535 research outputs found
Chaos and unpredictability in evolutionary dynamics in discrete time
A discrete-time version of the replicator equation for two-strategy games is
studied. The stationary properties differ from that of continuous time for
sufficiently large values of the parameters, where periodic and chaotic
behavior replace the usual fixed-point population solutions. We observe the
familiar period-doubling and chaotic-band-splitting attractor cascades of
unimodal maps but in some cases more elaborate variations appear due to
bimodality. Also unphysical stationary solutions have unusual physical
implications, such as uncertainty of final population caused by sensitivity to
initial conditions and fractality of attractor preimage manifolds.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure
Evolution of signalling systems with multiple senders and receivers
Sender–receiver games are simple, tractable models of information transmission. They provide a basic setting for the study the evolution of meaning. It is possible to investigate not only the equilibrium structure of these games but also the dynamics of evolution and learning—with sometimes surprising results. Generalizations of the usual binary game to interactions with multiple senders, multiple receivers or both provide the elements of signalling networks. These can be seen as the loci of information processing, group decisions, and teamwork
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Newman-Watts networks
Maintenance of cooperation was studied for a two-strategy evolutionary
Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players are located on a one-dimensional
chain and their payoff comes from games with the nearest and next-nearest
neighbor interactions. The applied host geometry makes possible to study the
impacts of two conflicting topological features. The evolutionary rule involves
some noise affecting the strategy adoptions between the interacting players.
Using Monte Carlo simulations and the extended versions of dynamical mean-field
theory we determined the phase diagram as a function of noise level and a
payoff parameter. The peculiar feature of the diagram is changed significantly
when the connectivity structure is extended by extra links as suggested by
Newman and Watts.Comment: 4 figure
Bayesian Conditioning, the Reflection Principle, and Quantum Decoherence
The probabilities a Bayesian agent assigns to a set of events typically
change with time, for instance when the agent updates them in the light of new
data. In this paper we address the question of how an agent's probabilities at
different times are constrained by Dutch-book coherence. We review and attempt
to clarify the argument that, although an agent is not forced by coherence to
use the usual Bayesian conditioning rule to update his probabilities, coherence
does require the agent's probabilities to satisfy van Fraassen's [1984]
reflection principle (which entails a related constraint pointed out by
Goldstein [1983]). We then exhibit the specialized assumption needed to recover
Bayesian conditioning from an analogous reflection-style consideration.
Bringing the argument to the context of quantum measurement theory, we show
that "quantum decoherence" can be understood in purely personalist
terms---quantum decoherence (as supposed in a von Neumann chain) is not a
physical process at all, but an application of the reflection principle. From
this point of view, the decoherence theory of Zeh, Zurek, and others as a story
of quantum measurement has the plot turned exactly backward.Comment: 14 pages, written in memory of Itamar Pitowsk
Evolution of Cooperation and Coordination in a Dynamically Networked Society
Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in
society and game theory is one major way in which they can be investigated.
Starting from the observation that individuals in society interact through
networks of acquaintances, we model the co-evolution of the agents' strategies
and of the social network itself using two prototypical games, the Prisoner's
Dilemma and the Stag Hunt. Allowing agents to dismiss ties and establish new
ones, we find that cooperation and coordination can be achieved through the
self-organization of the social network, a result that is non-trivial,
especially in the Prisoner's Dilemma case. The evolution and stability of
cooperation implies the condensation of agents exploiting particular game
strategies into strong and stable clusters which are more densely connected,
even in the more difficult case of the Prisoner's Dilemma.Comment: 18 pages, 14 figures. to appea
Indirect reciprocity and the evolution of “moral signals”
Signals regarding the behavior of others are an essential element of human moral systems and there are important evolutionary connections between language and large-scale cooperation. In particular, social communication may be required for the reputation tracking needed to stabilize indirect reciprocity. Additionally, scholars have suggested that the benefits of indirect reciprocity may have been important for the evolution of language and that social signals may have coevolved with large-scale cooperation. This paper investigates the possibility of such a coevolution. Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, we present a model that incorporates primitive “moral signaling” into a simple setting of indirect reciprocity. This model reveals some potential difficulties for the evolution of “moral signals.” We find that it is possible for “moral signals” to evolve alongside indirect reciprocity, but without some external pressure aiding the evolution of a signaling system, such a coevolution is unlikely
Evolution of Coordination in Social Networks: A Numerical Study
Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social
behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on
networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local
network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pure and
general coordination games and may explain social polarization. These results
are put into perspective with respect to known theoretical results. The main
insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in
social networks has a positive role in promoting socially efficient outcomes.Comment: preprint submitted to IJMP
Sequential Extensions of Causal and Evidential Decision Theory
Moving beyond the dualistic view in AI where agent and environment are
separated incurs new challenges for decision making, as calculation of expected
utility is no longer straightforward. The non-dualistic decision theory
literature is split between causal decision theory and evidential decision
theory. We extend these decision algorithms to the sequential setting where the
agent alternates between taking actions and observing their consequences. We
find that evidential decision theory has two natural extensions while causal
decision theory only has one.Comment: ADT 201
Universality of weak selection
Weak selection, which means a phenotype is slightly advantageous over
another, is an important limiting case in evolutionary biology. Recently it has
been introduced into evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary game dynamics,
the probability to be imitated or to reproduce depends on the performance in a
game. The influence of the game on the stochastic dynamics in finite
populations is governed by the intensity of selection. In many models of both
unstructured and structured populations, a key assumption allowing analytical
calculations is weak selection, which means that all individuals perform
approximately equally well. In the weak selection limit many different
microscopic evolutionary models have the same or similar properties. How
universal is weak selection for those microscopic evolutionary processes? We
answer this question by investigating the fixation probability and the average
fixation time not only up to linear, but also up to higher orders in selection
intensity. We find universal higher order expansions, which allow a rescaling
of the selection intensity. With this, we can identify specific models which
violate (linear) weak selection results, such as the one--third rule of
coordination games in finite but large populations.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures, accepted for publication in Physical Review
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