Memories of Gukurahundi massacre and the challenge of reconciliation

When Zimbabwe attained her independence from colonial powers in 1980, prospects of a peaceful nation were high, especially following the pledge made by the Prime Minister Elect in his victory speech. Isaiah 2:4b was quoted as a metaphor of peace, but things did not turn out as expected in the following years. The vicious cycle of violence that was inherited from the colonial legacy continued and the worse phase of that cycle was the Midlands and Matabeleland crisis, commonly known as Gukurahundi. Approximately 20 000 people died in the state-sanctioned violence (genocide). Using Cue-Dependent Forgetting Theory, this paper critically appraises possible reasons why the promised bliss through reconciliation did not materialise. Among the reasons cited in this paper are the lack of a serious Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and also the phenomenon of amnesia as the major contributory factors to this cycle of violence.https://www.upjournals.co.za/index.php/SHE/indexpm2020New Testament Studie

An exegesis of the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:25–35) and its relevance to the challenges caused by COVID-19

The article is on the exegesis of the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:25–35) and its relevance to the challenges that are being posed by COVID-19. Through the historicalcritical approach, the article has concluded that the parable is relevant in troubleshooting the challenges that are caused by COVID-19, such as discrimination, stigma, hate and stereotypes. The article sees COVID-19 as teaching humanity the important lesson that no one can live in isolation, however powerful or economically strong they are. Therefore, there is a need to take the opportunity of being a neighbour. Neighbourhood is understood as offering services to those in need and COVID-19 has presented a chance to the entire world to help someone with needs. A need-based world requires neighbours and this makes the parable relevant. Contribution: This article is a reflection of the challenges that are currently faced by people in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It is within the scope of this theological journal that issues of identity, relationships, and theological reflection should be addressed, hence the article fits well within this scope.http://www.hts.org.zapm2021New Testament Studie

The nature and ethics of indifference

Indifference is sometimes said to be a virtue. Perhaps more frequently it is said to be a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper presents a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant forms of indifference in terms of how subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in different circumstances; and how an indifferent orientation can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of its object. The resulting analysis is located in a wider context of moral psychology and ethical theory; in particular with respect to work on the virtues of care, empathy and other forms of affective engagement. During the course of this discussion, a number of recent claims associated with the ethics of care and empathy are shown to be either misleading or implausible

Foucault, normativity and critique as a practice of the self

In this paper I distinguish between two main critical questions: ?how possible? questions, which look for enabling conditions (empirical or transcendental) and raise issues of epistemic normativity; and ?whether permissible? questions, which relate to conditions of legitimacy and ethical normativity. I examine the interplay of both types of questions in Foucault?s work and argue that this helps us to understand both the function of the historical a priori in the archeological period and the subsequent accusations of crypto-normativity levelled against Foucault by commentators such as Taylor and Habermas. I chart the complex conceptual space available for a defense. After examining several possible replies (in particular deflationary and constructivist), I conclude that the most effective option, and the one that fits Foucault?s approach best, is to refuse the demand for normative justification as self-defeating, and to opt for the cultivation of an appropriate ethical sensibility through an emphasis on critique as a performative practice of the self. I offer in conclusion some thoughts on what such practice may look like for Foucault

Fl. Vegetii Renati De re militari libri quatuor

Flavii Vegetii... "De re militari" hasta p. 182 ; Sexti Iulii... "Strategematum" hasta p. 243 ; Aeliani "De instruendis aciebus" hasta p. 273 ; Modesti "Libellus de vocabulis rei militaris" hasta p. 279Copia digital. Madrid : Ministerio de Cultura. Subdirección General de Coordinación Bibliotecaria, 2009Marca de imp. en p. [280]Sign.: a\p4\s, A-Y\p6\s, Z\p8\sTexto con apostillas marginalesPort. con grabs. xilLas il. son grabs. xi

Applying Recent Argumentation Methods to Some Ancient Examples of Plausible Reasoning

Plausible (eikotic) reasoning known from ancient Greek (late Academic) skeptical philosophy is shown to be a clear notion that can be analyzed by argu- mentation methods, and that is important for argumentation studies. It is shown how there is a continuous thread running from the Sophists to the skeptical philosopher Carneades, through remarks of Locke and Bentham on the subject, to recent research in artificial intelligence. Eleven characteristics of plausible reasoning are specified by analyzing key examples of it recognized as important in ancient Greek skeptical philosophy using an artificial intelligence model called the Carneades Argumentation System (CAS). By applying CAS to ancient examples it is shown how plausible reasoning is especially useful for gaining a better understanding of evidential reasoning in law, and argued that it can also be applied to everyday argumentation. Our analysis of the snake and rope example of Carneades is also used to point out some ways CAS needs to be extended if it is to more fully model the views of this ancient philosopher on argumentation

Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias

Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e., that something is not the case) than when it is positive (i.e., that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psycholog

Science, institutions, and values

This paper articulates and defends three interconnected claims: firstly, that the debate on the role of values for science misses a crucial dimension, the institutional one; secondly, that institutions occupy the intermediate level between scientific activities and values and that they are to be systematically integrated into the analysis; thirdly, that the appraisal of the institutions of science with respect to values should be undertaken within the premises of a comparative approach rather than an ideal approach. Hence, I defend the view that the issue be framed in reference to the following question: “What kind of institutional rules should be in place in order for the scientific process to unfold in such a way that the values that we deem more important come to the fore?” Addressing this concern is equivalent to conducting a debate on institutions and their role for science