Vitalism and the Resistance to Experimentation on Life in the Eighteenth Century

There is a familiar opposition between a ‘Scientific Revolution’ ethos and practice of experimentation, including experimentation on life, and a ‘vitalist’ reaction to this outlook. The former is often allied with different forms of mechanism – if all of Nature obeys mechanical laws, including living bodies, ‘iatromechanism’ should encounter no obstructions in investigating the particularities of animal-machines – or with more chimiatric theories of life and matter, as in the ‘Oxford Physiologists’. The latter reaction also comes in different, perhaps irreducibly heterogeneous forms, ranging from metaphysical and ethical objections to the destruction of life, as in Margaret Cavendish, to more epistemological objections against the usage of instruments, the ‘anatomical’ outlook and experimentation, e.g. in Locke and Sydenham. But I will mainly focus on a third anti-interventionist argument, which I call ‘vitalist’ since it is often articulated in the writings of the so-called Montpellier Vitalists, including their medical articles for the Encyclopédie. The vitalist argument against experimentation on life is subtly different from the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological arguments, although at times it may borrow from any of them. It expresses a Hippocratic sensibility – understood as an artifact of early modernity, not as some atemporal trait of medical thought – in which Life resists the experimenter, or conversely, for the experimenter to grasp something about Life, it will have to be without torturing or radically intervening in it. I suggest that this view does not have to imply that Nature is something mysterious or sacred; nor does the vitalist have to attack experimentation on life in the name of some ‘vital force’ – which makes it less surprising to find a vivisectionist like Claude Bernard sounding so close to the vitalists

Investigating trophic ecology and dietary niche overlap among morphs of Lake Trout in Lake Superior

Four morphs of Lake Trout (Salvelinus namaycush, Walbaum 1792) have been identified in Lake Superior: leans, siscowets, humpers, and redfins. In this comprehensive study, the trophic ecology of Lake Trout morphs were characterized using stomach content, fatty acid, and stable isotope data. Stomach content results indicated a predominately piscivorous diet for leans, siscowets, and redfins, whereas humper diets were comprised of 50% fish and 50% Mysis by mass. Humper and siscowets were most similar in their dietary fatty acid profiles, whereas redfins had the most distinct dietary fatty acid profile. Results from stable isotope analysis revealed some among-morph differences along a pelagic-profundal consumption gradient (34S), but there were no significant differences in trophic position (15N) or basal carbon sources among morphs (13C). Using the recently developed nicheROVER software package, 4-dimensional trophic niches for each morph were quantified using stable isotope ratios (δ13C, δ15N, and δ34S) and fatty acid profiles (30 dietary fatty acids, condensed to one axis). Humpers had the largest 4-dimensional niche regions of all four morphs, and redfins had the smallest. Pairwise probability of overlap among morphs in these four-dimensional niche regions was determined to be < 50% in most cases. Overall, stomach content results indicate that humpers diets were more planktivorous than the other morphs, consistent with previous research. Results of the niche overlap analysis suggests some degree of generalist feeding for all morphs. Better characterization of seasonal variation in diet using tracers that reflect more recent feeding (e.g., fatty acids, stomach contents, and/or stable isotope analyses performed on tissues that turnover more quickly than muscle) are needed to further elucidate among-morph differences and similarities in diet and trophic ecology

The organism as ontological go-between. Hybridity, boundaries and degrees of reality in its conceptual history

The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a concept which plays a series of roles – sometimes overt, sometimes masked – throughout the history of biology, and frequently in very normative ways, also shifting between the biological and the social. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and the ‘theorization’ of Life, but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an instrument of transmission for the selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an outdated ‘vitalism’. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the ‘body’ than to the ‘molecule’, is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments presenting it as essential, sometimes even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. This paper does not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific validity or historical coherence; nor does it return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the emergence and transformation of the concept of organism, but has not emphasized so much the way in which organism is a shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as ‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or an epistemic limit case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of ‘nomadic concepts’. Thereby the concept of organism continues to function in different contexts – as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, a model of order, of regulation, etc. – despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or organismic biology