wherewithal to meet the challenges raised by Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, OUP, Oxford, 2013) who, as noted above, raises genuine concerns about our capacity to define presentism

The Growing-Block: Just one thing after another?

In this article, we consider two independently appealing theories—the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience—and argue that at least one is false. The Growing-Block view is a theory about the nature of time. It says that (a) past and present things exist, while future things do not, and (b) the passage of time consists in new things coming into existence. Humean Supervenience is a theory about the nature of entities like laws, nomological possibility, counterfactuals, dispositions, causation, and chance. It says that none of these entities are fundamental, since if there were, this would entail the existence of irreducible necessary connections between matters of fact. Instead, these entities supervene on a fundamental, nonnomological “Humean mosaic” of property instances at spacetime points. We will further explain and motivate the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience in sections 2 and 3, but first, we turn to our master argument

An analysis-ready and quality controlled resource for pediatric brain white-matter research

We created a set of resources to enable research based on openly-available diffusion MRI (dMRI) data from the Healthy Brain Network (HBN) study. First, we curated the HBN dMRI data (N = 2747) into the Brain Imaging Data Structure and preprocessed it according to best-practices, including denoising and correcting for motion effects, susceptibility-related distortions, and eddy currents. Preprocessed, analysis-ready data was made openly available. Data quality plays a key role in the analysis of dMRI. To optimize QC and scale it to this large dataset, we trained a neural network through the combination of a small data subset scored by experts and a larger set scored by community scientists. The network performs QC highly concordant with that of experts on a held out set (ROC-AUC = 0.947). A further analysis of the neural network demonstrates that it relies on image features with relevance to QC. Altogether, this work both delivers resources to advance transdiagnostic research in brain connectivity and pediatric mental health, and establishes a novel paradigm for automated QC of large datasets

Schizophrenia risk from complex variation of complement component 4

Schizophrenia is a heritable brain illness with unknown pathogenic mechanisms. Schizophrenia's strongest genetic association at a population level involves variation in the major histocompatibility complex (MHC) locus, but the genes and molecular mechanisms accounting for this have been challenging to identify. Here we show that this association arises in part from many structurally diverse alleles of the complement component 4 (C4) genes. We found that these alleles generated widely varying levels of C4A and C4B expression in the brain, with each common C4 allele associating with schizophrenia in proportion to its tendency to generate greater expression of C4A. Human C4 protein localized to neuronal synapses, dendrites, axons, and cell bodies. In mice, C4 mediated synapse elimination during postnatal development. These results implicate excessive complement activity in the development of schizophrenia and may help explain the reduced numbers of synapses in the brains of individuals with schizophrenia.This work was supported by R01 HG 006855 (to S.A.M), by the Stanley Center for Psychiatric Research (to S.A.M and B.S.), by R01 MH077139 (to the PGC), and by T32 GM007753 (to A.S. and M.B.)