Partner-Objectification and Relationship Satisfaction in Gay Male Relationships

Objectification theory explains how media-driven ideals can be internalized and lead to the development of eating disorders, poor body image, depression, anxiety, a desire to achieve a thin ideal, and lowered rates of relationship satisfaction. Research on objectification theory, until recently, has focused primarily on a female population and heterosexual couples. As nontraditional sexual identities have become more accepted in society, media influences have begun to impact other populations, including the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender community. The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of these media-driven ideals on a gay male population and determine how objectification may lead to lower rates of relationship satisfaction. A multiple linear regression analysis was used in this study to determine if the predictor variables of self-objectification, partner-objectification, socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, and education adequately predict the criterion variable of relationship satisfaction in a sample of 81 gay males. Results of the study support the theory that higher levels of reported objectification predicted relationship satisfaction. In other words, the more a gay male objectified himself, the less satisfied he was in romantic relationships. The findings of this study are significant because this is one of the first studies to investigate this topic among a gay male population. The results speak to the impact that media-driven messages can have on an individual, not only in terms of self-concept, but in terms of how those beliefs impact relationship satisfaction. In terms of positive social change, the results may allow for more education at younger ages to teach adolescents the impact of objectification

From the natural to the civil state : the evolutionary process as viewed by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau

The social contract theory was used extensively in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries by political philosophers to popularize the belief that governments were obligated to the people . This theory maintained that the people had originally formed governments, had set their limits and were allowing them to continue to operate. Governments owed their existence not to God and not to kings, but to the people. The social contract theorists tried to explain how political obligations were formed by men in a pre-political state. In order to do this, they first had to describe this pre-political state and demonstrate how it would lead to a social contract. Therefore, they invented the state of nature , i.e., man \u27s existence prior to civil or social laws. The state of nature described man as he would naturally appear on earth before formation of society. Man\u27s true nature with no external input could only be viewed in the state of nature

A Defense of animal citizens and sovereigns

In their commentaries on Zoopolis, Alasdair Cochrane and Oscar Horta raise several challenges to our argument for a “political theory of animal rights”, and to the specific models of animal citizenship and animal sovereignty we offer. In this reply, we focus on three key issues: 1) the need for a groupdifferentiated theory of animal rights that takes seriously ideas of membership in bounded communities, as against more “cosmopolitan” or “cosmo- cosmopolitan” or “cosmo- cosmopolitan” or “cosmo- ” or “cosmo- or “cosmozoopolis” alternatives that minimize the moral significance of boundaries and membership; 2) the challenge of defining the nature and scope of wild animal sovereignty; and 3) the problem of policing nature and humanitarian intervention to reduce suffering in the wild

Linking animal ethics and animal welfare science

Broom (2014) argues that theories of animal ethics need to be better informed by the findings of animal welfare science. We agree, but argue that animal welfare science in turn may need to ask different questions. To date it has largely assumed that society will continue to treat domesticated animals as a caste group that exists to serve us, and that animal welfare is to be improved within that legal and political framework. We offer an alternative model of human-animal relations, and discuss what kind of animal welfare science it would require

Linking animal ethics and animal welfare science

Broom (2014) argues that theories of animal ethics need to be better informed by the findings of animal welfare science. We agree, but argue that animal welfare science in turn may need to ask different questions. To date it has largely assumed that society will continue to treat domesticated animals as a caste group that exists to serve us, and that animal welfare is to be improved within that legal and political framework. We offer an alternative model of human-animal relations, and discuss what kind of animal welfare science it would require

Los animales y los límites de la ciudadanía

Citizenship has been at the core of struggles by historically excluded groups for respect and inclusion. Can citizenship be extended even further to domesticated animals? We begin this article by sketching an argument for why justice requires the extension of citizenship to domesticated animals, above and beyond compassionate care, stewardship or universal basic rights. We then consider two objections to this argument. Some animal rights theorists worry that extending citizenship to domesticated animals, while it may sound progressive, would in fact be bad for animals, providing yet another basis for policing their behaviour to fit human needs and interests. Critics of animal rights, on the other hand, worry that the inclusion of ‘unruly’ beasts would be bad for democracy, eroding its core values and principles. We attempt to show that both objections are misplaced, and that animal citizenship would both promote justice for animals and deepen fundamental democratic dispositions and values.El concepto de ciudadanía ha sido históricamente fundamental en la lucha de las minorías por respeto e inclusión. ¿Se puede extender la ciudadanía a los animales domésticos? Comenzamos este artículo esbozando un argumento en relación al por qué extender la ciudadanía a los animales domésticos es necesariamente justo, por sobre y más allá del cuidado compasivo, la relación amo-dueño y los derechos básicos universales. Luego, consideramos dos objeciones a dicho argumento. A algunos teóricos sobre los derechos animales les preocupa que extender la ciudadanía a los animales domésticos, aunque suene progresista, sería, de hecho, negativo para los animales, pues daría otra razón para controlar su comportamiento y ajustarlo a las necesidades e intereses humanos. Por otra parte, los críticos de los derechos animales señalan que la inclusión de bestias “indomables” podría ir en desmedro de la democracia, desgastando sus valores y principios nucleares. Nosotros pretendemos demostrar que ambas objeciones se encuentran fuera de lugar, y que la ciudadanía animal no solo incentivaría la justicia hacia los animales, sino que también ayudaría a profundizar sobre disposiciones y valores fundamentales

Les bêtes indisciplinées : les animaux citoyens et la menace de la tyrannie

Plusieurs commentateurs – incluant certains théoriciens des droits des animaux – ont soutenu que les animaux non humains ne peuvent pas être considérés comme des membres du dèmos parce qu’il leur manque les capacités critiques d’autonomie et d’agentivité morale qui seraient essentielles à la citoyenneté. Nous soutenons que cette inquiétude est fondée sur des idées erronées à propos de la citoyenneté, d’une part, et à propos des animaux, d’autre part. La citoyenneté requiert la maîtrise de soi et la sensibilité aux normes partagées, mais ces capacités ne devraient pas être comprises en un sens indûment intellectualisé ou idéalisé. Des études récentes sur l’agentivité morale montrent que les relations civilisées entre les citoyens sont largement fondées, non pas dans la réflexion rationnelle et l’assentiment à des propositions morales, mais dans des comportements intuitifs, irréfléchis et habituels qui s’enracinent dans une gamme d’émotions prosociales (l’empathie, l’amour) et de dispositions prosociales (coopération, altruisme, réciprocité, résolution de conflits). Cinquante ans de recherches éthologiques ont démontré que plusieurs animaux sociaux – particulièrement les animaux domestiques – partagent le type de dispositions et de capacités rendant possible le civisme quotidien. Une fois que nous élargissons notre conception de la citoyenneté pour inclure une compréhension plus riche des bases des relations civiques, il devient évident que les animaux domestiques et les humains peuvent être les co-créateurs d’un monde moral et politique commun. Nous n’avons rien à craindre, et beaucoup à gagner, à les accueillir comme membres du dèmos.Many commentators—including some animal rights theorists—have argued that non- human animals cannot be seen as members of the demos because they lack the critical capacities for self-rule and moral agency which are required for citizenship. We argue that this worry is based on mistaken ideas about both citizenship, on the one hand, and animals, on the other. Citizenship requires self-restraint and responsiveness to shared norms, but these capacities should not be understood in an unduly intellectualized or idealized way. Recent studies of moral behaviour show that civil relations between citizens are largely grounded, not in rational reflection and assent to moral propositions but in intuitive, unreflective and habituated behaviours which are themselves rooted in a range of pro-social emotions (empathy, love) and dispositions (co-operation, altruism, reciprocity, conflict resolution). Fifty years of ethological research have demonstrated that many social animals—particularly domesticated animals—share the sorts of dispositions and capacities underlying everyday civility. Once we broaden our conception of citizenship to include a richer account of the bases of civic relations, it becomes clear that domesticated animals and humans can be co-creators of a shared moral and political world. We have nothing to fear, and much to gain, by welcoming their membership in the demos

Uptake of silicon in barley under contrasting drought regimes

Purpose: Silicon (Si) accumulation in plant tissues plays a vital role in alleviating biotic and abiotic stresses, including drought. Temperate regions are predicted to experience reductions in the quantity and frequency of rainfall events, potentially impacting plant Si uptake via the transpiration stream. Despite the importance for predicting plant responses to Si amendments, the effects of changes in rainfall patterns on Si uptake in cereals have not been characterised. Methods: Five watering regimes were applied based on predicted precipitation scenarios, varying the quantity of water delivered (ambient, 40% or 60% reduction) and watering frequency (40% reduction in quantity, applied 50% or 25% of ambient frequency), and the effects on growth and leaf Si concentrations of a barley landrace and cultivar were determined. Results: Reductions in the quantity of water reduced plant growth and yield, whereas reducing the watering frequency had little impact on growth, and in some cases partially ameliorated the negative effects of drought. Reductions in quantity of water lowered leaf Si concentrations in both the cultivar and landrace, although this effect was alleviated under the drought/deluge watering regime. The landrace had greater leaf Si concentration than the cultivar regardless of watering regime, and under ambient watering deposited Si in all cells between trichomes, whereas the cultivar exhibited gaps in Si deposition. Conclusion: The impact of future reductions in rainfall on barley productivity will depend upon how the water is delivered, with drought/deluge events likely to have smaller effects on yield and on Si uptake than continuous drought

Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers' Brief

In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York (Barlow, 2017). Under animal welfare laws, Tommy’s owners, the Laverys, were doing nothing illegal by keeping him in those conditions. Nonetheless, the NhRP argued that given the cognitive, social, and emotional capacities of chimpanzees, Tommy’s confinement constituted a profound wrong that demanded remedy by the courts. Soon thereafter, the NhRP filed habeas corpus petitions on behalf of Kiko, another chimpanzee housed alone in Niagara Falls, and Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees held in research facilities at Stony Brook University. Thus began the legal struggle to move these chimpanzees from captivity to a sanctuary, an effort that has led the NhRP to argue in multiple courts before multiple judges. The central point of contention has been whether Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo have legal rights. To date, no judge has been willing to issue a writ of habeas corpus on their behalf. Such a ruling would mean that these chimpanzees have rights that confinement might violate. Instead, the judges have argued that chimpanzees cannot be bearers of legal rights because they are not, and cannot be persons. In this book we argue that chimpanzees are persons because they are autonomous

A Sustainable Campus: The Sydney Declaration on Interspecies Sustainability

Under the remit of an expanded definition of sustainability – one that acknowledges animal agriculture as a key carbon intensive industry, and one that includes interspecies ethics as an integral part of social justice – institutions such as Universities can and should play a role in supporting a wider agenda for sustainable food practices on campus. By drawing out clear connections between sustainability objectives on campus and the shift away from animal based products, the objective of this article is to advocate for a more consistent understanding and implementation of sustainability measures as championed by university campuses at large. We will draw out clear connections between sustainability objectives on campus and the shift away from animal based products. Overall, our arguments are contextualised within broader debates on the relationship between sustainability, social justice and interspecies ethics. We envisage that such discussion will contribute to an enriched, more robust sense of sustainability—one in which food justice refers not only to justice for human consumers and producers of food and the land used by them, but also to justice for the nonhuman animals considered as potential sources of food themselves