Antibodies against Lagos Bat Virus in Megachiroptera from West Africa

To investigate the presence of Lagos bat virus (LBV)–specific antibodies in megachiroptera from West Africa, we conducted fluorescent antibody virus neutralization tests. Neutralizing antibodies were detected in Eidolon helvum (37%), Epomophorus gambianus (3%), and Epomops buettikoferi (33%, 2/6) from Ghana. These findings confirm the presence of LBV in West Africa

Network analysis of host–virus communities in bats and rodents reveals determinants of cross-species transmission

Bats are natural reservoirs of several important emerging viruses. Cross-species transmission appears to be quite common among bats, which may contribute to their unique reservoir potential. Therefore, understanding the importance of bats as reservoirs requires examining them in a community context rather than concentrating on individual species. Here, we use a network approach to identify ecological and biological correlates of cross-species virus transmission in bats and rodents, another important host group. We show that given our current knowledge the bat viral sharing network is more connected than the rodent network, suggesting viruses may pass more easily between bat species. We identify host traits associated with important reservoir species: gregarious bats are more likely to share more viruses and bats which migrate regionally are important for spreading viruses through the network. We identify multiple communities of viral sharing within bats and rodents and highlight potential species traits that can help guide studies of novel pathogen emergence

Ebola Virus Antibodies in Fruit Bats, Ghana, West Africa

10.3201/eid1807.111654Emerging Infectious Diseases1871207-120

Antibodies against Lagos Bat Virus in Megachiroptera from West Africa

To investigate the presence of Lagos bat virus (LBV)–specific antibodies in megachiroptera from West Africa, we conducted fluorescent antibody virus neutralization tests. Neutralizing antibodies were detected in Eidolon helvum (37%), Epomophorus gambianus (3%), and Epomops buettikoferi (33%, 2/6) from Ghana. These findings confirm the presence of LBV in West Africa

On religion and cultural policy: notes on the Roman Catholic Church

This paper argues that religious institutions have largely been neglected within the study of cultural policy. This is attributed to the inherently secular tendency of most modern social sciences. Despite the predominance of the ‘secularisation paradigm’, the paper notes that religion continues to promote powerful attachments and denunciations. Arguments between the ‘new atheists’, in particular, Richard Dawkins, and their opponents are discussed, as is Habermas’s conciliatory encounter with Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI). The paper then moves to a consideration of the Roman Catholic Church as an agent of cultural policy, whose overriding aim is the promotion of ‘Christian consciousness’. Discussion focuses on the contested meanings of this, with reference to (1) the deliberations of Vatican II and (2) the exercise of theological and cultural authority by the Pope and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF). It is argued that these doctrinal disputes intersect with secular notions of social and cultural policy and warrant attention outside the specialist realm of theological discourse

Developing One Health surveillance systems

The health of humans, domestic and wild animals, plants, and the environment are inter-dependent. Global anthropogenic change is a key driver of disease emergence and spread and leads to biodiversity loss and ecosystem function degradation, which are themselves drivers of disease emergence. Pathogen spill-over events and subsequent disease outbreaks, including pandemics, in humans, animals and plants may arise when factors driving disease emergence and spread converge. One Health is an integrated approach that aims to sustainably balance and optimize human, animal and ecosystem health. Conventional disease surveillance has been siloed by sectors, with separate systems addressing the health of humans, domestic animals, cultivated plants, wildlife and the environment. One Health surveillance should include integrated surveillance for known and unknown pathogens, but combined with this more traditional disease-based surveillance, it also must include surveillance of drivers of disease emergence to improve prevention and mitigation of spill-over events. Here, we outline such an approach, including the characteristics and components required to overcome barriers and to optimize an integrated One Health surveillance system.</p

Meta-analysis of genome-wide association studies identifies common susceptibility polymorphisms for colorectal and endometrial cancer near SH2B3 and TSHZ1

High-risk mutations in several genes predispose to both colorectal cancer (CRC) and endometrial cancer (EC). We therefore hypothesised that some lower-risk genetic variants might also predispose to both CRC and EC. Using CRC and EC genome-wide association series, totalling 13,265 cancer cases and 40,245 controls, we found that the protective allele [G] at one previously-identified CRC polymorphism, rs2736100 near TERT, was associated with EC risk (odds ratio (OR) = 1.08, P = 0.000167); this polymorphism influences the risk of several other cancers. A further CRC polymorphism near TERC also showed evidence of association with EC (OR = 0.92; P = 0.03). Overall, however, there was no good evidence that the set of CRC polymorphisms was associated with EC risk, and neither of two previously-reported EC polymorphisms was associated with CRC risk. A combined analysis revealed one genome-wide significant polymorphism, rs3184504, on chromosome 12q24 (OR = 1.10, P = 7.23 × 10−9) with shared effects on CRC and EC risk. This polymorphism, a missense variant in the gene SH2B3, is also associated with haematological and autoimmune disorders, suggesting that it influences cancer risk through the immune response. Another polymorphism, rs12970291 near gene TSHZ1, was associated with both CRC and EC (OR = 1.26, P = 4.82 × 10−8), with the alleles showing opposite effects on the risks of the two cancers

Exploring the Bimodal Solar System via Sample Return from the Main Asteroid Belt: The Case for Revisiting Ceres

Abstract: Sample return from a main-belt asteroid has not yet been attempted, but appears technologically feasible. While the cost implications are significant, the scientific case for such a mission appears overwhelming. As suggested by the “Grand Tack” model, the structure of the main belt was likely forged during the earliest stages of Solar System evolution in response to migration of the giant planets. Returning samples from the main belt has the potential to test such planet migration models and the related geochemical and isotopic concept of a bimodal Solar System. Isotopic studies demonstrate distinct compositional differences between samples believed to be derived from the outer Solar System (CC or carbonaceous chondrite group) and those that are thought to be derived from the inner Solar System (NC or non-carbonaceous group). These two groups are separated on relevant isotopic variation diagrams by a clear compositional gap. The interface between these two regions appears to be broadly coincident with the present location of the asteroid belt, which contains material derived from both groups. The Hayabusa mission to near-Earth asteroid (NEA) (25143) Itokawa has shown what can be learned from a sample-return mission to an asteroid, even with a very small amount of sample. One scenario for main-belt sample return involves a spacecraft launching a projectile that strikes an object and flying through the debris cloud, which would potentially allow multiple bodies to be sampled if a number of projectiles are used on different asteroids. Another scenario is the more traditional method of landing on an asteroid to obtain the sample. A significant range of main-belt asteroids are available as targets for a sample-return mission and such a mission would represent a first step in mineralogically and isotopically mapping the asteroid belt. We argue that a sample-return mission to the asteroid belt does not necessarily have to return material from both the NC and CC groups to viably test the bimodal Solar System paradigm, as material from the NC group is already abundantly available for study. Instead, there is overwhelming evidence that we have a very incomplete suite of CC-related samples. Based on our analysis, we advocate a dedicated sample-return mission to the dwarf planet (1) Ceres as the best means of further exploring inherent Solar System variation. Ceres is an ice-rich world that may be a displaced trans-Neptunian object. We almost certainly do not have any meteorites that closely resemble material that would be brought back from Ceres. The rich heritage of data acquired by the Dawn mission makes a sample-return mission from Ceres logistically feasible at a realistic cost. No other potential main-belt target is capable of providing as much insight into the early Solar System as Ceres. Such a mission should be given the highest priority by the international scientific community

Prevention of zoonotic spillover : from relying on response to reducing the risk at source

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT : The devastating impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) on human health globally has prompted extensive discussions on how to better prepare for and safeguard against the next pandemic. Zoonotic spillover of pathogens from animals to humans is recognized as the predominant cause of emerging infectious diseases and as the primary cause of recent pandemics. This spillover risk is increased by a range of factors (called drivers) that impact the nature, frequency, and intensity of contact between humans and wild animals. Many of these drivers are related to human impact, for example, deforestation and changes in land use and agricultural practices. While it is clear that the triad of prevention-preparedness-response (P-P-R) is highly relevant, there is much discussion on which of these 3 strategic activities in the field of emerging infectious disease should be prioritized and how to optimally target resources. For this, it is important to understand the scope of the respective activity and the consequences of prioritization. Already, the World Bank Pandemic Fund and forthcoming global Pandemic instrument negotiated by the World Health Organization (WHO) appear primarily focused on the early detection, and reaction to the appearance of human illnesses, often with explicit focus only on action to be taken once pathogen spillover and spread have occurred. Strategies to reduce the probability of spillover events are under-prioritized and underutilized, as highlighted by recent infectious disease crises such as Ebola and Mpox epidemics, and have been lost in overall preparedness discussions and recovery financing. This “more of the same” focus suggests that it is politically more expedient to allocate financial resources to deal with a problem once it has arisen, rather than taking the steps necessary to reduce the risk of it occurring in the first place. It is often claimed that allocating resources to prevent something from happening is politically difficult as the value of prevention is largely “invisible” (prevention paradox) or it will take a long time to show effects. However, there are now several communications highlighting the economic benefits of prevention of spillover. If taken, actions to prevent spillover are estimated at $10 to 31 billion per year globally, as a cumulative investment from preventive actions achievable by specific industries. However, addressing the drivers of pathogen spillover through a One Health approach has significant subsequent economic co-benefits; for example, reducing deforestation is estimated to create$4 billion per year in social benefits from reduced greenhouse gas emissions. COVID-19 has demonstrated the immense burden of a pandemic, including significant mortality resulting in economic recession, with the global economy contracting by 4.4 percent in 2020. The expected economic losses from this pandemic are estimated at nearly $14 trillion up to 2024. These losses parallel those incurred by other infectious disease emergencies, including the 2003 SARS pandemic with an estimated economic loss of$52 billion; the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa in 2014 to 2016 with a GDP loss of $2.8 to 32.6 billion and the comprehensive economic and social burden estimated to be$53.19 billion; and the 2015 to 2016 Zika virus disease outbreak with an estimated loss in the United States, Caribbean, and Latin America of $20 billion. If invested in, prevention strategies would reduce the likelihood of another pandemic substantially and likely generate sufficient return on investment over time while also having the potential to generate substantial co-benefits. Prevention is already valued in other sectors: policymakers and industries have led on prevention in other areas, such as expenditure on counter-terrorism, driving laws and insurance incentives to reduce the frequency of traffic accidents, on the nuclear deterrent, and in some cases on flood prevention and other water management measures, exemplifying a political willingness to spend vast sums of money to preempt a harmful event in certain areas or circumstances, but not on pandemic prevention.https://journals.plos.org/plospathogens/am2024Medical VirologySDG-03:Good heatlh and well-bein

Developing One Health surveillance systems

DATA AVAILABILITY : No data was used for the research described in the article.The health of humans, domestic and wild animals, plants, and the environment are inter-dependent. Global anthropogenic change is a key driver of disease emergence and spread and leads to biodiversity loss and ecosystem function degradation, which are themselves drivers of disease emergence. Pathogen spill-over events and subsequent disease outbreaks, including pandemics, in humans, animals and plants may arise when factors driving disease emergence and spread converge. One Health is an integrated approach that aims to sustainably balance and optimize human, animal and ecosystem health. Conventional disease surveillance has been siloed by sectors, with separate systems addressing the health of humans, domestic animals, cultivated plants, wildlife and the environment. One Health surveillance should include integrated surveillance for known and unknown pathogens, but combined with this more traditional disease-based surveillance, it also must include surveillance of drivers of disease emergence to improve prevention and mitigation of spill-over events. Here, we outline such an approach, including the characteristics and components required to overcome barriers and to optimize an integrated One Health surveillance system.https://www.elsevier.com/locate/onehlthj2024Medical VirologySDG-03:Good heatlh and well-bein